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...ought comprehend it, so as to utter a word about it? If no one asks me, I know: if I wish to explain it to one who asketh, I know not. Saint Augustine, Confessions, Book 11 How long will it take you to read this chapter? The objective time, as measured by the clock, might depend on whether you’re scrutinizing every detail, or just skimming to get the main ideas. The subjective time might vary according to physiological factors like your pulse and body temperature (Cohen, 1967; Ornstein, 1969), psychological factors like how much the text engages your interest and attention (Glicksohn, 2001; 3 James, 1890; Zakay & Block, 1997), and some surprising environmental factors like the size of the room you’re sitting in (DeLong, 1981). Although subjective duration is among the earliest topics investigated by experimental psychologists (Mach, 1886), the cognitive sciences have yet to produce a comprehensive theory of how people track the passage of time, or even to agree on a set of principles that consistently govern people’s duration estimates. A excerpt from a review by Zakay and Block (1997) illustrates the current state of confusion: People may estimate filled durations as being longer than empty ...

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...ng that were consistent with linguistic metaphors only because they were required to process space or time in language. Would the same relations between representations of space and time be found if participants were tested on nonlinguistic tasks? The fact that people communicate via language replete with anaphora, ambiguity, metonymy, sarcasm, and deixis seems proof that what we say provides only a thumbnail sketch of what we think. Most theorists posit at least some independence between semantic representations and underlying conceptual representations (Jackendoff, 1972; Katz & Fodor, 1963; Levelt, 1989; cf., Fodor, 1975). Even those who posit a single, shared ‘level’ of representation for linguistic meaning and nonlinguistic concepts allow that semantic structures must constitute only a subset of conceptual structures (Chomsky, 1975; Jackendoff, 1983). Because we may think differently when we’re using language and when we’re not, well-founded doubts persist about how deeply patterns in language truly reflect – and shape – our nonlinguistic thought. According to linguist Dan Slobin (1996): Any utterance is a selective schematization of a concept – a schematization that is in some ways depend...

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... compose symphonies, invent calculus, or imagine time travel? How did foragers become physicists in an eyeblink of evolutionary time? The human capacity for abstract thought seems to far exceed what could have benefited our predecessors, yet natural selection can only effect changes that are immediately useful. The apparent evolutionary uselessness of human intelligence drove Alfred Wallace, Darwin’s co-founder of the theory of evolution by natural selection, to abandon their theory and invoke creationism to explain our capacity for abstract thought (Darwin, 1859/1998, 1874/1998; Gould, 1980; Pinker, 1997; Wallace, 1870/2003).2 Darwin’s own formulation of evolutionary theory points toward an elegant potential solution to Wallace’s dilemma: sometimes organisms recycle old structures for new uses. An organ built via selection for a specific role may be fortuitously suited to perform other unselected roles, as well. For example, the fossil record suggests that feathers were not originally ‘designed’ for flying. Rather, they evolved to regulate body temperature in small running dinosaurs, and were only later co-opted for flight (Gould, 1991). The process of adapting existing structures for new fun...

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... not be sensible to say that “the cat sat on the price / debate / issue / limit / appearance.” This test is similar to a test of sensible predicates for concrete vs. abstract entities devised by Fred Sommer (1963; cf., Turner, 2005). Based on examples like these, linguists have argued that people create abstract domains by importing structure from concepts grounded in physical experience. Although anticipated by others (e.g., Lafargue, 1898/1906), this idea appears to have been first articulated as the Thematic Relations Hypothesis (TRH) in 1965, by Jeffery Gruber. TRH was later elaborated by Jackendoff (1972; 1983) who wrote: The psychological claim behind [Gruber’s linguistic discovery] is that the mind does not manufacture abstract concepts out of thin air…it adapts machinery that is already there, both in the development of the individual organism and in the evolutionary development of the species. (1983, pg. 188-9) Not all theorists agree on the significance of metaphorical language for theories of mental representation. Gregory Murphy (1996; 1997) raised concerns about both the vagueness of the psychological processes suggested by linguists and about the limitations of purely linguistic evid...

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...rations and displacements were fully crossed, so there was no correlation between the spatial and temporal components of the stimuli. As such, one stimulus dimension served as a distractor for the other: an irrelevant piece of information that could potentially interfere with task performance. Patterns of crossdimensional interference were analyzed to reveal relationships between spatial and temporal representations.3 Broadly speaking, there are three possible relationships between people’s mental representations of space and time. First, the two domains could be symmetrically dependent. John Locke (1689/1995) argued that space and time are mutually inextricable in our minds, concluding that, “expansion and duration do mutually embrace and comprehend each other; every part of space being in every part of duration, and every part of duration in every part of expansion” (p. 140). Alternatively, our ideas of space and time could be independent. Any apparent relatedness could be due to structural similarities between essentially unrelated domains (Murphy, 1996, 1997). A third possibility is that time and space could be asymmetrically dependent. Representations in one domain could be parasitic on ...

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...) What makes time perception so difficult to understand? Ornstein (1969) argues that although we experience the passage of time, the idea that time can be perceived through the senses is misleading (cf. Evans, 2004): One major reason for the continuing scattering of [researchers’] effort has been that time is treated as if it were a sensory process. If time were a sensory process like vision…we would have an ‘organ’ of time experience such as the eye. (pg. 34) Although time is not something we can see or touch, we often talk about it as if it were (Boroditsky, 2000; Clark, 1973; Gruber, 1965; Jackendoff, 1983; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). Consider the following pair of sentences: i. They moved the truck forward two meters. ii. They moved the meeting forward two hours. The truck in sentence i. is a physical object which can move forward through space, and whose motion we might see, hear, or feel, from the staring point to the ending point. By contrast, there is no literal motion described in sentence ii. The meeting is not translated through space, and there is no way to experience its ‘movement’ through time via the senses. Events that occur in time are more abstract than objects that exist in space i...

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...eferences to the physical world were bleached out. The circuits could serve as a scaffolding whose slots are filled with symbols for more abstract concerns like states, possessions, ideas, and desires. (pg. 355) As evidence that abstract domains arose from circuits designed for reasoning about the physical world, Pinker appeals to patterns observed in language. Many linguists have noted that when people talk about states, possessions, ideas, and desires, they do so by co-opting the language of intuitive physics (Clark, 1973, Gibbs, 1994; Gruber, 1965; Jackendoff, 1983; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Langacker, 1987; Talmy, 1988). In particular, words borrowed from physical domains of space, force, and motion, give rise to metaphors for countless abstract ideas. 1l a high shelf 1m a high price 2l a big building 2m a big debate 3l forcing the door 3m forcing the issue 4l pushing the button 4m pushing the limit 5l keeping the roof up 5m keeping appearances up 5 For each pair above, sentence l illustrates a literal use and sentence m a metaphorical use of the italicized words. The concrete objects described in the literal sentences (e.g., shelf, building, door, button, roof) belong to a different ontologica...

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... and temporal thinking that were consistent with linguistic metaphors only because they were required to process space or time in language. Would the same relations between representations of space and time be found if participants were tested on nonlinguistic tasks? The fact that people communicate via language replete with anaphora, ambiguity, metonymy, sarcasm, and deixis seems proof that what we say provides only a thumbnail sketch of what we think. Most theorists posit at least some independence between semantic representations and underlying conceptual representations (Jackendoff, 1972; Katz & Fodor, 1963; Levelt, 1989; cf., Fodor, 1975). Even those who posit a single, shared ‘level’ of representation for linguistic meaning and nonlinguistic concepts allow that semantic structures must constitute only a subset of conceptual structures (Chomsky, 1975; Jackendoff, 1983). Because we may think differently when we’re using language and when we’re not, well-founded doubts persist about how deeply patterns in language truly reflect – and shape – our nonlinguistic thought. According to linguist Dan Slobin (1996): Any utterance is a selective schematization of a concept – a schematization that is in so...

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..., the copies’ connections to the eyes and muscles were severed, and references to the physical world were bleached out. The circuits could serve as a scaffolding whose slots are filled with symbols for more abstract concerns like states, possessions, ideas, and desires. (pg. 355) As evidence that abstract domains arose from circuits designed for reasoning about the physical world, Pinker appeals to patterns observed in language. Many linguists have noted that when people talk about states, possessions, ideas, and desires, they do so by co-opting the language of intuitive physics (Clark, 1973, Gibbs, 1994; Gruber, 1965; Jackendoff, 1983; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Langacker, 1987; Talmy, 1988). In particular, words borrowed from physical domains of space, force, and motion, give rise to metaphors for countless abstract ideas. 1l a high shelf 1m a high price 2l a big building 2m a big debate 3l forcing the door 3m forcing the issue 4l pushing the button 4m pushing the limit 5l keeping the roof up 5m keeping appearances up 5 For each pair above, sentence l illustrates a literal use and sentence m a metaphorical use of the italicized words. The concrete objects described in the literal sentences (e....

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...physical world were bleached out. The circuits could serve as a scaffolding whose slots are filled with symbols for more abstract concerns like states, possessions, ideas, and desires. (pg. 355) As evidence that abstract domains arose from circuits designed for reasoning about the physical world, Pinker appeals to patterns observed in language. Many linguists have noted that when people talk about states, possessions, ideas, and desires, they do so by co-opting the language of intuitive physics (Clark, 1973, Gibbs, 1994; Gruber, 1965; Jackendoff, 1983; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Langacker, 1987; Talmy, 1988). In particular, words borrowed from physical domains of space, force, and motion, give rise to metaphors for countless abstract ideas. 1l a high shelf 1m a high price 2l a big building 2m a big debate 3l forcing the door 3m forcing the issue 4l pushing the button 4m pushing the limit 5l keeping the roof up 5m keeping appearances up 5 For each pair above, sentence l illustrates a literal use and sentence m a metaphorical use of the italicized words. The concrete objects described in the literal sentences (e.g., shelf, building, door, button, roof) belong to a different ontological category tha...

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...semantic representations and underlying conceptual representations (Jackendoff, 1972; Katz & Fodor, 1963; Levelt, 1989; cf., Fodor, 1975). Even those who posit a single, shared ‘level’ of representation for linguistic meaning and nonlinguistic concepts allow that semantic structures must constitute only a subset of conceptual structures (Chomsky, 1975; Jackendoff, 1983). Because we may think differently when we’re using language and when we’re not, well-founded doubts persist about how deeply patterns in language truly reflect – and shape – our nonlinguistic thought. According to linguist Dan Slobin (1996): Any utterance is a selective schematization of a concept – a schematization that is in some ways dependent on the grammaticized meanings of the 7 speaker’s particular language, recruited for the purposes of verbal expression. (pg. 75-76) Slobin argues that when people are “thinking for speaking” (and presumably for reading or listening to speech), their thoughts are structured, in part, according to their language and its peculiarities. Consequently, speakers of different languages may think differently when they are using language. But how about when people are not thinking for speaking? Ev...

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...perception so difficult to understand? Ornstein (1969) argues that although we experience the passage of time, the idea that time can be perceived through the senses is misleading (cf. Evans, 2004): One major reason for the continuing scattering of [researchers’] effort has been that time is treated as if it were a sensory process. If time were a sensory process like vision…we would have an ‘organ’ of time experience such as the eye. (pg. 34) Although time is not something we can see or touch, we often talk about it as if it were (Boroditsky, 2000; Clark, 1973; Gruber, 1965; Jackendoff, 1983; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). Consider the following pair of sentences: i. They moved the truck forward two meters. ii. They moved the meeting forward two hours. The truck in sentence i. is a physical object which can move forward through space, and whose motion we might see, hear, or feel, from the staring point to the ending point. By contrast, there is no literal motion described in sentence ii. The meeting is not translated through space, and there is no way to experience its ‘movement’ through time via the senses. Events that occur in time are more abstract than objects that exist in space insomuch as we typically h...

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...xperiments unequivocally support the hypothesis that people incorporate spatial information into their time judgments more than they incorporate temporal information into their spatial judgments. These findings converge with those of Cantor & Thomas (1977), who showed that spatial information influences temporal judgments but not vice versa for very briefly presented stimuli (30-70 msecs). Previous behavioral tests of Conceptual Metaphor Theory have used linguistic stimuli (Boroditsky, 2000, 2001; Boroditsky & Ramscar, 2002; Gibbs, 1994; Meier & Robinson, 2004; Meier, Robinson, & Clore, 2004; Richardson, Spivey, Barsalou, & McRae, 2003; Schubert, 2005; Torralbo, Santiago, & Lupiáñez, 2006). While these studies support the psychological reality of Conceptual Metaphor, they leave open the possibility that people only think about abstract domains like time metaphorically when they are using language (i.e., when they are thinking for speaking (E. Clark, 2003; Slobin, 1996)). Experiments described above used nonlinguistic stimuli and responses, and demonstrated that even our low-level perceptuo-motor representations in the domains of space and time are related as predicted by linguistic metaphors. Over the past century of psycho...

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...is that people incorporate spatial information into their time judgments more than they incorporate temporal information into their spatial judgments. These findings converge with those of Cantor & Thomas (1977), who showed that spatial information influences temporal judgments but not vice versa for very briefly presented stimuli (30-70 msecs). Previous behavioral tests of Conceptual Metaphor Theory have used linguistic stimuli (Boroditsky, 2000, 2001; Boroditsky & Ramscar, 2002; Gibbs, 1994; Meier & Robinson, 2004; Meier, Robinson, & Clore, 2004; Richardson, Spivey, Barsalou, & McRae, 2003; Schubert, 2005; Torralbo, Santiago, & Lupiáñez, 2006). While these studies support the psychological reality of Conceptual Metaphor, they leave open the possibility that people only think about abstract domains like time metaphorically when they are using language (i.e., when they are thinking for speaking (E. Clark, 2003; Slobin, 1996)). Experiments described above used nonlinguistic stimuli and responses, and demonstrated that even our low-level perceptuo-motor representations in the domains of space and time are related as predicted by linguistic metaphors. Over the past century of psychophysical experim...

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...; Ornstein, 1969), psychological factors like how much the text engages your interest and attention (Glicksohn, 2001; 3 James, 1890; Zakay & Block, 1997), and some surprising environmental factors like the size of the room you’re sitting in (DeLong, 1981). Although subjective duration is among the earliest topics investigated by experimental psychologists (Mach, 1886), the cognitive sciences have yet to produce a comprehensive theory of how people track the passage of time, or even to agree on a set of principles that consistently govern people’s duration estimates. A excerpt from a review by Zakay and Block (1997) illustrates the current state of confusion: People may estimate filled durations as being longer than empty durations, but sometimes the reverse is found. Duration judgments tend to be shorter if a more difficult task is performed than if an easier task is performed, but again the opposite has also been reported. People usually make longer duration estimates for complex than for simple stimuli, although some researchers have found the opposite. (pg. 12) What makes time perception so difficult to understand? Ornstein (1969) argues that although we experience the passage of time, the idea that ...

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... action. 1.1 Time as an abstract domain For what is time? Who can readily and briefly explain this? Who can even in thought comprehend it, so as to utter a word about it? If no one asks me, I know: if I wish to explain it to one who asketh, I know not. Saint Augustine, Confessions, Book 11 How long will it take you to read this chapter? The objective time, as measured by the clock, might depend on whether you’re scrutinizing every detail, or just skimming to get the main ideas. The subjective time might vary according to physiological factors like your pulse and body temperature (Cohen, 1967; Ornstein, 1969), psychological factors like how much the text engages your interest and attention (Glicksohn, 2001; 3 James, 1890; Zakay & Block, 1997), and some surprising environmental factors like the size of the room you’re sitting in (DeLong, 1981). Although subjective duration is among the earliest topics investigated by experimental psychologists (Mach, 1886), the cognitive sciences have yet to produce a comprehensive theory of how people track the passage of time, or even to agree on a set of principles that consistently govern people’s duration estimates. A excerpt from a review by Zakay and Block (...

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...osite. (pg. 12) What makes time perception so difficult to understand? Ornstein (1969) argues that although we experience the passage of time, the idea that time can be perceived through the senses is misleading (cf. Evans, 2004): One major reason for the continuing scattering of [researchers’] effort has been that time is treated as if it were a sensory process. If time were a sensory process like vision…we would have an ‘organ’ of time experience such as the eye. (pg. 34) Although time is not something we can see or touch, we often talk about it as if it were (Boroditsky, 2000; Clark, 1973; Gruber, 1965; Jackendoff, 1983; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). Consider the following pair of sentences: i. They moved the truck forward two meters. ii. They moved the meeting forward two hours. The truck in sentence i. is a physical object which can move forward through space, and whose motion we might see, hear, or feel, from the staring point to the ending point. By contrast, there is no literal motion described in sentence ii. The meeting is not translated through space, and there is no way to experience its ‘movement’ through time via the senses. Events that occur in time are more abstract than objects tha...

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..., this idea appears to have been first articulated as the Thematic Relations Hypothesis (TRH) in 1965, by Jeffery Gruber. TRH was later elaborated by Jackendoff (1972; 1983) who wrote: The psychological claim behind [Gruber’s linguistic discovery] is that the mind does not manufacture abstract concepts out of thin air…it adapts machinery that is already there, both in the development of the individual organism and in the evolutionary development of the species. (1983, pg. 188-9) Not all theorists agree on the significance of metaphorical language for theories of mental representation. Gregory Murphy (1996; 1997) raised concerns about both the vagueness of the psychological processes suggested by linguists and about the limitations of purely linguistic evidence for metaphorical conceptual structure. Murphy (1996) proposed that linguistic metaphors may merely reveal structural similarities between mental domains: not causal relationships. He argued that in the absence of corroborating nonlinguistic evidence, his Structural Similarity proposal should be preferred on grounds of simplicity: his view posits that all concepts are represented independently, on their own terms, whereas the metaphoric a...

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...otion. [INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] Results of all six experiments unequivocally support the hypothesis that people incorporate spatial information into their time judgments more than they incorporate temporal information into their spatial judgments. These findings converge with those of Cantor & Thomas (1977), who showed that spatial information influences temporal judgments but not vice versa for very briefly presented stimuli (30-70 msecs). Previous behavioral tests of Conceptual Metaphor Theory have used linguistic stimuli (Boroditsky, 2000, 2001; Boroditsky & Ramscar, 2002; Gibbs, 1994; Meier & Robinson, 2004; Meier, Robinson, & Clore, 2004; Richardson, Spivey, Barsalou, & McRae, 2003; Schubert, 2005; Torralbo, Santiago, & Lupiáñez, 2006). While these studies support the psychological reality of Conceptual Metaphor, they leave open the possibility that people only think about abstract domains like time metaphorically when they are using language (i.e., when they are thinking for speaking (E. Clark, 2003; Slobin, 1996)). Experiments described above used nonlinguistic stimuli and responses, and demonstrated that even our low-level perceptuo-motor representations in the domains of space and time are ...

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...ed more recently by Pinker (1994) and by Lila Gleitman and colleagues (Papafragou, Massey, & Gleitman, 2002; Snedeker & Gleitman, 2004). The Shallow View proposed here can be considered a variety of the universalist view that can plausibly be maintained despite recent psycholinguistic evidence supporting the Whorfian hypothesis (e.g., Boroditsky, 2001). Skepticism about some Whorfian claims has been well founded (see Pinker, 1994, ch. 3, for a review of evidence against the Whorfian hypothesis). A notorious fallacy, attributable in part to Whorf, illustrates the need for methodological rigor. Whorf (1939/2000) argued that Eskimos must conceive of snow differently than English speakers because the Eskimo lexicon contains multiple words that distinguish different types of snow, whereas English has only one word to describe all types. The exact number of snow words the Eskimos were purported to have is not clear. This number has now been inflated by the popular press to as many as four-hundred. According to a Western Greenlandic Eskimo dictionary published in Whorf’s time, however, Eskimos may have had as few as two distinct words for snow (Pullum, 1991). Setting aside Whorf’s imprecision and th...

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...epts of ‘time,’ ‘space,’ and ‘matter’ given in substantially the same form by experience to all men, or are they in part conditioned by the structure of particular languages?” (1939/2000, pg. 138.) This Whorfian question remains the subject of renewed interest and debate. Does language shape thought? The answer yes would call for a reexamination of the ‘universalist’ assumption that has guided Cognitive Science for decades, according to which nonlinguistic concepts are formed independently of the words that name them, and are invariant across languages and cultures (Fodor, 1975; Pinker, 1994, Papafragou, Massey, & Gleitman, 2002). This position is often attributed to Chomsky (1975), but has been articulated more recently by Pinker (1994) and by Lila Gleitman and colleagues (Papafragou, Massey, & Gleitman, 2002; Snedeker & Gleitman, 2004). The Shallow View proposed here can be considered a variety of the universalist view that can plausibly be maintained despite recent psycholinguistic evidence supporting the Whorfian hypothesis (e.g., Boroditsky, 2001). Skepticism about some Whorfian claims has been well founded (see Pinker, 1994, ch. 3, for a review of evidence against the Whorfian hypothesis). A notorious fallacy, ...

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...mate filled durations as being longer than empty durations, but sometimes the reverse is found. Duration judgments tend to be shorter if a more difficult task is performed than if an easier task is performed, but again the opposite has also been reported. People usually make longer duration estimates for complex than for simple stimuli, although some researchers have found the opposite. (pg. 12) What makes time perception so difficult to understand? Ornstein (1969) argues that although we experience the passage of time, the idea that time can be perceived through the senses is misleading (cf. Evans, 2004): One major reason for the continuing scattering of [researchers’] effort has been that time is treated as if it were a sensory process. If time were a sensory process like vision…we would have an ‘organ’ of time experience such as the eye. (pg. 34) Although time is not something we can see or touch, we often talk about it as if it were (Boroditsky, 2000; Clark, 1973; Gruber, 1965; Jackendoff, 1983; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). Consider the following pair of sentences: i. They moved the truck forward two meters. ii. They moved the meeting forward two hours. The truck in sentence i. is a physical o...

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...ies if indeed Tau and Kappa effects reveal influences of imputed speed on time and space estimation, whereas the tasks described here test for interference between temporal and spatial information, per se. It is noteworthy that space influenced temporal judgments even for spatiotemporal stimuli that participants could experience directly. Growing lines are observable, and are arguably less abstract than entities like the ‘moving meeting’ described in section 1.1. Brief durations could, in principle, be mentally represented independently of space, by an interval-timer or pulse-accumulator (see Ivry & Richardson, 2002 for review), yet our data suggest that spatial representations are integral to the timing of even simple, observable events. Space may play an 12 indispensable role in forming more sophisticated and abstract temporal representations, such as very long intervals (e.g., the next millennium) and intervals that only exist in the past or the future (e.g., the 16th century), which we can never experience directly. Together, these experiments demonstrate that the metaphors we use can provide a window on the structure of our abstract concepts. They also raise a further question about relations betwee...

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...nextricable in our minds, concluding that, “expansion and duration do mutually embrace and comprehend each other; every part of space being in every part of duration, and every part of duration in every part of expansion” (p. 140). Alternatively, our ideas of space and time could be independent. Any apparent relatedness could be due to structural similarities between essentially unrelated domains (Murphy, 1996, 1997). A third possibility is that time and space could be asymmetrically dependent. Representations in one domain could be parasitic on representations in the other (Boroditsky, 2000; Gentner, 2001; Gibbs, 1994; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, 1999). These three possible relations between space and time predict three distinct patterns of cross-dimensional interference. If spatial and temporal representations are symmetrically dependent on one another, then any cross-dimensional interference should be approximately symmetric: line displacement should modulate estimates of line duration, and vice versa. Alternatively, if spatial and temporal representations are independent, there should be no significant cross-dimensional interference. However, if mental representations of time are asymmetrically...

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...ncorporate spatial information into their time judgments more than they incorporate temporal information into their spatial judgments. These findings converge with those of Cantor & Thomas (1977), who showed that spatial information influences temporal judgments but not vice versa for very briefly presented stimuli (30-70 msecs). Previous behavioral tests of Conceptual Metaphor Theory have used linguistic stimuli (Boroditsky, 2000, 2001; Boroditsky & Ramscar, 2002; Gibbs, 1994; Meier & Robinson, 2004; Meier, Robinson, & Clore, 2004; Richardson, Spivey, Barsalou, & McRae, 2003; Schubert, 2005; Torralbo, Santiago, & Lupiáñez, 2006). While these studies support the psychological reality of Conceptual Metaphor, they leave open the possibility that people only think about abstract domains like time metaphorically when they are using language (i.e., when they are thinking for speaking (E. Clark, 2003; Slobin, 1996)). Experiments described above used nonlinguistic stimuli and responses, and demonstrated that even our low-level perceptuo-motor representations in the domains of space and time are related as predicted by linguistic metaphors. Over the past century of psychophysical experimentation on space and time judgments, ...

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...ABOUT HERE] Results of all six experiments unequivocally support the hypothesis that people incorporate spatial information into their time judgments more than they incorporate temporal information into their spatial judgments. These findings converge with those of Cantor & Thomas (1977), who showed that spatial information influences temporal judgments but not vice versa for very briefly presented stimuli (30-70 msecs). Previous behavioral tests of Conceptual Metaphor Theory have used linguistic stimuli (Boroditsky, 2000, 2001; Boroditsky & Ramscar, 2002; Gibbs, 1994; Meier & Robinson, 2004; Meier, Robinson, & Clore, 2004; Richardson, Spivey, Barsalou, & McRae, 2003; Schubert, 2005; Torralbo, Santiago, & Lupiáñez, 2006). While these studies support the psychological reality of Conceptual Metaphor, they leave open the possibility that people only think about abstract domains like time metaphorically when they are using language (i.e., when they are thinking for speaking (E. Clark, 2003; Slobin, 1996)). Experiments described above used nonlinguistic stimuli and responses, and demonstrated that even our low-level perceptuo-motor representations in the domains of space and time are related as predicted by linguist...

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...taphorically when they are using language (i.e., when they are thinking for speaking (E. Clark, 2003; Slobin, 1996)). Experiments described above used nonlinguistic stimuli and responses, and demonstrated that even our low-level perceptuo-motor representations in the domains of space and time are related as predicted by linguistic metaphors. Over the past century of psychophysical experimentation on space and time judgments, two findings have emerged repeatedly: the Kappa effect and the Tau effect (Benussi, 1913; Bill & Teft, 1969; Cohen, 1967; Cohen, Hansel, & Sylvester, 1954; Collyer, 1977; Helson, 1930; Jones & Huang, 1982; Price-Williams, 1954; Sarrazin, Giraudo, Pailhous, & Bootsma, 2004). In a typical experiment, three light bulbs were arranged in a row and flashed in succession, forming two spatiotemporal intervals. Participants were asked to compare either the spatial or temporal extents of the two intervals. Often, time judgments were found to increase as a function of the spatial separation between stimuli (the Kappa effect), and distance judgments were found to increase as a function of the temporal separation between stimuli (the Tau effect). At first glance, these experiments appe...

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...olume metaphors in language, native English speakers’ performance on the Filling Tank task was statistically indistinguishable from the performance of the native Greek and Spanish speakers tested in Experiment 9. By encouraging the habitual use of either distance or volume metaphors, our natural linguistic environments may influence our everyday thinking about time in much the same way as this laboratory training task. These findings help to resolve apparent tensions between the proposal that perceptuo-motor image schemas underlie our abstract concepts and the notion of linguistic relativity. Johnson (2005) defines an image schema as “a dynamic recurring pattern of organism-environment interactions” (pg. 19). Presumably, people from all language communities inhabit the same physical world and interact with their environment using the same perceptuo-motor capacities, therefore the image schemas they develop should be universal. Yet, even if we all develop similar image schemas based on our physical experiences, Experiments 8-10 suggest the concepts that these image schemas undergird are not immutable. Duration can be understood both in terms of distance and in terms of volume. The extent to which...

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...ustrates the need for methodological rigor. Whorf (1939/2000) argued that Eskimos must conceive of snow differently than English speakers because the Eskimo lexicon contains multiple words that distinguish different types of snow, whereas English has only one word to describe all types. The exact number of snow words the Eskimos were purported to have is not clear. This number has now been inflated by the popular press to as many as four-hundred. According to a Western Greenlandic Eskimo dictionary published in Whorf’s time, however, Eskimos may have had as few as two distinct words for snow (Pullum, 1991). Setting aside Whorf’s imprecision and the media’s exaggeration, there remains a critical missing link between Whorf’s data and his conclusions: Whorf (like many researchers today) used purely linguistic data to support inferences about nonlinguistic mental representations. Steven Pinker illustrates the resulting circularity of Whorf’s claim in this parody of his logic: 13 [They] speak differently so they must think differently. How do we know that they think differently? Just listen to the way they speak! (Pinker, 1994, pg. 61). Such circularity would be escaped if nonlinguistic evidence cou...

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...onies, invent calculus, or imagine time travel? How did foragers become physicists in an eyeblink of evolutionary time? The human capacity for abstract thought seems to far exceed what could have benefited our predecessors, yet natural selection can only effect changes that are immediately useful. The apparent evolutionary uselessness of human intelligence drove Alfred Wallace, Darwin’s co-founder of the theory of evolution by natural selection, to abandon their theory and invoke creationism to explain our capacity for abstract thought (Darwin, 1859/1998, 1874/1998; Gould, 1980; Pinker, 1997; Wallace, 1870/2003).2 Darwin’s own formulation of evolutionary theory points toward an elegant potential solution to Wallace’s dilemma: sometimes organisms recycle old structures for new uses. An organ built via selection for a specific role may be fortuitously suited to perform other unselected roles, as well. For example, the fossil record suggests that feathers were not originally ‘designed’ for flying. Rather, they evolved to regulate body temperature in small running dinosaurs, and were only later co-opted for flight (Gould, 1991). The process of adapting existing structures for new functions, which D...

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...y are thinking for speaking (E. Clark, 2003; Slobin, 1996)). Experiments described above used nonlinguistic stimuli and responses, and demonstrated that even our low-level perceptuo-motor representations in the domains of space and time are related as predicted by linguistic metaphors. Over the past century of psychophysical experimentation on space and time judgments, two findings have emerged repeatedly: the Kappa effect and the Tau effect (Benussi, 1913; Bill & Teft, 1969; Cohen, 1967; Cohen, Hansel, & Sylvester, 1954; Collyer, 1977; Helson, 1930; Jones & Huang, 1982; Price-Williams, 1954; Sarrazin, Giraudo, Pailhous, & Bootsma, 2004). In a typical experiment, three light bulbs were arranged in a row and flashed in succession, forming two spatiotemporal intervals. Participants were asked to compare either the spatial or temporal extents of the two intervals. Often, time judgments were found to increase as a function of the spatial separation between stimuli (the Kappa effect), and distance judgments were found to increase as a function of the temporal separation between stimuli (the Tau effect). At first glance, these experiments appear similar to those we report here; the Kappa effect seems consistent with our results, b...

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... Who can even in thought comprehend it, so as to utter a word about it? If no one asks me, I know: if I wish to explain it to one who asketh, I know not. Saint Augustine, Confessions, Book 11 How long will it take you to read this chapter? The objective time, as measured by the clock, might depend on whether you’re scrutinizing every detail, or just skimming to get the main ideas. The subjective time might vary according to physiological factors like your pulse and body temperature (Cohen, 1967; Ornstein, 1969), psychological factors like how much the text engages your interest and attention (Glicksohn, 2001; 3 James, 1890; Zakay & Block, 1997), and some surprising environmental factors like the size of the room you’re sitting in (DeLong, 1981). Although subjective duration is among the earliest topics investigated by experimental psychologists (Mach, 1886), the cognitive sciences have yet to produce a comprehensive theory of how people track the passage of time, or even to agree on a set of principles that consistently govern people’s duration estimates. A excerpt from a review by Zakay and Block (1997) illustrates the current state of confusion: People may estimate filled durations as being lon...

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...s, but do they really think about them that way? 1.3 Evidence for Conceptual Metaphor The idea that conventionalized metaphors in language reveal the structure of abstract concepts is often associated with linguist George Lakoff and philosopher Mark Johnson, who described Conceptual Metaphor theory as one of “three major findings of cognitive science” (1999, pg. 3). Yet, this claim was supported almost entirely by linguistic evidence, supplemented by a computational model providing an in principle demonstration of how the meanings of some linguistic metaphors might be learned and represented (Narayanan, 1997). Despite the impressive body of linguistic theory and data that Lakoff & Johnson summarized, they offered little evidence that the importance of metaphor extends beyond language. Without nonlinguistic evidence for metaphorically structured mental representations, the idea that abstract thought is an exaptation from physical domains remained “just an avowal of faith” among scientists who believe that the mind must ultimately be explicable as a product of natural selection (Pinker, 1997, pg. 301). Boroditsky (2000) conducted some of the first behavioral tests of Conceptual Metaphor Theory. Her ...

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...nguage (i.e., when they are thinking for speaking (E. Clark, 2003; Slobin, 1996)). Experiments described above used nonlinguistic stimuli and responses, and demonstrated that even our low-level perceptuo-motor representations in the domains of space and time are related as predicted by linguistic metaphors. Over the past century of psychophysical experimentation on space and time judgments, two findings have emerged repeatedly: the Kappa effect and the Tau effect (Benussi, 1913; Bill & Teft, 1969; Cohen, 1967; Cohen, Hansel, & Sylvester, 1954; Collyer, 1977; Helson, 1930; Jones & Huang, 1982; Price-Williams, 1954; Sarrazin, Giraudo, Pailhous, & Bootsma, 2004). In a typical experiment, three light bulbs were arranged in a row and flashed in succession, forming two spatiotemporal intervals. Participants were asked to compare either the spatial or temporal extents of the two intervals. Often, time judgments were found to increase as a function of the spatial separation between stimuli (the Kappa effect), and distance judgments were found to increase as a function of the temporal separation between stimuli (the Tau effect). At first glance, these experiments appear similar to those we report here; the Kap...

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...tent with linguistic metaphors only because they were required to process space or time in language. Would the same relations between representations of space and time be found if participants were tested on nonlinguistic tasks? The fact that people communicate via language replete with anaphora, ambiguity, metonymy, sarcasm, and deixis seems proof that what we say provides only a thumbnail sketch of what we think. Most theorists posit at least some independence between semantic representations and underlying conceptual representations (Jackendoff, 1972; Katz & Fodor, 1963; Levelt, 1989; cf., Fodor, 1975). Even those who posit a single, shared ‘level’ of representation for linguistic meaning and nonlinguistic concepts allow that semantic structures must constitute only a subset of conceptual structures (Chomsky, 1975; Jackendoff, 1983). Because we may think differently when we’re using language and when we’re not, well-founded doubts persist about how deeply patterns in language truly reflect – and shape – our nonlinguistic thought. According to linguist Dan Slobin (1996): Any utterance is a selective schematization of a concept – a schematization that is in some ways dependent on the grammati...

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...ur ability to compose symphonies, invent calculus, or imagine time travel? How did foragers become physicists in an eyeblink of evolutionary time? The human capacity for abstract thought seems to far exceed what could have benefited our predecessors, yet natural selection can only effect changes that are immediately useful. The apparent evolutionary uselessness of human intelligence drove Alfred Wallace, Darwin’s co-founder of the theory of evolution by natural selection, to abandon their theory and invoke creationism to explain our capacity for abstract thought (Darwin, 1859/1998, 1874/1998; Gould, 1980; Pinker, 1997; Wallace, 1870/2003).2 Darwin’s own formulation of evolutionary theory points toward an elegant potential solution to Wallace’s dilemma: sometimes organisms recycle old structures for new uses. An organ built via selection for a specific role may be fortuitously suited to perform other unselected roles, as well. For example, the fossil record suggests that feathers were not originally ‘designed’ for flying. Rather, they evolved to regulate body temperature in small running dinosaurs, and were only later co-opted for flight (Gould, 1991). The process of adapting existing structur...

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...at physical relations they can sensibly be said to enter into. For example, it is sensible to say “the cat sat on the shelf / building / door / button / roof”, but it may not be sensible to say that “the cat sat on the price / debate / issue / limit / appearance.” This test is similar to a test of sensible predicates for concrete vs. abstract entities devised by Fred Sommer (1963; cf., Turner, 2005). Based on examples like these, linguists have argued that people create abstract domains by importing structure from concepts grounded in physical experience. Although anticipated by others (e.g., Lafargue, 1898/1906), this idea appears to have been first articulated as the Thematic Relations Hypothesis (TRH) in 1965, by Jeffery Gruber. TRH was later elaborated by Jackendoff (1972; 1983) who wrote: The psychological claim behind [Gruber’s linguistic discovery] is that the mind does not manufacture abstract concepts out of thin air…it adapts machinery that is already there, both in the development of the individual organism and in the evolutionary development of the species. (1983, pg. 188-9) Not all theorists agree on the significance of metaphorical language for theories of mental representation. Gr...

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...mains the subject of renewed interest and debate. Does language shape thought? The answer yes would call for a reexamination of the ‘universalist’ assumption that has guided Cognitive Science for decades, according to which nonlinguistic concepts are formed independently of the words that name them, and are invariant across languages and cultures (Fodor, 1975; Pinker, 1994, Papafragou, Massey, & Gleitman, 2002). This position is often attributed to Chomsky (1975), but has been articulated more recently by Pinker (1994) and by Lila Gleitman and colleagues (Papafragou, Massey, & Gleitman, 2002; Snedeker & Gleitman, 2004). The Shallow View proposed here can be considered a variety of the universalist view that can plausibly be maintained despite recent psycholinguistic evidence supporting the Whorfian hypothesis (e.g., Boroditsky, 2001). Skepticism about some Whorfian claims has been well founded (see Pinker, 1994, ch. 3, for a review of evidence against the Whorfian hypothesis). A notorious fallacy, attributable in part to Whorf, illustrates the need for methodological rigor. Whorf (1939/2000) argued that Eskimos must conceive of snow differently than English speakers because the Eskimo lexicon contains multi...

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...ract thought (Darwin, 1859/1998, 1874/1998; Gould, 1980; Pinker, 1997; Wallace, 1870/2003).2 Darwin’s own formulation of evolutionary theory points toward an elegant potential solution to Wallace’s dilemma: sometimes organisms recycle old structures for new uses. An organ built via selection for a specific role may be fortuitously suited to perform other unselected roles, as well. For example, the fossil record suggests that feathers were not originally ‘designed’ for flying. Rather, they evolved to regulate body temperature in small running dinosaurs, and were only later co-opted for flight (Gould, 1991). The process of adapting existing structures for new functions, which Darwin (1859/1993) gave the misleading name preadaptation, was later dubbed exaptation by evolutionary biologist Steven Jay Gould and paleontologist Elisabeth Vrba (1982). Gould argued that this process may explain the origin of many improbable biological and psychological structures. Can exaptation account for mental abilities in humans that could not have been selected for directly? If so, how might this have happened? Which adapted capacities might abstract domains be exapted from? Steven Pinker (1997) sketched the follo...

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... words. The concrete objects described in the literal sentences (e.g., shelf, building, door, button, roof) belong to a different ontological category than the abstract entities in the metaphorical examples, according a test of what physical relations they can sensibly be said to enter into. For example, it is sensible to say “the cat sat on the shelf / building / door / button / roof”, but it may not be sensible to say that “the cat sat on the price / debate / issue / limit / appearance.” This test is similar to a test of sensible predicates for concrete vs. abstract entities devised by Fred Sommer (1963; cf., Turner, 2005). Based on examples like these, linguists have argued that people create abstract domains by importing structure from concepts grounded in physical experience. Although anticipated by others (e.g., Lafargue, 1898/1906), this idea appears to have been first articulated as the Thematic Relations Hypothesis (TRH) in 1965, by Jeffery Gruber. TRH was later elaborated by Jackendoff (1972; 1983) who wrote: The psychological claim behind [Gruber’s linguistic discovery] is that the mind does not manufacture abstract concepts out of thin air…it adapts machinery that is already there,...

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...e objects described in the literal sentences (e.g., shelf, building, door, button, roof) belong to a different ontological category than the abstract entities in the metaphorical examples, according a test of what physical relations they can sensibly be said to enter into. For example, it is sensible to say “the cat sat on the shelf / building / door / button / roof”, but it may not be sensible to say that “the cat sat on the price / debate / issue / limit / appearance.” This test is similar to a test of sensible predicates for concrete vs. abstract entities devised by Fred Sommer (1963; cf., Turner, 2005). Based on examples like these, linguists have argued that people create abstract domains by importing structure from concepts grounded in physical experience. Although anticipated by others (e.g., Lafargue, 1898/1906), this idea appears to have been first articulated as the Thematic Relations Hypothesis (TRH) in 1965, by Jeffery Gruber. TRH was later elaborated by Jackendoff (1972; 1983) who wrote: The psychological claim behind [Gruber’s linguistic discovery] is that the mind does not manufacture abstract concepts out of thin air…it adapts machinery that is already there, both in the develop...

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...hen they are using language (i.e., when they are thinking for speaking (E. Clark, 2003; Slobin, 1996)). Experiments described above used nonlinguistic stimuli and responses, and demonstrated that even our low-level perceptuo-motor representations in the domains of space and time are related as predicted by linguistic metaphors. Over the past century of psychophysical experimentation on space and time judgments, two findings have emerged repeatedly: the Kappa effect and the Tau effect (Benussi, 1913; Bill & Teft, 1969; Cohen, 1967; Cohen, Hansel, & Sylvester, 1954; Collyer, 1977; Helson, 1930; Jones & Huang, 1982; Price-Williams, 1954; Sarrazin, Giraudo, Pailhous, & Bootsma, 2004). In a typical experiment, three light bulbs were arranged in a row and flashed in succession, forming two spatiotemporal intervals. Participants were asked to compare either the spatial or temporal extents of the two intervals. Often, time judgments were found to increase as a function of the spatial separation between stimuli (the Kappa effect), and distance judgments were found to increase as a function of the temporal separation between stimuli (the Tau effect). At first glance, these experiments appear similar to those w...

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...e our own concepts of ‘time,’ ‘space,’ and ‘matter’ given in substantially the same form by experience to all men, or are they in part conditioned by the structure of particular languages?” (1939/2000, pg. 138.) This Whorfian question remains the subject of renewed interest and debate. Does language shape thought? The answer yes would call for a reexamination of the ‘universalist’ assumption that has guided Cognitive Science for decades, according to which nonlinguistic concepts are formed independently of the words that name them, and are invariant across languages and cultures (Fodor, 1975; Pinker, 1994, Papafragou, Massey, & Gleitman, 2002). This position is often attributed to Chomsky (1975), but has been articulated more recently by Pinker (1994) and by Lila Gleitman and colleagues (Papafragou, Massey, & Gleitman, 2002; Snedeker & Gleitman, 2004). The Shallow View proposed here can be considered a variety of the universalist view that can plausibly be maintained despite recent psycholinguistic evidence supporting the Whorfian hypothesis (e.g., Boroditsky, 2001). Skepticism about some Whorfian claims has been well founded (see Pinker, 1994, ch. 3, for a review of evidence against the Whorf...