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The Future of Russian Gas and Gazprom,
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(Show Context)
Citation Context ...scorrupt part of the Russian economy. Not surprisingly, it is also the most stagnantssector. Europe’s problem is that Gazprom is supplying one quarter of EU gas suppliessor 40 percent of its imports (=-=Stern 2005-=-, Åslund 2008).sOn January 1, 2009, Gazprom cut off gas supplies to Ukraine, claiming that itshad not paid for gas deliveries in 2008, penalties for delayed payments, and nosagreement on prices had be... |
| 24 |
The Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis of January 2006’, media release, 16 January, viewed 20
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Citation Context ...lders,sor Russian taxpayers.”sIn January 2006, Gazprom’s stock price surged when it cut off its deliveries tosUkraine for two days, because investors appreciated that Gazprom opted for highersprices (=-=Stern 2006-=-, Teylan and Gustafson 2006). This time the commercial logic is thesopposite: By demanding a higher price than the market can bear and cutting suppliessto innocent customers, Gazprom is pricing itself... |
| 23 | The Impact of Liberalizing Barriers to Foreign Direct Investment in Services: the case of Russian Accession to the World Trade Organization, www.worldbank.org/trade/russia-wto - Rutherford, Tarr, et al. |
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Russia's capitalist revolution: Why market reform succeeded and democracy failed
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Citation Context ...y freesindividuals and independent firms. To judge by the transition index composed by thesEuropean Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), Russia became a fullfledged market economy by 1996 (=-=Åslund 2007-=-, pp. 278-80).sAnother feature of a market economy is the dominance of private enterprise.sRussia undertook the largest privatization in world history from 1992 until 1997.sAccording to the EBRD (2008... |
| 12 | Economy-wide and sector effects of Russia's accession to the WTO, World Bank Policy Paper - Jensen, Rutheford, et al. - 2004 |
| 11 | and Roopa Purushothaman. Dreaming with BRICs: the path to 2050. Global Economics paper No 99, Goldman Sachs - Wilson - 2003 |
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How Ukraine became a Market Economy and a Democracy
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Citation Context ... and expensive supplier.sThe mover and shaker in the Russian-Ukrainian gas trade is RosUkrEnergos(RUE), which was set up in a meeting between Presidents Putin and Leonid Kuchmasin Yalta in July 2004 (=-=Åslund 2009-=-). It is a non-transparent trading intermediary thatsAdlib Express Watermarks16ssells Turkmen gas to Ukraine through Gazprom’s pipelines, which Edward Chow andsJonathan Elkind (2009, 80) pointedly cha... |
| 7 |
Rapid Growth in Transition Economies: Growth-Accounting Approach."
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Citation Context ...a (World Bank 2008). Growth accountingsshows that after 2000, half of Russia’s growth arises from capital and half from risingstotal factor productivity, while labor has given a minor positive input (=-=Iradian 2007-=-).s“Russia 2020” conveys the vision of Russia as an innovation leader and asmiddle class society. The key goal of “Russia 2020” is to raise Russia’s GDP perscapita from $12,000 in 2008 to $30,000 in 2... |
| 5 | Where East Meets West: European Gas and Ukrainian - Chow, Elkind - 2009 |
| 4 | Telecommunications Reform within Russia's Accession to the WTO - Jensen, Rutherford, et al. - 2006 |
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Putin and Gazprom: An Independent Expert Report
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Citation Context ...ansferred to the Putin-connected Rossiya Bank in late 2006. Gazpromsbought that half of RUE for no less than $3.5 billion, although all its assets derivedsfrom the Gazprom-sponsored trading contract (=-=Nemtsov and Milov 2008-=-).sThe other half of RUE is controlled by a few top Ukrainians. Formally, it issowned by two Ukrainian businessmen, Dmytro Firtash (90 percent) and Ivan Fursins(10 percent). Firtash is a major financi... |
| 3 | Corruption Perceptions Index.” Available at http://transparency.org. (Accessed on - International - 2008 |
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World Development Indicators [Online] database. Available: http://publications.worldbank.org/WDI/. Last retrieved on 15
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Citation Context ...9 to 57 percent in 2007. Even so, Russia’s industrial sector is still large bysinternational standards, contributing 38 percent of GDP in 2006, compared with 27spercent of GDP in the euro area (World =-=Bank 2008-=-). Partly, this sizable industrialssector reflects insufficient market adjustment yet to come, partly it shows Russia’sscomparative advantage in raw-material-extraction.sTogether, the systemic and str... |
| 2 |
A Necessary Deterrent to Gazprom
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Citation Context ...t of the Russian economy. Not surprisingly, it is also the most stagnantssector. Europe’s problem is that Gazprom is supplying one quarter of EU gas suppliessor 40 percent of its imports (Stern 2005, =-=Åslund 2008-=-).sOn January 1, 2009, Gazprom cut off gas supplies to Ukraine, claiming that itshad not paid for gas deliveries in 2008, penalties for delayed payments, and nosagreement on prices had been reached fo... |
| 2 | Of BRICs and Brains: Comparing Russia with China, India and other Populous Emerging Economies’, Eurasian Geography and - Cooper - 2006 |
| 2 | Can Russia Compete in the Global - Cooper - 2007 |
| 2 | The Economic Rationale of the ‘European Neighborhood Policy - Milcher, Slay, et al. - 2007 |
| 2 | Regional Impacts of Russia’s Accession to the WTO - Rutherford, Tarr - 2006 |
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Citation Context ...9 to 57 percent in 2007. Even so, Russia’s industrial sector is still large bysinternational standards, contributing 38 percent of GDP in 2006, compared with 27spercent of GDP in the euro area (World =-=Bank 2008-=-). Partly, this sizable industrialssector reflects insufficient market adjustment yet to come, partly it shows Russia’sscomparative advantage in raw-material-extraction.sTogether, the systemic and str... |
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Speech at Expanded Meeting of the State Council on Russia’s Development Strategy through 2020,” February 8
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Citation Context ...20. Then President Vladimir Putin laid out the program, “Russia 2020,” in a speechson February 8, 2008. The Ministry of Economic Development and Trade presented asmore detailed program in March 2008 (=-=Putin 2008-=-, Ministry 2008).sAdlib Express Watermarks5sThe dominant reason for growth has been European or capitalist convergence,swhich Russia has enjoyed thanks the hard-fought introduction of a market economy... |
| 1 | Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin Met with Foreign - Putin |
| 1 | Oleksandr Shepotylo, “Poverty Effects of Russia’s WTO Accession: Modelling “Real” Households and Endogenous Productivity Effects - Rutherford, Tarr - 2004 |
| 1 | Oleksandr Shepotylo, “The Impact on Russia of WTO Accession and the Doha Agenda: The Importance of Liberalization - Rutherford, Tarr - 2005 |
| 1 | Russia and Ukraine’s New Gas Agreement: What Does it Mean and How Long Will It Last?” CERA Decision Brief - Teylan, Christine, et al. - 2006 |
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International Finance Corporation. 2008. Doing Business in 2009: Creating Jobs. Washington: The World Bank. Accessible at http://www.doingbusiness.org/. (accessed on October 20
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Citation Context ...9 to 57 percent in 2007. Even so, Russia’s industrial sector is still large bysinternational standards, contributing 38 percent of GDP in 2006, compared with 27spercent of GDP in the euro area (World =-=Bank 2008-=-). Partly, this sizable industrialssector reflects insufficient market adjustment yet to come, partly it shows Russia’sscomparative advantage in raw-material-extraction.sTogether, the systemic and str... |
