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A repeated game formulation of energyefficient decentralized power control
 IEEE TRANS. ON WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS
, 2010
"... Decentralized multiple access channels where each transmitter wants to selfishly maximize his transmission energyefficiency are considered. Transmitters are assumed to choose freely their power control policy and interact (through multiuser interference) several times. It is shown that the correspo ..."
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Cited by 16 (7 self)
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Decentralized multiple access channels where each transmitter wants to selfishly maximize his transmission energyefficiency are considered. Transmitters are assumed to choose freely their power control policy and interact (through multiuser interference) several times. It is shown that the corresponding conflict of interest can have a predictable outcome, namely a finitely or discounted repeated game equilibrium. Remarkably, it is shown that this equilibrium is Paretoefficient under reasonable sufficient conditions and the corresponding decentralized power control policies can be implemented under realistic information assumptions: only individual channel state information and a public signal are required to implement the equilibrium strategies. Explicit equilibrium conditions are derived in terms of minimum number of game stages or maximum discount factor. Both analytical and simulation results are provided to compare the performance of the proposed power control policies with those already existing and exploiting the same information assumptions namely, those derived for the oneshot and Stackelberg games.
Author manuscript, published in "International Sympotsium on Comunications, Control and Signal Processing, Cyprus (2010)" Implicit cooperation in distributed energyefficient networks
, 2010
"... Abstract—We consider the problem of cooperation in distributed wireless networks of selfish and free transmitters aiming at maximizing their energyefficiency. The strategy of each transmitter consists in choosing his power control (PC) policy. Two scenarios are considered: the case where transmitte ..."
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Abstract—We consider the problem of cooperation in distributed wireless networks of selfish and free transmitters aiming at maximizing their energyefficiency. The strategy of each transmitter consists in choosing his power control (PC) policy. Two scenarios are considered: the case where transmitters can update their power levels within time intervals less than the channel coherence time (fast PC) and the case where it is updated only once per time interval (slow PC). One of our objectives is to show how cooperation can be stimulated without assuming cooperation links between the transmitters but only by repeating the corresponding PC game and by signals from the receiver. In order to design efficient PC policies, standard and stochastic repeated games are respectively exploited to analyze the fast and slow PC problems. In the first case a cooperation plan between transmitters, that is both efficient and relies on mild information assumptions, is proposed. In the second case, the region of equilibrium utilities is derived from very recent and powerful results in game theory. I.
MeanField Games and Green Power Control
"... Abstract—In this work, we consider a distributed wireless network where many transmitters communicate with a common receiver. Having the choice of their power control policy, transmitters are concerned with energy constraints: instantaneous energyefficiency and longterm energy consumption. The i ..."
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Abstract—In this work, we consider a distributed wireless network where many transmitters communicate with a common receiver. Having the choice of their power control policy, transmitters are concerned with energy constraints: instantaneous energyefficiency and longterm energy consumption. The individual optimization of the average energyefficient utility over a finite horizon is studied by using control theory and a coupled system of HamiltonJacobiBellmanFleming equations is obtained. Even though the existence of a solution to the corresponding stochastic differential game is proven, the game is difficult to analyze when the number of transmitters is large (in particular, the Nash equilibrium analysis becomes hard and even impossible). But when the number of transmitters is large, the stochastic differential game converges to a meanfield game which is ruled by a more tractable system of equations. A condition for the uniqueness of the equilibrium of the meanfield game is given. I.
1A Repeated Game Formulation of EnergyEfficient Decentralized Power Control
"... Decentralized multiple access channels where each transmitter wants to selfishly maximize his transmission energyefficiency are considered. Transmitters are assumed to choose freely their power control policy and interact (through multiuser interference) several times. It is shown that the correspo ..."
Abstract
 Add to MetaCart
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Decentralized multiple access channels where each transmitter wants to selfishly maximize his transmission energyefficiency are considered. Transmitters are assumed to choose freely their power control policy and interact (through multiuser interference) several times. It is shown that the corresponding conflict of interest can have a predictable outcome, namely a finitely or discounted repeated game equilibrium. Remarkably, it is shown that this equilibrium is Paretoefficient under reasonable sufficient conditions and the corresponding decentralized power control policies can be implemented under realistic information assumptions: only individual channel state information and a public signal are required to implement the equilibrium strategies. Explicit equilibrium conditions are derived in terms of minimum number of game stages or maximum discount factor. Both analytical and simulation results are provided to compare the performance of the proposed power control policies with those already existing and exploiting the same information assumptions namely, those derived for the oneshot and Stackelberg games.