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396
Reasoning the fast and frugal way: Models of bounded rationality.
- Psychological Review,
, 1996
"... Humans and animals make inferences about the world under limited time and knowledge. In contrast, many models of rational inference treat the mind as a Laplacean Demon, equipped with unlimited time, knowledge, and computational might. Following H. Simon's notion of satisncing, the authors have ..."
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Cited by 611 (30 self)
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Humans and animals make inferences about the world under limited time and knowledge. In contrast, many models of rational inference treat the mind as a Laplacean Demon, equipped with unlimited time, knowledge, and computational might. Following H. Simon's notion of satisncing, the authors have proposed a family of algorithms based on a simple psychological mechanism: onereason decision making. These fast and frugal algorithms violate fundamental tenets of classical rationality: They neither look up nor integrate all information. By computer simulation, the authors held a competition between the satisncing "Take The Best" algorithm and various "rational" inference procedures (e.g., multiple regression). The Take The Best algorithm matched or outperformed all competitors in inferential speed and accuracy. This result is an existence proof that cognitive mechanisms capable of successful performance in the real world do not need to satisfy the classical norms of rational inference.
Models of Ecological Rationality: The Recognition Heuristic.
- Psychological Review,
, 2002
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On the Reality of Cognitive Illusions
, 1996
"... The study of heuristics and biases in judgment has been criticized in several publications by G. Gigerenzer, who argues that "biases are not biases" and "heuristics are meant to explain what does not exist" (1991, p. 102). This article responds to Gigerenzer's critique and s ..."
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Cited by 186 (2 self)
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The study of heuristics and biases in judgment has been criticized in several publications by G. Gigerenzer, who argues that "biases are not biases" and "heuristics are meant to explain what does not exist" (1991, p. 102). This article responds to Gigerenzer's critique and shows that it misrepresents the authors' theoretical position and ignores critical evidence. Contrary to Gigerenzer's central empirical claim, judgments of frequency—not only subjective probabilities—are susceptible to large and systematic biases. A postscript responds to Gigerenzer's (1996) reply.
On narrow norms and vague heuristics: A reply to Kahneman and Tversky
- Psychological Review
, 1996
"... the heuristics-and-biases approach to statistical reasoning is and is not about. At issue is the imposition of unnecessarily narrow norms of sound reasoning that are used to diagnose so-called cognitive illusions and the continuing reliance on vague heuristics that explain everything and nothing. D. ..."
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Cited by 176 (16 self)
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the heuristics-and-biases approach to statistical reasoning is and is not about. At issue is the imposition of unnecessarily narrow norms of sound reasoning that are used to diagnose so-called cognitive illusions and the continuing reliance on vague heuristics that explain everything and nothing. D. Kahneman and A. Tversky (1996) incorrectly asserted that Gigerenzer simply claimed that frequency formats make all cognitive illusions disappear. In contrast, Gigerenzer has proposed and tested models that actually predict when frequency judgments are valid and when they are not. The issue is not whether or not. or how often, cognitive illusions disappear. The focus should be rather the construction of detailed models of cognitive processes that explain when and why they disappear. A postscript responds to Kahneman and Tversky's (1996) postscript. I welcome Kahneman and Tversky's (1996) reply to my critique (e.g., Gigerenzer, 1991, 1994; Gigerenzer & Murray, 1987) and hope this exchange will encourage a rethinking of research strategies. I emphasize research strategies, rather than specific empirical results or even explanations of those results, because I believe that this debate is fundamentally about what
Engineering Design Thinking, Teaching, and Learning
- JOURNAL OF ENGINEERING EDUCATION
, 2005
"... This paper is based on the premises that the purpose of engineering education is to graduate engineers who can design, and that design thinking is complex. The paper begins by briefly reviewing the history and role of design in the engineering curriculum. Several dimensions of design thinking are th ..."
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Cited by 158 (6 self)
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This paper is based on the premises that the purpose of engineering education is to graduate engineers who can design, and that design thinking is complex. The paper begins by briefly reviewing the history and role of design in the engineering curriculum. Several dimensions of design thinking are then detailed, explaining why design is hard to learn and harder still to teach, and outlining the research available on how well design thinking skills are learned. The currently most-favored pedagogical model for teaching design, project-based learning (PBL), is explored next, along with available assessment data on its success. Two contexts for PBL are emphasized: first-year cornerstone courses and globally dispersed PBL courses. Finally, the paper lists some of the open research questions that must be answered to identify the best pedagogical practices of improving design learning, after which it closes by making recommendations for research aimed at enhancing design learning.
The Paranoid Optimist: An Integrative Evolutionary Model of Cognitive Biases
"... Human cognition is often biased, from judgments of the time of impact of approaching objects all the way through to estimations of social outcomes in the future. We propose these effects and a host of others may all be understood from an evolutionary psychological perspective. In this article, we el ..."
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Cited by 111 (3 self)
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Human cognition is often biased, from judgments of the time of impact of approaching objects all the way through to estimations of social outcomes in the future. We propose these effects and a host of others may all be understood from an evolutionary psychological perspective. In this article, we elaborate error management theory (EMT; Haselton & Buss, 2000). EMT predicts that if judgments are made under uncertainty, and the costs of false positive and false negative errors have been asymmetric over evolutionary history, selection should have favored a bias toward making the least costly error. This perspective integrates a diverse array of effects under a single explanatory umbrella, and it yields new content-specific predictions. Better safe than sorry. (folk wisdom) Nothing ventured, nothing gained. (contradictory folk wisdom) These two wisdoms seem contradictory. The first urges caution, whereas the second reminds us that we have nothing to lose and should throw caution to the
Predicting risk-sensitivity in humans and lower animals: Risk as variance or coefficient of variation
- Psychological Review
, 2004
"... This article examines the statistical determinants of risk preference. In a meta-analysis of animal risk preference (foraging birds and insects), the coefficient of variation (CV), a measure of risk per unit of return, predicts choices far better than outcome variance, the risk measure of normative ..."
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Cited by 98 (10 self)
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This article examines the statistical determinants of risk preference. In a meta-analysis of animal risk preference (foraging birds and insects), the coefficient of variation (CV), a measure of risk per unit of return, predicts choices far better than outcome variance, the risk measure of normative models. In a meta-analysis of human risk preference, the superiority of the CV over variance in predicting risk taking is not as strong. Two experiments show that people’s risk sensitivity becomes strongly proportional to the CV when they learn about choice alternatives like other animals, by experiential sampling over time. Experience-based choices differ from choices when outcomes and probabilities are numerically de-scribed. Zipf’s law as an ecological regularity and Weber’s law as a psychological regularity may give rise to the CV as a measure of risk. Decision making under risk and uncertainty is a topic of re-search in disciplines as diverse as psychology, economics, zool-ogy, and entomology. Both the animal and the human risky choice literatures have proposed models that either predict choices in a deterministic fashion or predict risk sensitivity (i.e., the probability of choosing a riskier or less risky option) in a stochastic fashion.
The ‘Conjunction Fallacy’ Revisited: How Intelligent Inferences Look Like Reasoning Errors
- Journal of Behavioral Decision Making
, 1999
"... Findings in recent research on the `conjunction fallacy ' have been taken as evidence that our minds are not designed to work by the rules of probability. This conclusion springs from the idea that norms should be content-blind Ð in the present case, the assumption that sound reasoning requires ..."
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Cited by 87 (16 self)
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Findings in recent research on the `conjunction fallacy ' have been taken as evidence that our minds are not designed to work by the rules of probability. This conclusion springs from the idea that norms should be content-blind Ð in the present case, the assumption that sound reasoning requires following the conjunction rule of probability theory. But content-blind norms overlook some of the intelligent ways in which humans deal with uncertainty, for instance, when drawing semantic and pragmatic inferences. In a series of studies, we ®rst show that people infer nonmathematical meanings of the polysemous term `probability' in the classic Linda conjunction problem. We then demonstrate that one can design contexts in which people infer mathematical meanings of the term and are therefore more likely to conform to the conjunction rule. Finally, we report evidence that the term `frequency ' narrows the spectrum of possible interpretations of `probability ' down to its mathematical meanings, and that this fact Ð rather than the presence or absence of `extensional cues ' Ð accounts for the low proportion of violations of the conjunction rule when people are asked for
Adaptations, exaptations, and spandrels
- The American Psychologist
, 1998
"... Adaptation and natural selection are central concepts in the emerging science of evolutionary psychology. Natural selection is the only known causal process capable of producing complex functional organic mechanisms. These adaptations, along with their incidental by-products and a residue of noise, ..."
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Cited by 79 (16 self)
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Adaptation and natural selection are central concepts in the emerging science of evolutionary psychology. Natural selection is the only known causal process capable of producing complex functional organic mechanisms. These adaptations, along with their incidental by-products and a residue of noise, comprise all forms of life. Recently, S. J. Gould (1991) proposed that exaptations and spandrels may be more important than adaptations for evolutionary psychology. These refer to features that did not originally arise for their current use but rather were co-opted for new purposes. He suggested that many important phenomena--such as art, language, commerce, and war--although evolutionary in origin, are incidental spandrels of the large human brain. The authors outline the conceptual and evidentiary standards that apply to adaptations, exaptations, and spandrels and discuss the relative utility of these concepts for psychological science. Oi spective within the field of psychology. Evolu-ver the past decade, evolutionary psychology rhas emerged as a prominent new theoretical per-tionary psychology seeks to synthesize the guiding principles of modem evolutionary theory with current formulations
