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Hilbert’s Program Then and Now
, 2005
"... Hilbert’s program is, in the first instance, a proposal and a research program in the philosophy and foundations of mathematics. It was formulated in the early 1920s by German mathematician David Hilbert (1862–1943), and was pursued by him and his collaborators at the University of Göttingen and els ..."
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Hilbert’s program is, in the first instance, a proposal and a research program in the philosophy and foundations of mathematics. It was formulated in the early 1920s by German mathematician David Hilbert (1862–1943), and was pursued by him and his collaborators at the University of Göttingen and elsewhere in the 1920s
Computers, Reasoning and Mathematical Practice
"... ion in itself is not the goal: for Whitehead [117]"it is the large generalisation, limited by a happy particularity, which is the fruitful conception." As an example consider the theorem in ring theory, which states that if R is a ring, f(x) is a polynomial over R and f(r) = 0 for every e ..."
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ion in itself is not the goal: for Whitehead [117]"it is the large generalisation, limited by a happy particularity, which is the fruitful conception." As an example consider the theorem in ring theory, which states that if R is a ring, f(x) is a polynomial over R and f(r) = 0 for every element of r of R then R is commutative. Special cases of this, for example f(x) is x 2 \Gamma x or x 3 \Gamma x, can be given a first order proof in a few lines of symbol manipulation. The usual proof of the general result [20] (which takes a semester's postgraduate course to develop from scratch) is a corollary of other results: we prove that rings satisfying the condition are semisimple artinian, apply a theorem which shows that all such rings are matrix rings over division rings, and eventually obtain the result by showing that all finite division rings are fields, and hence commutative. This displays von Neumann's architectural qualities: it is "deep" in a way in which the symbol manipulati...
Does Reductive Proof Theory Have A Viable Rationale?
 Erkenntnis
, 2000
"... The goals of reduction and reductionism in the natural sciences are mainly explanatory in character, while those in mathematics are primarily foundational. In contrast to global reductionist programs which aim to reduce all of mathematics to one supposedly "universal " system or founda ..."
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The goals of reduction and reductionism in the natural sciences are mainly explanatory in character, while those in mathematics are primarily foundational. In contrast to global reductionist programs which aim to reduce all of mathematics to one supposedly "universal " system or foundational scheme, reductive proof theory pursues local reductions of one formal system to another which is more justified in some sense. In this direction, two specific rationales have been proposed as aims for reductive proof theory, the constructive consistencyproof rationale and the foundational reduction rationale. However, recent advances in proof theory force one to consider the viability of these rationales. Despite the genuine problems of foundational significance raised by that work, the paper concludes with a defense of reductive proof theory at a minimum as one of the principal means to lay out what rests on what in mathematics. In an extensive appendix to the paper, various reducti...
THOMAS HOFWEBER PROOFTHEORETIC REDUCTION AS A PHILOSOPHER’S TOOL
"... a philosophical part. It is concerned with philosophical questions that are the real aim of the program. To carry out this part one, basically, has to show why the technical part answers the philosophical questions one wanted to have answered. Hilbert probably thought that he had completed the philo ..."
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a philosophical part. It is concerned with philosophical questions that are the real aim of the program. To carry out this part one, basically, has to show why the technical part answers the philosophical questions one wanted to have answered. Hilbert probably thought that he had completed the philosophical part of his program, maybe up to a few details. What was left to do was the technical part. To carry it out one, roughly, had to give a precise axiomatization of mathematics and show that it is consistent on purely finitistic grounds. This would come down to giving a relative consistency proof of mathematics in finitist mathematics, or to give a prooftheoretic reduction of mathematics on to finitist mathematics (we will look at these notions in more detail soon). It is widely believed that Gödel’s theorems showed that the technical part of Hilbert’s program could not be carried out. Gödel’s theorems show that the consistency of arithmetic can not even be proven in arithmetic, not to speak of by finitistic means alone. So, the
On the calculating power of Laplace’s demon (Part I)
, 2006
"... We discuss several ways of making precise the informal concept of physical determinism, drawing on ideas from mathematical logic and computability theory. We outline a programme of investigating these notions of determinism in detail for specific, precisely articulated physical theories. We make a s ..."
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We discuss several ways of making precise the informal concept of physical determinism, drawing on ideas from mathematical logic and computability theory. We outline a programme of investigating these notions of determinism in detail for specific, precisely articulated physical theories. We make a start on our programme by proposing a general logical framework for describing physical theories, and analysing several possible formulations of a simple Newtonian theory from the point of view of determinism. Our emphasis throughout is on clarifying the precise physical and metaphysical assumptions that typically underlie a claim that some physical theory is ‘deterministic’. A sequel paper is planned, in which we shall apply similar methods to the analysis of other physical theories. Along the way, we discuss some possible repercussions of this kind of investigation for both physics and logic. 1
unknown title
, 2009
"... The significance of Nathanson’s boss factor in legitimising Aristotle’s particularisation Why we need to revise current interpretations of Cantor’s, Gödel’s, Turing’s and Tarski’s formal reasoning ..."
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The significance of Nathanson’s boss factor in legitimising Aristotle’s particularisation Why we need to revise current interpretations of Cantor’s, Gödel’s, Turing’s and Tarski’s formal reasoning
unknown title
, 2009
"... The significance of Nathanson’s boss factor in legitimising Aristotle’s particularisation Why we need to revise current interpretations of Cantor’s, Gödel’s, Turing’s and Tarski’s formal reasoning ..."
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The significance of Nathanson’s boss factor in legitimising Aristotle’s particularisation Why we need to revise current interpretations of Cantor’s, Gödel’s, Turing’s and Tarski’s formal reasoning
unknown title
, 2009
"... The significance of Nathanson’s boss factor in legitimising Aristotle’s particularisation Why we need to revise current interpretations of Cantor’s, Gödel’s, Turing’s and Tarski’s formal reasoning ..."
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The significance of Nathanson’s boss factor in legitimising Aristotle’s particularisation Why we need to revise current interpretations of Cantor’s, Gödel’s, Turing’s and Tarski’s formal reasoning