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Monotonic Modal Logics
, 2003
"... Monotonic modal logics form a generalization of normal modal logics... ..."
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Cited by 24 (0 self)
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Monotonic modal logics form a generalization of normal modal logics...
Strategic games and truly playable effectivity functions
 In Proceedings of AAMAS2011
, 2011
"... A well known (and often used) result by Marc Pauly states that for every playable effectivity function E there exists a strategic game that assigns to coalitions exactly the same power as E, and vice versa. While the latter direction of the correspondence is correct, we show that the former does not ..."
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Cited by 13 (5 self)
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A well known (and often used) result by Marc Pauly states that for every playable effectivity function E there exists a strategic game that assigns to coalitions exactly the same power as E, and vice versa. While the latter direction of the correspondence is correct, we show that the former does not always hold in the case of infinite game models. We point out where the proof of correspondence goes wrong, and we present examples of playable effectivity functions in infinite models for which no equivalent strategic game exists. Then, we characterize the class of truly playable effectivity functions, that does correspond to strategic games. Moreover, we discuss a construction that transforms any playable effectivity function into a truly playable one while preserving the power of most (but not all) coalitions. We also show that Coalition Logic is not expressive enough to distinguish between playable and truly playable effectivity functions, and we extend it to a logic that can make this distinction while enjoying finite axiomatization and finite model property.
A Logic of Games and . . .
, 2009
"... We present a logic for reasoning about strategic games. The logic is a modal formalism, based on the Coalition Logic of Propositional Control, to which we add the notions of outcomes and preferences over outcomes. We study the underlying structure of powers of coalitions as they are expressed in the ..."
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We present a logic for reasoning about strategic games. The logic is a modal formalism, based on the Coalition Logic of Propositional Control, to which we add the notions of outcomes and preferences over outcomes. We study the underlying structure of powers of coalitions as they are expressed in their effectivity function, and formalise a collection of solution concepts. We provide a sound and complete axiomatisation for the logic, and we demonstrate its features by applying it to some problems from social choice theory.
Noname manuscript No. (will be inserted by the editor) Strategic Games and Truly Playable Effectivity Functions
"... Abstract A wellknown result in the logical analysis of cooperative games states that the socalled playable effectivity functions exactly correspond to strategic games. More precisely, this result states that for every playable effectivity function E there exists a strategic game that assigns to co ..."
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Abstract A wellknown result in the logical analysis of cooperative games states that the socalled playable effectivity functions exactly correspond to strategic games. More precisely, this result states that for every playable effectivity function E there exists a strategic game that assigns to coalitions of players exactly the same power as E, and every strategic game generates a playable effectivity function. While the latter direction of the correspondence is correct, we show that the former does not hold for a number of infinite state games. We point out where the original proof of correspondence goes wrong, and we present examples of playable effectivity functions for which no equivalent strategic game exists. Then, we characterize the class of truly playable effectivity functions, that do correspond to strategic games. Moreover, we discuss a construction that transforms any playable effectivity function into a truly playable one while preserving the power of most (but not all) coalitions. We also show that Coalition Logic, a formalism used to reason about effectivity functions, is not expressive enough to distinguish between playable and truly playable effectivity functions, and we extend it to a logic that can make that distinction while still enjoying the good metalogical properties of Coalition Logic, such as finite axiomatization and decidability via finite model property.