Insecurity of an efficient privacy-preserving public auditing scheme for cloud data storage Cloud storage has a long string of merits but at the same time, poses many challenges on data integrity and privacy. A cloud data auditing protocol, which enables a cloud server to prove the integrity of stored files to a verifier, is a powerful tool for secure cloud storage. Wang et al. proposed a privacy-preserving public auditing protocol, however, Worku et al. found the protocol is seriously insecure and proposed an improvement to remedy the weakness. In this paper, unfortunately, we demonstrate that the new protocol due to Worku et al. fails to achieve soundness and obtains merely limited privacy. Specifically, we show even deleting all the files of a data owner, a malicious cloud server is able to generate a response to a challenge without being caught by TPA in their enhanced but unrealistic security model. Worse still, the protocol is insecure even in a correct security model. For privacy, a dishonest verifier can tell which file is stored on the cloud. Solutions to efficient