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346
A Taxonomy of DDoS Attack and DDoS Defense Mechanisms
- ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review
, 2004
"... Distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) is a rapidly growing problem. The multitude and variety of both the attacks and the defense approaches is overwhelming. This paper presents two taxonomies for classifying attacks and defenses, and thus provides researchers with a better understanding of the probl ..."
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Cited by 347 (2 self)
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Distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) is a rapidly growing problem. The multitude and variety of both the attacks and the defense approaches is overwhelming. This paper presents two taxonomies for classifying attacks and defenses, and thus provides researchers with a better understanding of the problem and the current solution space. The attack classification criteria was selected to highlight commonalities and important features of attack strategies, that define challenges and dictate the design of countermeasures. The defense taxonomy classifies the body of existing DDoS defenses based on their design decisions; it then shows how these decisions dictate the advantages and deficiencies of proposed solutions.
SOS: Secure overlay services
- In Proceedings of ACM SIGCOMM
, 2002
"... angelos,misra,danr¥ Denial of service (DoS) attacks continue to threaten the reliability of networking systems. Previous approaches for protecting networks from DoS attacks are reactive in that they wait for an attack to be launched before taking appropriate measures to protect the network. This lea ..."
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Cited by 253 (16 self)
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angelos,misra,danr¥ Denial of service (DoS) attacks continue to threaten the reliability of networking systems. Previous approaches for protecting networks from DoS attacks are reactive in that they wait for an attack to be launched before taking appropriate measures to protect the network. This leaves the door open for other attacks that use more sophisticated methods to mask their traffic. We propose an architecture called Secure Overlay Services (SOS) that proactively prevents DoS attacks, geared toward supporting Emergency Services or similar types of communication. The architecture is constructed using a combination of secure overlay tunneling, routing via consistent hashing, and filtering. We reduce the probability of successful attacks by (i) performing intensive filtering near protected network edges, pushing the attack point perimeter into the core of the network, where high-speed routers can handle the volume of attack traffic, and (ii) introducing randomness and anonymity into the architecture, making it difficult for an attacker to target nodes along the path to a specific SOS-protected destination. Using simple analytical models, we evaluate the likelihood that an attacker can successfully launch a DoS attack against an SOSprotected network. Our analysis demonstrates that such an architecture reduces the likelihood of a successful attack to minuscule levels.
A Framework for Classifying Denial of Service Attacks
- In Proceedings of ACM SIGCOMM
, 2003
"... Launching a denial of service (DoS) attack is trivial, but detection and response is a painfully slow and often a manual process. Automatic classification of attacks as single- or multi-source can help focus a response, but current packet-header-based approaches are susceptible to spoofing. This pap ..."
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Cited by 214 (12 self)
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Launching a denial of service (DoS) attack is trivial, but detection and response is a painfully slow and often a manual process. Automatic classification of attacks as single- or multi-source can help focus a response, but current packet-header-based approaches are susceptible to spoofing. This paper introduces a framework for classifying DoS attacks based on header content, transient ramp-up behavior and novel techniques such as spectral analysis. Although headers are easily forged, we show that characteristics of attack ramp-up and attack spectrum are more difficult to spoof. To evaluate our framework we monitored access links of a regional ISP detecting 80 live attacks. Header analysis identified the number of attackers in 67 attacks, while the remaining 13 attacks were classified based on ramp-up and spectral analysis. We validate our results through monitoring at a second site, controlled experiments, and simulation. We use experiments and simulation to understand the underlying reasons for the characteristics observed. In addition to helping understand attack dynamics, classification mechanisms such as ours are important for the development of realistic models of DoS traffic, can be packaged as an automated tool to aid in rapid response to attacks, and can also be used to estimate the level of DoS activity on the Internet.
SIFF: A Stateless Internet Flow Filter to Mitigate DDoS Flooding Attacks
- In IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
, 2004
"... One of the fundamental limitations of the Internet is the inability of a packet flow recipient to halt disruptive flows before they consume the recipient's network link resources. Critical infrastructures and businesses alike are vulnerable to DoS attacks or flash-crowds that can incapacitate t ..."
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Cited by 191 (13 self)
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One of the fundamental limitations of the Internet is the inability of a packet flow recipient to halt disruptive flows before they consume the recipient's network link resources. Critical infrastructures and businesses alike are vulnerable to DoS attacks or flash-crowds that can incapacitate their networks with traffic floods. Unfortunately, current mechanisms require per-flow state at routers, ISP collaboration, or the deployment of an overlay infrastructure to defend against these events.
A DoS-limiting network architecture
- In Proceedings of ACM SIGCOMM
, 2005
"... We present the design and evaluation of TVA, a network architecture that limits the impact of Denial of Service (DoS) floods from the outset. Our work builds on earlier work on capabilities in which senders obtain short-term authorizations from receivers that they stamp on their packets. We address ..."
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Cited by 191 (7 self)
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We present the design and evaluation of TVA, a network architecture that limits the impact of Denial of Service (DoS) floods from the outset. Our work builds on earlier work on capabilities in which senders obtain short-term authorizations from receivers that they stamp on their packets. We address the full range of possible attacks against communication between pairs of hosts, including spoofed packet floods, network and host bottlenecks, and router state exhaustion. We use simulation to show that attack traffic can only degrade legitimate traffic to a limited extent, significantly outperforming previously proposed DoS solutions. We use a modified Linux kernel implementation to argue that our design can run on gigabit links using only inexpensive off-the-shelf hardware. Our design is also suitable for transition into practice, providing incremental benefit for incremental deployment.
Hop-count filtering: an effective defense against spoofed DDoS traffic
, 2003
"... IP spoofing has been exploited by Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks to (1) conceal flooding sources and localities in flooding traffic, and (2) coax legitimate hosts into becoming reflectors, redirecting and amplifying flooding traffic. Thus, the ability to filter spoofed IP packets near ..."
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Cited by 187 (4 self)
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IP spoofing has been exploited by Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks to (1) conceal flooding sources and localities in flooding traffic, and (2) coax legitimate hosts into becoming reflectors, redirecting and amplifying flooding traffic. Thus, the ability to filter spoofed IP packets near victims is essential to their own protection as well as to their avoidance of becoming involuntary DoS reflectors. Although an attacker can forge any field in the IP header, he or she cannot falsify the number of hops an IP packet takes to reach its destination. This hop-count information can be inferred from the Time-to-Live (TTL) value in the IP header. Using a mapping between IP addresses and their hop-counts to an Internet server, the server can distinguish spoofed IP packets from legitimate ones. Base on this observation, we present a novel filtering technique that is immediately deployable to weed out spoofed IP packets. Through analysis using network measurement data, we show that Hop-Count Filtering (HCF) can identify close to 90 % of spoofed IP packets, and then discard them with little collateral damage. We implement and evaluate HCF in the Linux kernel, demonstrating its benefits using experimental measurements.
Pi: A Path Identification Mechanism to Defend against DDoS Attacks
- In IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
, 2003
"... Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks continue to plague the Internet. Defense against these attacks is complicated by spoofed source IP addresses, which make it difficult to determine a packet's true origin. We propose Pi (short for Path Identifier), a new packet marking approach in whi ..."
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Cited by 182 (10 self)
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Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks continue to plague the Internet. Defense against these attacks is complicated by spoofed source IP addresses, which make it difficult to determine a packet's true origin. We propose Pi (short for Path Identifier), a new packet marking approach in which a path fingerprint is embedded in each packet, enabling a victim to identify packets traversing the same paths through the Internet on a per packet basis, regardless of source IP address spoofing.
Attacking DDoS at the Source
, 2002
"... Distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks present an Internet-wide threat. We propose D-WARD, a DDoS defense system deployed at source-end networks that autonomously detects and stops attacks originating from these networks. Attacks are detected by the constant monitoring of two-way traffic flows ..."
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Cited by 176 (9 self)
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Distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks present an Internet-wide threat. We propose D-WARD, a DDoS defense system deployed at source-end networks that autonomously detects and stops attacks originating from these networks. Attacks are detected by the constant monitoring of two-way traffic flows between the network and the rest of the Internet and periodic comparison with normal flow models. Mismatching flows are rate-limited in proportion to their aggressiveness. D-WARD offers good service to legitimate traffic even during an attack, while effectively reducing DDoS traffic to a negligible level. A prototype of the system has been built in a Linux router. We show its effectiveness in various attack scenarios, discuss motivations for deployment, and describe associated costs.
Mayday: Distributed Filtering for Internet Services
, 2003
"... Mayday is an architecture that combines overlay networks with lightweight packet filtering to defend against denial of service attacks. The overlay nodes perform client authentication and protocol verification, and then relay the requests to a protected server. The server is protected from outside a ..."
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Cited by 144 (3 self)
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Mayday is an architecture that combines overlay networks with lightweight packet filtering to defend against denial of service attacks. The overlay nodes perform client authentication and protocol verification, and then relay the requests to a protected server. The server is protected from outside attack by simple packet filtering rules that can be efficiently deployed even in backbone routers. Mayday generalizes
Preventing Internet Denial-of-Service with Capabilities
- SIGCOMM COMPUT. COMMUN. REV
, 2003
"... In this paper, we propose a new approach to preventing and constraining denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. Instead of being able to send anything to anyone at any time, in our architecture, nodes must first obtain "permission to send" from the destination; a receiver provides tokens, or capa ..."
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Cited by 141 (5 self)
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In this paper, we propose a new approach to preventing and constraining denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. Instead of being able to send anything to anyone at any time, in our architecture, nodes must first obtain "permission to send" from the destination; a receiver provides tokens, or capabilities, to those senders whose traffic it agrees to accept. The senders then include these tokens in packets. This enables verification points distributed around the network to check that traffic has been certified as legitimate by both endpoints and the path in between, and to cleanly discard unauthorized traffic. We show that our approach addresses many of the limitations of the currently popular approaches to DoS based on anomaly detection, traceback, and pushback. Further, we argue that our approach can be readily implemented in today's technology, is suitable for incremental deployment, and requires no more of a security infrastructure than that already needed to fix BGP's security weaknesses. Finally, our proposal facilitates innovation in application and networking protocols, something increasingly curtailed by existing DoS measures.
