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Iterative Combinatorial Auctions: Achieving Economic and Computational Efficiency (2001)

by D C Parkes
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Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design: Recent Results and Future Directions

by Joan Feigenbaum, Scott Shenker , 2002
"... Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design (DAMD) combines theoretical computer science’s traditional focus on computational tractability with its more recent interest in incentive compatibility and distributed computing. The Internet’s decentralized nature, in which distributed computation and autono ..."
Abstract - Cited by 283 (24 self) - Add to MetaCart
Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design (DAMD) combines theoretical computer science’s traditional focus on computational tractability with its more recent interest in incentive compatibility and distributed computing. The Internet’s decentralized nature, in which distributed computation and autonomous agents prevail, makes DAMD a very natural approach for many Internet problems. This paper first outlines the basics of DAMD and then reviews previous DAMD results on multicast cost sharing and interdomain routing. The remainder of the paper describes several promising research directions and poses some specific open problems.
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...be jointly addressed. Although many subdisciplines of computer science have a long history of using game theory --- such as networking (e.g., [21, 25, 35]), distributed artificial intelligence (e.g., =-=[55, 61]-=-), and marketbased computation (e.g., [65]) --- the first work in TCS to address incentives and computational complexity simultaneously was Nisan and Ronen's seminal paper [52] on algorithmic mechanis...

Preference Elicitation in Combinatorial Auctions (Extended Abstract)

by Wolfram Conen, Tuomas Sandholm - IN PROCEEDINGS OF THE ACM CONFERENCE ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE (ACM-EC , 2001
"... Combinatorial auctions (CAs) where bidders can bid on bundles of items can be very desirable market mechanisms when the items sold exhibit complementarity and/or substitutability, so the bidder's valuations for bundles are not additive. However, in a basic CA, the bidders may need to bid on e ..."
Abstract - Cited by 108 (27 self) - Add to MetaCart
Combinatorial auctions (CAs) where bidders can bid on bundles of items can be very desirable market mechanisms when the items sold exhibit complementarity and/or substitutability, so the bidder's valuations for bundles are not additive. However, in a basic CA, the bidders may need to bid on exponentially many bundles, leading to di#culties in determining those valuations, undesirable information revelation, and unnecessary communication. In this paper we present a design of an auctioneer agent that uses topological structure inherent in the problem to reduce the amount of information that it needs from the bidders. An analysis tool is presented as well as data structures for storing and optimally assimilating the information received from the bidders. Using this information, the agent then narrows down the set of desirable (welfare-maximizing or Pareto-e#cient) allocations, and decides which questions to ask next. Several algorithms are presented that ask the bidders for value, order, and rank information. A method is presented for making the elicitor incentive compatible.

Rationality and Self-Interest in Peer to Peer Networks

by Jeffrey Shneidman, David C. Parkes - IN 2ND INT. WORKSHOP ON PEER-TO-PEER SYSTEMS (IPTPS’03) , 2003
"... Much of the existing work in peer to peer networking assumes that users will follow prescribed protocols without deviation. This assumption ignores the user's ability to modify the behavior of an algorithm for self-interested reasons. ..."
Abstract - Cited by 99 (9 self) - Add to MetaCart
Much of the existing work in peer to peer networking assumes that users will follow prescribed protocols without deviation. This assumption ignores the user's ability to modify the behavior of an algorithm for self-interested reasons.
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...utcomes while retaining computational feasibility [16]. Research in mechanism design has also focused on the design of mechanisms that reduce the computational complexity of agent participation (e.g. =-=[18]-=-). Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design (DAMD) is an even newer construction [7]. Whereas AMD is concerned with a centralized implementation, DAMD assumes that a mechanism is carried out via a dis...

Contract-Based Load Management in Federated Distributed Systems

by Magdalena Balazinska, Hari Balakrishnan, Mike Stonebraker - In NSDI Symposium , 2004
"... This paper focuses on load management in looselycoupled federated distributed systems. We present a distributed mechanism for moving load between autonomous participants using bilateral contracts that are negotiated offline and that set bounded prices for moving load. We show that our mechanism has ..."
Abstract - Cited by 87 (8 self) - Add to MetaCart
This paper focuses on load management in looselycoupled federated distributed systems. We present a distributed mechanism for moving load between autonomous participants using bilateral contracts that are negotiated offline and that set bounded prices for moving load. We show that our mechanism has good incentive properties, efficiently redistributes excess load, and has a low overhead in practice.
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...a systemwide optimal allocation. As recent applications frequently involve independently administered entities, more efforts have started to consider participant selfishness. In mechanism design (MD) =-=[20, 33]-=-, agents reveal their costs to a central entity that computes the optimal allocation and a vector of compensating payments. Agents seek to maximize their utility computed as the difference between pay...

A Concise Introduction to Multiagent Systems and Distributed AI

by Nikos Vlassis , 2003
"... ..."
Abstract - Cited by 70 (14 self) - Add to MetaCart
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...ns by any other general mechanism. The revelation principle has been proven a powerful theoretical tool for establishing several possibility and impossibility results in mechanism design (see, e.g., (=-=Parkes, 2001-=-) for details and references). Example: second-price sealed-bid (Vickrey) auction Let us return to the auction example, and consider a direct-revelation mechanism M3(Θi, f, p) with p as in M2. In othe...

Computational-Mechanism Design: A Call to Arms

by Rajdeep K. Dash, Nicholas R. Jennings, David C. Parkes - IEEE INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS , 2003
"... ..."
Abstract - Cited by 69 (6 self) - Add to MetaCart
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Specification Faithfulness in Networks with Rational Nodes

by Jeffrey Shneidman, David C. Parkes , 2004
"... It is useful to prove that an implementation correctly follows a specification. But even with a provably correct implementation, given a choice, would a node choose to follow it? This paper explores how to create distributed system specifications that will be faithfully implemented in networks with ..."
Abstract - Cited by 66 (10 self) - Add to MetaCart
It is useful to prove that an implementation correctly follows a specification. But even with a provably correct implementation, given a choice, would a node choose to follow it? This paper explores how to create distributed system specifications that will be faithfully implemented in networks with rational nodes, so that no node will choose to deviate. Given a strategyproof centralized mechanism, and given a network of nodes modeled as having rational-manipulation faults, we provide a proof technique to establish the incentive-, communication-, and algorithm-compatibility properties that guarantee that participating nodes are faithful to a suggested specification. As a case study, we apply our methods to extend the strategyproof interdomain routing mechanism proposed by Feigenbaum, Papadimitriou, Sami, and Shenker (FPSS) [7], defining a faithful implementation.

Auction Design with Costly Preference Elicitation

by David Parkes - Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence , 2003
"... We consider auction design in a setting with costly preference elicitation. We motivate the role of proxy agents, that are situated between bidders and the auction, and maintain partial information about agent preferences and compute equilibrium bidding strategies based on the available information. ..."
Abstract - Cited by 65 (14 self) - Add to MetaCart
We consider auction design in a setting with costly preference elicitation. We motivate the role of proxy agents, that are situated between bidders and the auction, and maintain partial information about agent preferences and compute equilibrium bidding strategies based on the available information. The proxy agents can also elicit additional preference information incrementally during an auction. We show that indirect mechanisms, such as proxied ascending-price auctions, can achieve better allocative efficiency with less preference elicitation than direct mechanisms, such as sealed-bid auctions.
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...on to theoretical mechanism design. It can be used both to prove negative results, and also to define incentive-compatible payment rules. However, the revelation principle ignores computational costs =-=[26, 37, 10]-=-. Consider the following two computational disadvantages of DRMs: 1. All computation (e.g. winner-determination, payments) is centralized in a DRM, while an indirect mechanism can distribute computati...

Distributed Implementations of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanisms

by David C. Parkes, Jeffrey Shneidman - in Proc. 3rd Int. Joint Conf. on Autonomous Agents and Multi Agent Systems , 2004
"... Mechanism design (MD) provides a useful method to implement outcomes with desirable properties in systems with self-interested computational agents. One drawback, however, is that computation is implicitly centralized in MD theory, with a central planner taking all decisions. We consider distributed ..."
Abstract - Cited by 49 (10 self) - Add to MetaCart
Mechanism design (MD) provides a useful method to implement outcomes with desirable properties in systems with self-interested computational agents. One drawback, however, is that computation is implicitly centralized in MD theory, with a central planner taking all decisions. We consider distributed implementations, in which the outcome is determined by the self-interested agents themselves. Clearly this introduces new opportunities for manipulation. We propose a number of principles to guide the distribution of computation, focusing in particular on Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms for implementing outcomes that maximize total value across agents. Our solutions bring the complete implementation into an ex post Nash equilibrium.

Iterative combinatorial auctions

by David C. Parkes , 2001
"... ..."
Abstract - Cited by 49 (4 self) - Add to MetaCart
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