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16
Techniques for Design and Implementation of Secure Reconfigurable PUFs
- ACM TRETS
, 2009
"... Physically unclonable functions (PUFs) provide a basis for many security and digital rights management protocols. PUF-based security approaches have numerous comparative strengths with respect to traditional cryptography-based techniques, including resilience against physical and side channel attack ..."
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Cited by 37 (16 self)
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Physically unclonable functions (PUFs) provide a basis for many security and digital rights management protocols. PUF-based security approaches have numerous comparative strengths with respect to traditional cryptography-based techniques, including resilience against physical and side channel attacks and suitability for lightweight protocols. However, classical delay-based PUF structures have a number of drawbacks including susceptibility to guessing, reverse engineering, and emulation attacks, as well as sensitivity to operational and environmental variations. To address these limitations, we have developed a new set of techniques for FPGA-based PUF design and implementation. We demonstrate how reconfigurability can be exploited to eliminate the stated PUF limitations. We also show how FPGA-based PUFs can be used for privacy protection. Furthermore, reconfigurability enables the introduction of new techniques for PUF testing. The effectiveness of all the proposed techniques is validated using extensive implementations, simulations, and statistical analysis.
CheapBFT: resource-efficient byzantine fault tolerance
- In European Conference on Computer Systems (EuroSys
, 2012
"... One of the main reasons why Byzantine fault-tolerant (BFT) systems are not widely used lies in their high resource consumption: 3f + 1 replicas are necessary to tolerate only f faults. Recent works have been able to reduce the minimum number of replicas to 2f + 1 by relying on a trusted subsystem th ..."
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Cited by 19 (6 self)
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One of the main reasons why Byzantine fault-tolerant (BFT) systems are not widely used lies in their high resource consumption: 3f + 1 replicas are necessary to tolerate only f faults. Recent works have been able to reduce the minimum number of replicas to 2f + 1 by relying on a trusted subsystem that prevents a replica from making conflicting statements to other replicas without being detected. Nevertheless, having been designed with the focus on fault handling, these systems still employ a majority of replicas during normalcase operation for seemingly redundant work. Furthermore, the trusted subsystems available trade off performance for security; that is, they either achieve high throughput or they come with a small trusted computing base. This paper presents CheapBFT, a BFT system that, for the first time, tolerates that all but one of the replicas active in normal-case operation become faulty. CheapBFT runs a composite agreement protocol and exploits passive replication to save resources; in the absence of faults, it requires that only f + 1 replicas actively agree on client requests and execute them. In case of suspected faulty behavior, CheapBFT triggers a transition protocol that activates f extra passive replicas and brings all non-faulty replicas into a consistent state again. This approach, for example, allows the system to safely switch to another, more resilient agreement protocol. CheapBFT relies on an FPGA-based trusted subsystem for the authentication of protocol messages that provides high performance and comprises a small trusted computing base.
A Trusted Mobile Phone Reference Architecture via Secure Kernel
- In Proceedings of the ACM workshop on Scalable Trusted Computing
, 2007
"... Driven by the ever increasing information security demands in mobile devices, the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) formed a dedicated group — Mobile Phone Working Group (MPWG) — to address the security needs of mobile platforms. Along this direction, the MPWG has recently released a Trusted Mobile Pho ..."
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Cited by 18 (3 self)
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Driven by the ever increasing information security demands in mobile devices, the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) formed a dedicated group — Mobile Phone Working Group (MPWG) — to address the security needs of mobile platforms. Along this direction, the MPWG has recently released a Trusted Mobile Phone Reference Architecture Specification. In order to realize trusted mobile platforms, they adapt well-known concepts like TPM, isolation, integrity measurement, etc. from the trusted PC world — with slight modifications due to the characteristics and resource limitations of mobile devices — into generic mobile phone platforms. The business needs of mobile phone industry mandate 4 different stakeholders (platform owners): device manufacturer, cellular service provider, general service provider, and of course the end-user. The specification requires separate trusted and isolated operational domains,
Embedded Trusted Computing with Authenticated Non-Volatile Memory ⋆
"... Abstract. Trusted computing is an emerging technology to improve the trustworthiness of computing platforms. The Trusted Computing Group has proposed specifications for a Trusted Platform Module and a Mobile Trusted Module. One of the key problems when integrating these trusted modules into an embed ..."
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Cited by 6 (0 self)
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Abstract. Trusted computing is an emerging technology to improve the trustworthiness of computing platforms. The Trusted Computing Group has proposed specifications for a Trusted Platform Module and a Mobile Trusted Module. One of the key problems when integrating these trusted modules into an embedded system-on-chip design, is the lack of on-chip multiple-time-programmable non-volatile memory. In this paper, we describe a solution to protect the trusted module’s persistent state in external memory against non-invasive attacks. We introduce a minimal cryptographic protocol to achieve an authenticated channel between the trusted module and the external non-volatile memory. A MAC algorithm has to be added to the external memory to ensure authenticity. As a case study, we discuss trusted computing on reconfigurable hardware. In order to make our solution applicable to the low-end FPGA series which has no security measures on board, we present a solution that only relies on the reverse engineering complexity of the undocumented bitstream encoding and uses a physically unclonable function for one-time-programmable key storage. Clearly, this solution is also applicable to high-end series with special security measures on board. Our solution also supports field updates of the trusted module. 1
Memory Security Management for Reconfigurable Embedded Systems
"... The constrained operating environments of many FPGAbased embedded systems require flexible security that can be configured to minimize the impact on FPGA area and power consumption. In this paper, a security approach for external memory in FPGA-based embedded systems that exploits FPGA configurabili ..."
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Cited by 6 (3 self)
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The constrained operating environments of many FPGAbased embedded systems require flexible security that can be configured to minimize the impact on FPGA area and power consumption. In this paper, a security approach for external memory in FPGA-based embedded systems that exploits FPGA configurability is presented. Our FPGA-based security core provides both confidentiality and integrity for data stored externally to an FPGA which is accessed by a processor on the FPGA chip. The benefits of our security core are demonstrated using four embedded applications implemented on a Stratix II device. Each application requires a collection of tasks with varying memory security requirements. Our security core is used in conjunction with a NIOS II soft processor running the MicroC/OS II operating system. An average memory and energy savings of about 64 % and 16%, respectively, is achieved for the four applications versus a non-configurable, uniform security approach. 1
Trust in a small package: minimized mrtm software implementation for mobile secure environments. In:
- STC ’09: Proceedings of the 2009 ACM workshop on Scalable trusted computing,
, 2009
"... ABSTRACT In this paper we present a software-based implementation of a Mobile Remote Owner Trusted Module, using security extensions of contemporary System-On-Chip architectures. An explicit challenge are the constrained resources of such on-chip mechanisms. We expose a software architecture that m ..."
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Cited by 6 (0 self)
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ABSTRACT In this paper we present a software-based implementation of a Mobile Remote Owner Trusted Module, using security extensions of contemporary System-On-Chip architectures. An explicit challenge are the constrained resources of such on-chip mechanisms. We expose a software architecture that minimizes the code and data size of the MRTM, applying some novel approaches proposed in recent research. Additionally, we explore alternatives within the specification to further optimize the size of MTMs. We present an analysis of specific new security issues induced by the architecture. Performance figures for an on-the-market mobile handset are provided. The results clearly indicate that a software-based MRTM is feasible on modern embedded hardware with legacy security environments.
Reassassing the TCG Specifications for Trusted Computing in Mobile Embedded Systems.
- In 1st IEEE Workshop on hardware-Oriented Security and Trust HOST2008: 84(Ed)^(Eds):
, 2008
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Forward-secure content distribution to reconfigurable hardware
- In Reconfigurable Computing and FPGAs
, 2008
"... Confidentiality and integrity of bitstreams and authenticated update of FPGA configurations are fundamental to trusted computing on reconfigurable technology. In this paper, we propose to provide these security services for digital content broadcast to FPGA-based devices. To that end, we introduce a ..."
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Cited by 3 (0 self)
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Confidentiality and integrity of bitstreams and authenticated update of FPGA configurations are fundamental to trusted computing on reconfigurable technology. In this paper, we propose to provide these security services for digital content broadcast to FPGA-based devices. To that end, we introduce a new property we call forward security, which ensures that broadcast content can only be accessed by FPGA chips configured with the latest bitstream version. We describe the hardware architecture and communication protocols supporting this security property, and we evaluate the associated cost.
VoteBox Nano: A Smaller, Stronger FPGA-based Voting Machine
- In EVT/WOTE ’09: Proceedings of the 2009 USENIX/Accurate Electronic Voting Technology Workshop / Workshop on Trustworthy Elections
"... This paper describes a minimal implementation of a cryptographically secure electronic voting system, built with a low-cost Xilinx FPGA board. This system, called VoteBox Nano, follows the same basic design principles as VoteBox, a full-featured electronic voting system. As with VoteBox, the votes a ..."
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Cited by 2 (0 self)
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This paper describes a minimal implementation of a cryptographically secure electronic voting system, built with a low-cost Xilinx FPGA board. This system, called VoteBox Nano, follows the same basic design principles as VoteBox, a full-featured electronic voting system. As with VoteBox, the votes are encrypted using Elgamal homomorphic encryption and the accuracy of the system can be challenged by real voters during an ongoing election. In order to fit within the limits of a minimal FPGA, VoteBox Nano eliminates VoteBox’s sophisticated network replication and storage facilities. In return, VoteBox Nano runs without any operating systems or language runtime system, radically shrinking the implementation complexity. VoteBox Nano also integrates a hardware true random number generator, providing improved security for the ballot cryptography. In order to deter hardware tampering, which might be done to compromise the random number generator, the FPGA’s native JTAG interface can be used to verify the FPGA’s configuration. At boot-time, the proper FPGA configuration also displays a random number on the builtin display. Any interaction with the JTAG interface will replace the random number with another one, allowing poll workers to detect election-day tampering, simply by observing whether the number has changed. 1
Flexible µTPMs through Disembedding
"... With the utilization of TPM-based trusted platforms in real applications, and the subsequent adaption of the specifica-tion to the experience gained from such utilization, it in-creasingly appears that the TPM architecture has some fun-damental flaws that result in more and more complex and expensiv ..."
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Cited by 1 (0 self)
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With the utilization of TPM-based trusted platforms in real applications, and the subsequent adaption of the specifica-tion to the experience gained from such utilization, it in-creasingly appears that the TPM architecture has some fun-damental flaws that result in more and more complex and expensive hardware requirements. In this paper, we propose a new architecture that resets the trust boundary to a much smaller scale, thus allowing for much simpler and more flex-ible TPM implementations, without sacrificing the security gains from a classical TPM. Categories and Subject Descriptors C.2 [Computer Systems Organization]: Special-Purpose