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Core affect and the psychological construction of emotion
- Psychological Review
"... At the heart of emotion, mood, and any other emotionally charged event are states experienced as simply feeling good or bad, energized or enervated. These states—called core affect—influence reflexes, perception, cognition, and behavior and are influenced by many causes internal and external, but pe ..."
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Cited by 448 (0 self)
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At the heart of emotion, mood, and any other emotionally charged event are states experienced as simply feeling good or bad, energized or enervated. These states—called core affect—influence reflexes, perception, cognition, and behavior and are influenced by many causes internal and external, but people have no direct access to these causal connections. Core affect can therefore be experienced as freefloating (mood) or can be attributed to some cause (and thereby begin an emotional episode). These basic processes spawn a broad framework that includes perception of the core-affect-altering properties of stimuli, motives, empathy, emotional meta-experience, and affect versus emotion regulation; it accounts for prototypical emotional episodes, such as fear and anger, as core affect attributed to something plus various nonemotional processes. Most major topics in psychology and every major problem faced by humanity involve emotion. Perhaps the same could be said of cognition. Yet, in the psychology of human beings, with passions as well as reasons, with feelings as well as thoughts, it is the emotional side that remains the more mysterious. Psychology and humanity can progress without considering emotion—about as fast
Reflective and impulsive determinants of social behavior
- Personality and Social Psychology Review
, 2004
"... This article describes a 2-systems model that explains social behavior as a joint function of reflective and impulsive processes. In particular, it is assumed that social behavior is controlled by 2 interacting systems that follow different operating principles. The reflective system generates behav ..."
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Cited by 365 (5 self)
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This article describes a 2-systems model that explains social behavior as a joint function of reflective and impulsive processes. In particular, it is assumed that social behavior is controlled by 2 interacting systems that follow different operating principles. The reflective system generates behavioral decisions that are based on knowledge about facts and values, whereas the impulsive system elicits behavior through associative links and motivational orientations. The proposed model describes how the 2 systems interact at various stages of processing, and how their outputs may determine behavior in a synergistic or antagonistic fashion. It extends previous models by integrating motivational components that allow more precise predictions of behavior. The implications of this reflective–impulsive model are applied to various phenomena from social psychology and beyond. Extending previous dual-process accounts, this model is not limited to specific domains of mental functioning and attempts to integrate cognitive, motivational, and behavioral mechanisms. In the history of attempts to discover the causes of human behavior, the most widespread explanations are based on the assumption that human beings do what they believe is good for them. Thus, they are construed as “rational animals ” capable of recognizing the value or utility of their actions. At the same time, however, it is obvious that human beings do not always act this way; that is, under certain circumstances people behave in ways that do not reflect their values. To account for this phenomenon, to which the Greek philosophers gave the name akrasia (e.g., Mele, 1992), several strategies have been pursued. The first strategy assumes ignorance or lack of knowledge on the part of the actor. Socrates, for example, claimed that if people only knew what is good for them, they would act accordingly. A similar position is held by modern economists who imply that irrational decisions This article received the 2003 Theoretical Innovation Price of the
Political conservatism as motivated social cognition
- Psychological Bulletin
, 2003
"... Analyzing political conservatism as motivated social cognition integrates theories of personality (authoritarianism, dogmatism–intolerance of ambiguity), epistemic and existential needs (for closure, regulatory focus, terror management), and ideological rationalization (social dominance, system just ..."
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Cited by 333 (39 self)
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Analyzing political conservatism as motivated social cognition integrates theories of personality (authoritarianism, dogmatism–intolerance of ambiguity), epistemic and existential needs (for closure, regulatory focus, terror management), and ideological rationalization (social dominance, system justification). A meta-analysis (88 samples, 12 countries, 22,818 cases) confirms that several psychological variables predict political conservatism: death anxiety (weighted mean r �.50); system instability (.47); dogmatism–intolerance of ambiguity (.34); openness to experience (–.32); uncertainty tolerance (–.27); needs for order, structure, and closure (.26); integrative complexity (–.20); fear of threat and loss (.18); and self-esteem (–.09). The core ideology of conservatism stresses resistance to change and justification of inequality and is motivated by needs that vary situationally and dispositionally to manage uncertainty and threat. Conservatism is a demanding mistress and is giving me a migraine. —George F. Will, Bunts For more than half a century, psychologists have been tracking the hypothesis that different psychological motives and tendencies underlie ideological differences between the political left and the
Beyond valence: Toward a model of emotion-specific influences on judgement and choice
- Cognition and Emotion
, 2000
"... Most theories of affective in ¯ uences on judgement and choice take a valencebased approach, contrasting the effects of positive versus negative feeling states. These approaches have not speci ® ed if and when distinct emotions of the same valence have different effects on judgement. In this article ..."
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Cited by 282 (20 self)
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Most theories of affective in ¯ uences on judgement and choice take a valencebased approach, contrasting the effects of positive versus negative feeling states. These approaches have not speci ® ed if and when distinct emotions of the same valence have different effects on judgement. In this article, we propose a model of emotion-speci ® c in ¯ uences on judgement and choice. We posit that each emotion is de ® ned by a tendency to perceive new events and objects in ways that are consistent with the original cognitive-appraisal dimensions of the emotion. To pit the valence and appraisal-tendency approaches against one another, we present a study that addresses whether two emotions of the same valence but differing appraisalsÐ anger and fearÐ relate in different ways to risk perception. Consistent with the appraisaltendency hypothesis, fearful people made pessimistic judgements of future events whereas angry people made optimistic judgements. In the Discussion we expand the proposed model and review evidence supporting two social moderators of appraisal-tendency processes.
The affect system has parallel and integrative processing components: Form follows function
- Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
, 1999
"... The affect system has been shaped by the hammer and chisel of adaptation and natural selection such that form follows function. The characteristics of the system thus differ across the nervous system as a function of the unique constraints existent at each level. For instance, although physical limi ..."
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Cited by 183 (6 self)
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The affect system has been shaped by the hammer and chisel of adaptation and natural selection such that form follows function. The characteristics of the system thus differ across the nervous system as a function of the unique constraints existent at each level. For instance, although physical limitations constrain behavioral expressions and incline behavioral predispositions toward a bipolar (good—bad, approach—withdraw) organization, these limiting conditions lose their power at the level of underlying mechanisms. According to the authors ' model of evaluative space ( J. T. Cacioppo & G. G. Berntson, 1994; J. T. Cacioppo, W. L. Gardner, & G. G. Berntson, 1997), the common metric governing approach—withdrawal is generally a single dimension at response stages that itself is the consequence of multiple operations, such as the activation function for positivity (appetition) and the activation function for negativity (aversion), at earlier affective processing stages.
All Negative Moods Are Not Equal: Motivational Influences of Anxiety and Sadness on Decision
- Making. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes.79(1):56-77 Rajgopal
, 1999
"... Affective states of the same valence may have distinct, yet predictable, influences on decision processes. Results from three experiments show that, in gambling decisions, as well as in jobselection decisions, sad individuals are biased in favor of highrisk/high-reward options, whereas anxious indiv ..."
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Cited by 105 (6 self)
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Affective states of the same valence may have distinct, yet predictable, influences on decision processes. Results from three experiments show that, in gambling decisions, as well as in jobselection decisions, sad individuals are biased in favor of highrisk/high-reward options, whereas anxious individuals are biased in favor of low-risk/low-reward options. We argue that these biases occur because anxiety and sadness convey distinct types of information to the decision-maker and prime different goals. While anxiety primes an implicit goal of uncertainty reduction, sadness primes an implicit goal of reward replacement. We offer that these motivational influences operate through an active process of feeling monitoring, whereby anxious or sad individuals think about the options and ask themselves, “What would I feel better about...? ” � 1999 Academic Press Common wisdom holds that one should abstain from making substantial resolutions unless one is cool and collected. Consider, however, the career moves that a recently cut-off employee has to investigate or the relocation decisions The authors contributed equally to the research and are listed in random order. The research was funded in part by a research grant from the Graduate School of Business of Columbia University to the second author. Address correspondence and reprint requests either to Rajagopal Raghunathan, Stern School
Self-regulation of goal setting: Turning free fantasies about the future into binding goals
- Journal of Psychology and Social Psychology
, 2001
"... Fantasy realization theory states that when people contrast their fantasies about a desired future with reflections on present reality, a necessity to act is induced that leads to the activation and use of relevant expectations. Strong goal commitment arises in light of favorable expectations, and w ..."
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Cited by 103 (39 self)
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Fantasy realization theory states that when people contrast their fantasies about a desired future with reflections on present reality, a necessity to act is induced that leads to the activation and use of relevant expectations. Strong goal commitment arises in light of favorable expectations, and weak goal commitment arises in light of unfavorable expectations. To the contrary, when people only fantasize about a desired future or only reflect on present reality, expectancy-independent moderate goal commitment emerges. Four experiments pertaining to various life domains supported these hypotheses. Strength of goal commitment was assessed in cognitive (e.g., making plans), affective (e.g., felt attachment), and behavioral terms (e.g., effort expenditure, quality of performance). Implications for theories on goal setting and goal striving are discussed.
Employee commitment and motivation: A conceptual analysis and integrative model
- Journal of Applied Psychology
, 2004
"... Theorists and researchers interested in employee commitment and motivation have not made optimal use of each other’s work. Commitment researchers seldom address the motivational processes through which commitment affects behavior, and motivation researchers have not recognized important distinctions ..."
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Cited by 102 (1 self)
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Theorists and researchers interested in employee commitment and motivation have not made optimal use of each other’s work. Commitment researchers seldom address the motivational processes through which commitment affects behavior, and motivation researchers have not recognized important distinctions in the forms, foci, and bases of commitment. To encourage greater cross-fertilization, the authors present an integrative framework in which commitment is presented as one of several energizing forces for motivated behavior. E. A. Locke’s (1997) model of the work motivation process and J. P. Meyer and L. Herscovitch’s (2001) model of workplace commitments serve as the foundation for the development of this new framework. To facilitate the merger, a new concept, goal regulation, is derived from self-determination theory (E. L. Deci & R. M. Ryan, 1985) and regulatory focus theory (E. I. Higgins, 1997). By including goal regulation, it is acknowledged that motivated behavior can be accompanied by different mindsets that have particularly important implications for the explanation and prediction of discretionary work behavior. Organizational scientists and practitioners have long been inter-ested in employee motivation and commitment. This interest de-rives from the belief and evidence that there are benefits to having
Negative affects deriving from the behavioral approach system
- Emotion
, 2004
"... Does the behavioral approach system (BAS) relate to the experience of any negative affects, or are all negative affects tied to the behavioral inhibition system (BIS)? In Study 1, self-reported Fun Seeking predicted reports of greater frustration and sadness after frustrative nonreward. In Study 2, ..."
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Cited by 102 (14 self)
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Does the behavioral approach system (BAS) relate to the experience of any negative affects, or are all negative affects tied to the behavioral inhibition system (BIS)? In Study 1, self-reported Fun Seeking predicted reports of greater frustration and sadness after frustrative nonreward. In Study 2, self-reported Reward Responsiveness predicted reports of greater anger in response to scenarios. In Study 3, self-reported Drive predicted reports of greater anger after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. In no case did BIS sensitivity contribute uniquely to these affects, though BIS predicted nervousness in Study 2 and fear in Study 3. Discussion focuses on the role of frustration and anger in effortful pursuit of goals and depressed affect in disengagement from goals. Preparation of this article was facilitated by National Cancer Institute Grants CA64710, CA78995, and CA84944. My thanks to Walter Scott for consultation during the development of the anger-eliciting scenarios and to Björn Meyer and Sheri Johnson for comments on earlier versions of this article. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed
Leading us not unto temptation: Momentary allurements elicit overriding goal activation
- Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
, 2003
"... The present research explored the nature of automatic associations formed between short-term motives (temptations) and the overriding goals with which they interfere. Five experimental studies, encompassing several self-regulatory domains, found that temptations tend to activate such higher priority ..."
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Cited by 96 (20 self)
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The present research explored the nature of automatic associations formed between short-term motives (temptations) and the overriding goals with which they interfere. Five experimental studies, encompassing several self-regulatory domains, found that temptations tend to activate such higher priority goals, whereas the latter tend to inhibit the temptations. These activation patterns occurred outside of participants’ conscious awareness and did not appear to tax their mental resources. Moreover, they varied as a function of subjective goal importance and were more pronounced for successful versus unsuccessful self-regulators in a given domain. Finally, priming by temptation stimuli was found not only to influence the activation of overriding goals but also to affect goal-congruent behavioral choices. A delicious chocolate cake in the storefront of a bakery may remind individuals of the unfortunate fact that they should go on a diet. A thought of an exotic place, ideal for a relaxing vacation, may conjure up approaching deadlines at work. Momentarily alluring yet morally questionable activities may spontaneously bring to mind the image of a stern parent or a religious leader. On these and similar occasions, elaborating on a seemingly desirable course
