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Election Verifiability: Cryptographic Definitions and an Analysis of Helios and JCJ
, 2015
"... Definitions of election verifiability in the computational model of cryptography are proposed. The definitions formalize notions of voters verifying their own votes, auditors verifying the tally of votes, and auditors verifying that only eligible voters vote. The Helios (Adida et al., 2009) and JCJ ..."
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Definitions of election verifiability in the computational model of cryptography are proposed. The definitions formalize notions of voters verifying their own votes, auditors verifying the tally of votes, and auditors verifying that only eligible voters vote. The Helios (Adida et al., 2009) and JCJ (Juels et al., 2010) election schemes are analyzed using these definitions. Helios 4.0 satisfies the definitions, but Helios 2.0 does not because of previously known attacks. JCJ does not satisfy the definitions because of a trust assumption it makes, but it does satisfy a weakened definition. Two previous definitions of verifiability (Juels et al., 2010; Cortier et al., 2014) are shown to permit election schemes vulnerable to attacks, whereas the new definitions prohibit those schemes.
BeleniosRF: A Strongly Receipt-Free Electronic Voting Scheme
"... We propose a new voting scheme, BeleniosRF, that offers both strong receipt-freeness and end-to-end verifiability. It is strongly receipt-free in the sense that even dishonest voters cannot prove how they voted. We give a game-based definition capturing this property, inspired by and improving the o ..."
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We propose a new voting scheme, BeleniosRF, that offers both strong receipt-freeness and end-to-end verifiability. It is strongly receipt-free in the sense that even dishonest voters cannot prove how they voted. We give a game-based definition capturing this property, inspired by and improving the original receipt-freeness definition by Benaloh and Tuinstra. Built upon the Helios protocol, BeleniosRF inherits from its simplicity. 1
Zero-Knowledge Proofs and Applications
"... The material below covers two lectures on the beautiful and influential concept of zero-knowledge proofs. This notion, introduced by Goldwasser, Micali and Rackoff [GMR85] formal-izes the idea of a proof that “yields nothing but its validity”.1 We will start by describing a simple running example, w ..."
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The material below covers two lectures on the beautiful and influential concept of zero-knowledge proofs. This notion, introduced by Goldwasser, Micali and Rackoff [GMR85] formal-izes the idea of a proof that “yields nothing but its validity”.1 We will start by describing a simple running example, which will allow us to abstract away some basic properties. This will lead to the concept of Σ-protocols, and their application to construct secure identification schemes. Next, we will move to cryptographic applications. In particular we will show how to use zero-knowledge proofs to construct efficient (and provably secure) identification and signature schemes. Finally, we will formalize the definition of zero-knowledge and survey the main results about constructing zero-knowledge proofs for all NP. The topics covered and the exposition, are inspired by [Dam10, HL10, Ven12]. Comments,
Ceremonies for End-to-End Verifiable Elections
, 2015
"... State-of-the-art e-voting systems rely on voters to perform certain actions to ensure that the election authorities are not manipulating the election result. This so-called “end-to-end (E2E) verifiability ” is the hallmark of current e-voting protocols; nevertheless, thorough analysis of current sys ..."
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State-of-the-art e-voting systems rely on voters to perform certain actions to ensure that the election authorities are not manipulating the election result. This so-called “end-to-end (E2E) verifiability ” is the hallmark of current e-voting protocols; nevertheless, thorough analysis of current systems is still far from being complete. In this work, we initiate the study of e-voting protocols as ceremonies. A ceremony, as introduced by Ellison [Ell07], is an extension of the notion of a protocol that includes human participants as separate nodes of the system that should be taken into account when performing the security analysis. We propose a model for secure e-voting ceremonies that centers on the two properties of end-to-end verifiability and privacy/receipt-freeness and allows the consideration of arbitrary behavioral distributions for the human participants. We then analyze the Helios system as an e-voting ceremony. Security in the e-voting ceremony model requires the specification of a class of human behaviors with respect to which the security properties can be preserved. We show how end-to-end verifiability is sensitive to human behavior in the protocol by characterizing the set of behaviors under
