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Election Verifiability: Cryptographic Definitions and an Analysis of Helios and JCJ
, 2015
"... Definitions of election verifiability in the computational model of cryptography are proposed. The definitions formalize notions of voters verifying their own votes, auditors verifying the tally of votes, and auditors verifying that only eligible voters vote. The Helios (Adida et al., 2009) and JCJ ..."
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Definitions of election verifiability in the computational model of cryptography are proposed. The definitions formalize notions of voters verifying their own votes, auditors verifying the tally of votes, and auditors verifying that only eligible voters vote. The Helios (Adida et al., 2009) and JCJ (Juels et al., 2010) election schemes are analyzed using these definitions. Helios 4.0 satisfies the definitions, but Helios 2.0 does not because of previously known attacks. JCJ does not satisfy the definitions because of a trust assumption it makes, but it does satisfy a weakened definition. Two previous definitions of verifiability (Juels et al., 2010; Cortier et al., 2014) are shown to permit election schemes vulnerable to attacks, whereas the new definitions prohibit those schemes.
BeleniosRF: A Strongly ReceiptFree Electronic Voting Scheme
"... We propose a new voting scheme, BeleniosRF, that offers both strong receiptfreeness and endtoend verifiability. It is strongly receiptfree in the sense that even dishonest voters cannot prove how they voted. We give a gamebased definition capturing this property, inspired by and improving the o ..."
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We propose a new voting scheme, BeleniosRF, that offers both strong receiptfreeness and endtoend verifiability. It is strongly receiptfree in the sense that even dishonest voters cannot prove how they voted. We give a gamebased definition capturing this property, inspired by and improving the original receiptfreeness definition by Benaloh and Tuinstra. Built upon the Helios protocol, BeleniosRF inherits from its simplicity. 1
ZeroKnowledge Proofs and Applications
"... The material below covers two lectures on the beautiful and influential concept of zeroknowledge proofs. This notion, introduced by Goldwasser, Micali and Rackoff [GMR85] formalizes the idea of a proof that “yields nothing but its validity”.1 We will start by describing a simple running example, w ..."
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The material below covers two lectures on the beautiful and influential concept of zeroknowledge proofs. This notion, introduced by Goldwasser, Micali and Rackoff [GMR85] formalizes the idea of a proof that “yields nothing but its validity”.1 We will start by describing a simple running example, which will allow us to abstract away some basic properties. This will lead to the concept of Σprotocols, and their application to construct secure identification schemes. Next, we will move to cryptographic applications. In particular we will show how to use zeroknowledge proofs to construct efficient (and provably secure) identification and signature schemes. Finally, we will formalize the definition of zeroknowledge and survey the main results about constructing zeroknowledge proofs for all NP. The topics covered and the exposition, are inspired by [Dam10, HL10, Ven12]. Comments,
Ceremonies for EndtoEnd Verifiable Elections
, 2015
"... Stateoftheart evoting systems rely on voters to perform certain actions to ensure that the election authorities are not manipulating the election result. This socalled “endtoend (E2E) verifiability ” is the hallmark of current evoting protocols; nevertheless, thorough analysis of current sys ..."
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Stateoftheart evoting systems rely on voters to perform certain actions to ensure that the election authorities are not manipulating the election result. This socalled “endtoend (E2E) verifiability ” is the hallmark of current evoting protocols; nevertheless, thorough analysis of current systems is still far from being complete. In this work, we initiate the study of evoting protocols as ceremonies. A ceremony, as introduced by Ellison [Ell07], is an extension of the notion of a protocol that includes human participants as separate nodes of the system that should be taken into account when performing the security analysis. We propose a model for secure evoting ceremonies that centers on the two properties of endtoend verifiability and privacy/receiptfreeness and allows the consideration of arbitrary behavioral distributions for the human participants. We then analyze the Helios system as an evoting ceremony. Security in the evoting ceremony model requires the specification of a class of human behaviors with respect to which the security properties can be preserved. We show how endtoend verifiability is sensitive to human behavior in the protocol by characterizing the set of behaviors under