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...ferent types of financial choices and indicate that excessive activation of these circuits may lead to investing mistakes. Thus, consideration of anticipatory neural mechanisms may add predictive power to the rational actor model of economic decision making. Introduction Individual investors systematically deviate from optimal behavior, which could influence asset valuation (Daniel et al., 2002; Hirshleifer, 2001; Odean, 1998). The causes of these deviations have not been established, but emotion may have some influence. While some research has examined the role of emotion in decision making (Camerer et al., 2005; Loewenstein et al., 2001) and economists have begun to incorporate emotion into models of individual choice (Bernheim and Rangel, 2004; Caplin and Leahy, 2001), scientists still lack a mechanistic account of how emotion might influence choice. Understanding such mechanisms might help theorists to specify more accurate models of individual decision making, which could ultimately improve the design of economic institutions so as to facilitate optimal investor behavior. Here, we sought to examine whether neural activation linked to anticipatory affect would predict financial choices. At least t...

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... [44], [45], or [46]), surveys (like [47], [48], or [1]), and experiments (in the lab [4], [28], or [29]; and in the field [39]) with behavioral economics and newer approaches (such as neuroeconomics =-=[49]-=-) may help us cast light on the intricacies and surprising observations with respect to privacy valuations and actions. The above research can improve policy decision making and technology design for ...

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...to use brain imaging. This allows researchers to directly measure neurological activation during a decision task. The rapid evolution of the field of neuroeconomics has resulted in a wealth of data about distinct brain systems involved in 2688 G.S. Berns et al. / NeuroImage 49 (2010) 2687–2696elements of individual choice (see, for example, Rangel et al., 2008). Based on these data, some consensus has arisen about the functions of different regions of the brain. For example, convergent evidence from these studies points to activation in dopaminergic receptive regions as associated with value (Camerer et al., 2005; Glimcher et al., 2005; Hampton and O'Doherty, 2007; Knutson et al., 2007; Knutson et al., 2005; Montague and Berns, 2002). Similarly, the activation of the insula has been associated with aversive states (Berns et al., 2006, 2008; Chandrasekhar et al., 2008; Craig, 2003; Koyama et al., 2005; Peyron et al., 2000; Ploghaus et al., 2003; Porro et al., 2002). In contrast, there is less consensus about the neural mechanisms of social influence. However, using current knowledge of how the brain processes reward, it is possible to utilize fMRI technology to discriminate between conformity that is m...

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...TMS (e.g. Martin and Gotts, 2005; Paus, 2005) because it “directly leads to causal inferences about brain functioning rather than the purely associational evidence provided by imaging tech12 niques” (=-=Camerer et al., 2005-=-, pp.13–14). For example, Knoch et al. (2006) used TMS to understand the neural mechanisms underlying a common behavior observed in the strategic situation known as the “ultimatum game.” In this game,...

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...lopmental neuroscience (Johnson, Munakata, & Gilmore, 2001), and social neuroscience (Cacioppo, Visser, & Pickett, 2005). It is increasingly true in economics, where the rapid rise of neuroeconomics (=-=Camerer, Loewenstein, & Prelec, 2005-=-) has caught the attention of the popular press (Cassidy, 2006). Other social sciences, including communication (Anderson et al., 2006), political science (McDermott, 2004), and sociology (Wexler, 200...

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...mean that their socially conditioned autonomic brains are oblivious to all considerations or hints of a future, especially it seems, in the case of the dictator game. I think these results are significant in hinting as to how geared subject brains are to be cognizant (if unconsciously) of building valuable reputations in the repeat interactions of daily life—considerations that it would be convenient to believe are fully controlled in the single play of a stage game between anonymous pairs of subjects. When a subject faces a task choice in a one-shot game what is her homeostatic “set point?” (Camerer et al., 2005) How safe are we in assuming that the set point corresponds to the experimentalist/theorist definition: a single interaction between strangers in which the players take no account of reputation issues? How is that set point affected by circumstances and history? Suppose a person’s accustomed behavioral mode is to try cooperation in most or all first encounters, because this seems to have had long term benefits, and to modify it only when it is discovered to ill serve her in a particular situation. Then when matched by the gods with another like person, this “set point” will earn her more money...