Results 1  10
of
17
OURS: Optimal Unicast Routing Systems in NonCooperative Wireless Networks
 MOBICOM'06
, 2006
"... We propose novel solutions for unicast routing in wireless networks consisted of selfish terminals: in order to alleviate the inevitable overpayment problem (and thus economic inefficiency) of the VCG (VickreyClarkGroves) mechanism, we design a mechanism that results in Nash equilibria rather tha ..."
Abstract

Cited by 25 (3 self)
 Add to MetaCart
We propose novel solutions for unicast routing in wireless networks consisted of selfish terminals: in order to alleviate the inevitable overpayment problem (and thus economic inefficiency) of the VCG (VickreyClarkGroves) mechanism, we design a mechanism that results in Nash equilibria rather than the traditional strategyproofness (using weakly dominant strategy). In addition, we systematically study the unicast routing system in which both the relay terminals and the service requestor (either the source or the destination nodes or both) could be selfish. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that presents social efficient unicast routing systems with proved performance guarantee. Thus, we call the proposed systems: Optimal Unicast Routing Systems (OURS). Our main contributions of OURS are as follows. (1) For the principal model where the service requestor is not selfish, we propose a
A game approach for multichannel allocation in multihop wireless networks
 In Proceedings of the 9th ACM International Symposium on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing (MOBIHOC ’08
, 2008
"... Channel allocation was extensively investigated in the framework of cellular networks, but it was rarely studied in the wireless adhoc networks, especially in the multihop adhoc networks. In this paper, we study the competitive multiradio channel allocation problem in multihop wireless networ ..."
Abstract

Cited by 20 (0 self)
 Add to MetaCart
(Show Context)
Channel allocation was extensively investigated in the framework of cellular networks, but it was rarely studied in the wireless adhoc networks, especially in the multihop adhoc networks. In this paper, we study the competitive multiradio channel allocation problem in multihop wireless networks in detail. We model the channel allocation problem as a static cooperative game, in which some players collaborate to achieve high date rate. We propose the minmax coalitionproof Nash equilibrium (MMCPNE) channel allocation scheme in the game, which aims to max the achieved date rates of communication links. We analyze the existence of MMCPNE and prove the necessary conditions for MMCPNE. Furthermore, we propose several algorithms that enable the selfish players to converge to MMCPNE. Simulation results show that MMCPNE outperforms CPNE and NE schemes in terms of achieved data rates of the multihop links due to cooperation gain.
Efficient and Strategyproof Spectrum Allocations in Multichannel Wireless Networks
"... Abstract—In this paper, we study the spectrum assignment problem for wireless access networks. We assume that each secondary user will bid a certain value for exclusive usage of some spectrum channels for a certain time period or for a certain time duration. A secondary user may also require the exc ..."
Abstract

Cited by 15 (4 self)
 Add to MetaCart
(Show Context)
Abstract—In this paper, we study the spectrum assignment problem for wireless access networks. We assume that each secondary user will bid a certain value for exclusive usage of some spectrum channels for a certain time period or for a certain time duration. A secondary user may also require the exclusive usage of a subset of channels, or require the exclusive usage of a certain number of channels. Thus, several versions of problems are formulated under various different assumptions. For the majority of problems, we design PTAS or efficient constantapproximation algorithms such that overall profit is maximized. Here, the profit is defined as the total bids of all satisfied secondary users. As a side product of our algorithms, we are able to show that a previously studied Scheduling Split Interval Problem (SSIP) [2], in which each job is composed of t intervals, cannot be approximated within Oðt1 Þ for any small>0 unless NP ZPP. Opportunistic spectrum usage, although a promising technology, could suffer from the selfish behavior of secondary users. In order to improve opportunistic spectrum usage, we then propose to combine the game theory with wireless modeling. We show how to design a truthful mechanism based on all of these algorithms such that the best strategy of each secondary user to maximize its own profit is to truthfully report its actual bid.
Truthful Online Spectrum Allocation and Auction in MultiChannel Wireless Networks
"... Abstract—We propose efficient spectrum channel allocation and auction methods for the online wireless channel scheduling. Assume that each user requests for the exclusive usage of a number of wireless channels for a certain time interval. The scheduler has to decide whether to grant its exclusive us ..."
Abstract

Cited by 12 (2 self)
 Add to MetaCart
(Show Context)
Abstract—We propose efficient spectrum channel allocation and auction methods for the online wireless channel scheduling. Assume that each user requests for the exclusive usage of a number of wireless channels for a certain time interval. The scheduler has to decide whether to grant its exclusive usage an how much will be charged. To possibly serve users with higher priority, preemptions are allowed with penalties. We analytically prove that our protocols are efficient, truthful, and they have asymptotically optimum competitive ratios. Our extensive simulations show that they perform almost optimum: most of our methods can achieve more than 50 % of the optimum by offline method. Index Terms—Spectrum, online algorithm, competitive ratio, wireless networks, mechanisms, strategyproof. I.
Dealing With Selfishness and Moral Hazard in NonCooperative Wireless Networks
, 2008
"... For noncooperative networks in which each node is a selfish agent, certain incentives must be given to intermediate nodes to let them forward the data for others. What makes the scenario worse is that, in a multihop noncooperative network, the endpoints can only observe whether or not the endto ..."
Abstract

Cited by 6 (0 self)
 Add to MetaCart
For noncooperative networks in which each node is a selfish agent, certain incentives must be given to intermediate nodes to let them forward the data for others. What makes the scenario worse is that, in a multihop noncooperative network, the endpoints can only observe whether or not the endtoend transaction was successful or not, but not the individual actions of intermediate nodes. Thus, in the absence of properly designed incentive schemes, rational and selfish intermediate nodes may choose to forward data packets at a very low priority or simply drop the packets, and they could put the blame on the unreliable channel. In this paper, assuming the receiver is a trusted authority, we propose several methods that discourage the hidden actions under hidden information in multihop noncooperative networks with high probability. We design several algorithmic mechanisms for a number of routing scenarios such that each selfish agent will maximize its expected utility (i.e., profit) when it truthfully declares its type (i.e., cost and its actions) and it truthfully follows its declared actions. Our simulations show that the payments by our mechanisms are only slightly larger than the actual cost incurred by all intermediate nodes.
Mechanism design for set cover games when elements are agents
 In Proc 1st Intl Conf Algorithmic Applications in Management (AAIM
, 2005
"... Abstract. In this paper we study the set cover games when the elements are selfish agents. In this case, each element has a privately known valuation of receiving the service from the sets, i.e., being covered by some set. Each set is assumed to have a fixed cost. We develop several approximately ef ..."
Abstract

Cited by 5 (1 self)
 Add to MetaCart
Abstract. In this paper we study the set cover games when the elements are selfish agents. In this case, each element has a privately known valuation of receiving the service from the sets, i.e., being covered by some set. Each set is assumed to have a fixed cost. We develop several approximately efficient strategyproof mechanisms, each of which decides, after soliciting the declared bids by all elements, which elements will be covered, which sets will provide the coverage to these selected elements, and how much each element will be charged. For singlecover 1 set cover games, we present a mechanism that is at least dmaxefficient, 1 dmax fraction i.e., the total valuation of all selected elements is at least of the total valuation produced by any mechanism. Here dmax is the maximum size of the sets. For multicover set cover games, we present 1 a budgetbalanced strategyproof mechanism that isefficient dmaxHdmax under reasonable assumptions. Here Hn is the harmonic function. For set cover games when both sets and elements are selfish agents, we show that a crossmonotonic paymentsharing scheme does not necessarily induce a strategyproof mechanism. This is a sharp contrast to the wellknown fact that a crossmonotonic costsharing scheme always induces a strategyproof mechanism. 1
Mechanism design for set cover games with selfish element agents
 Theor. Comput. Sci
, 2010
"... In this paper we study the set cover games when the elements are selfish agents, each of which has a privately known valuation of receiving the service from the sets, i.e., being covered by some set. Each set is assumed to have a fixed cost. We develop several approximately efficient strategyproof m ..."
Abstract

Cited by 5 (0 self)
 Add to MetaCart
In this paper we study the set cover games when the elements are selfish agents, each of which has a privately known valuation of receiving the service from the sets, i.e., being covered by some set. Each set is assumed to have a fixed cost. We develop several approximately efficient strategyproof mechanisms that decide, after soliciting the declared bids by all elements, which elements will be covered, which sets will provide the coverage to these selected elements, and how much each element will be charged. For singlecover set cover games, we present a mechanism 1 that is at leastefficient, i.e., the total valuation of all selected eldmax 1 ements is at least fraction of the total valuation produced by any dmax
Strongly polynomialtime truthful mechanisms in one shot
 In Proc. of the International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics (WINE), LNCS
, 2006
"... Abstract. One of the main challenges in algorithmic mechanism design is to turn (existing) efficient algorithmic solutions into efficient truthful mechanisms. Building a truthful mechanism is indeed a difficult process since the underlying algorithm must obey certain “monotonicity ” properties and s ..."
Abstract

Cited by 2 (0 self)
 Add to MetaCart
(Show Context)
Abstract. One of the main challenges in algorithmic mechanism design is to turn (existing) efficient algorithmic solutions into efficient truthful mechanisms. Building a truthful mechanism is indeed a difficult process since the underlying algorithm must obey certain “monotonicity ” properties and suitable payment functions need to be computed (this task usually represents the bottleneck in the overall time complexity). We provide a general technique for building truthful mechanisms that provide optimal solutions in strongly polynomial time. We show that the entire mechanism can be obtained if one is able to express/write a strongly polynomialtime algorithm (for the corresponding optimization problem) as a “suitable combination ” of simpler algorithms. This approach applies to a wide class of mechanism design graph problems, where each selfish agent corresponds to a weighted edge in a graph (the weight of the edge is the cost of using that edge). Our technique can be applied to several optimization problems which prior results cannot
Design Differentiated Service Multicast With Selfish Agents
, 2005
"... Differentiated service (DiffServ) is a mechanism to provide the Quality of Service (QoS) with a certain performance guarantee. In this paper, we study how to design DiffServ multicast when every relay link is an independent selfish agent. We assume that each link ei is associated with a (privately k ..."
Abstract

Cited by 2 (0 self)
 Add to MetaCart
Differentiated service (DiffServ) is a mechanism to provide the Quality of Service (QoS) with a certain performance guarantee. In this paper, we study how to design DiffServ multicast when every relay link is an independent selfish agent. We assume that each link ei is associated with a (privately known) cost coefficient ci such that the cost of ei to provide a transmission service with bandwidth demand x is ci · x. Further, we assume that there is a fixed source node s and a set R of receivers, each of which requires from s data with a minimum bandwidth demand. The DiffServ multicast problem is to compute a linkweighted tree rooted at s and spanning R such that the receivers ’ demands are met. This generalizes the traditional link weighted Steiner tree problem. We first show that a previous approximation algorithm does not directly induce a strategyproof mechanism. We then give a new polynomial time algorithm to construct a DiffServ multicast tree whose total cost is no more than 8 times the optimal total cost when the cost coefficient of each link is known. Based on this tree, we design a truthful mechanism for DiffServ multicast, i.e., we give a polynomialtime computable payment scheme to compensate all chosen relay links such that each link maximizes its profit when it declares its cost coefficient truthfully.
Using Nash Implementation to Achieve Better Frugality Ratios
"... Abstract. Most of the recent works on algorithmic mechanism design exploit the solution concept of dominant strategy equilibria. Such work designs a proper payment scheme so that selfish agents maximize their utility by truthfully revealing their types. It has been pointed out that these truthful me ..."
Abstract

Cited by 1 (0 self)
 Add to MetaCart
Abstract. Most of the recent works on algorithmic mechanism design exploit the solution concept of dominant strategy equilibria. Such work designs a proper payment scheme so that selfish agents maximize their utility by truthfully revealing their types. It has been pointed out that these truthful mechanisms, the famous among them being the VCG mechanisms, often incur high payments and fruglity ratios. In this work, we exploit the solution concept of Nash implementation to overcome this problem. Our mechanisms induce a set of Nash equilibria so that selfish agents have incentive to act based on a Nash equilibrium. We prove that our mechanisms enjoy substantial advantages over the truthful mechanisms in terms of payment and frugality. 1