Background: An increasing body of evidence has demonstrated that in contrast to the classic understanding the primary somatosensory cortex (SI) reflects merely seen touch (in the absence of any real touch on the own body). Based on these results it has been discussed that SI may play a role in understanding touch seen on other bodies. In order to further examine this understanding of observed touch, the current study aimed to test if mirror-like responses in SI are affected by the perspective of the seen touch. Thus, we presented touch on a hand and close to the hand either in first-person-perspective or in third-person-perspective. Principal Findings: Results of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) revealed stronger vicarious brain responses in SI/BA2 for touch seen in first-person-perspective. Surprisingly, the third-person viewpoint revealed activation in SI both when subjects viewed a hand being stimulated as well as when the space close to the hand was being touched. Conclusions/Significance: Based on these results we conclude that vicarious somatosensory responses in SI/BA2 are affected by the viewpoint of the seen hand. Furthermore, we argue that mirror-like responses in SI do not only reflect seen touch, but also the peripersonal space surrounding this body (in third-person-perspective). We discuss these findings with recent studies on mirror responses for action observation in peripersonal space.

Abstract: In the present paper we address the issue of the role of the body in shaping our basic self-awareness. It is generally taken for granted that basic bodily self-awareness has primarily to do with proprioception. Here we challenge this assumption by arguing from both a phenomenological and a neurophysiological point of view that our body is primarily given to us as a manifold of action possibilities that cannot be reduced to any form of proprioceptive awareness. By discussing the notion of affordance and the spatiality of the body we show that both have to be construed in terms of the varying range of our power for action. Finally, we posit that the motor roots of our bodily self-awareness shed new light on both the common ground for and the distinguishing criterium between self and other. The proper-ties of the mirror mechanism indicate that the same action possibili-ties constituting our bodily self also allow us to make sense of other bodily selves inasmuch as their action possibilities can be mapped onto our own ones. Our proposal may pave the way towards a general deconstruction of the different layers at the core of our full-fledged sense of self and others.

Social dysfunction has been recognized as an elementary feature of schizophrenia, but it remains a crucial issue whether social deficits in schizophrenia concern the inter-subjective domain or primarily have their roots in disturbances of self-experience. Social perception comprises vicarious processes grounding an experiential inter-relationship with others as well as self-regulation processes allowing to maintain a coherent sense of self. The present study investigated whether the functional neural basis underlying these processes is altered in first-episode schizophrenia (FES). Twenty-four FES patients and 22 healthy control participants underwent functional magnetic resonance imaging during a social perception task requiring them to watch videos depicting other individuals ’ inanimate and animate/social tactile stimulations, and a tactile localizer condition. Activation in ventral premotor cortex for observed bodily tactile stimulations was reduced in the FES group and negatively correlated with self-experience disturbances. Moreover, FES patients showed aberrant differential activation in posterior insula for first-person tactile experiences and observed affective tactile stimulations. These findings suggest that social perception in FES at a pre-reflective level is characterized by disturbances of self-experience, including impaired multisensory representations and self-other distinction. However, the results also show that social perception in FES involves more complex

■ Effective social interactions require the ability to evaluate other peopleʼs actions and intentions, sometimes only on the basis of such subtle factors as body language, and these eval-uative judgments may lead to powerful impressions. However, little is known about the impact of affective body language on evaluative responses in social settings and the associated neu-ral correlates. This study investigated the neural correlates of observing social interactions in a business setting, in which whole-body dynamic stimuli displayed approach and avoidance behaviors that were preceded or not by a handshake and were followed by participants ʼ ratings of these behaviors. First, ap-proach was associated with more positive evaluations than avoidance behaviors, and a handshake preceding social interac-tion enhanced the positive impact of approach and diminished the negative impact of avoidance behavior on the evaluation of social interaction. Second, increased sensitivity to approach than to avoidance behavior in the amygdala and STS was linked to a positive evaluation of approach behavior and a positive im-pact of handshake. Third, linked to the positive effect of hand-shake on social evaluation, nucleus accumbens showed greater activity for Handshake than for No-handshake conditions. These findings shed light on the neural correlates of observing and evaluating nonverbal social interactions and on the role of handshake as a way of formal greeting. ■

Moving in a co-ordinated fashion with another individual changes our behaviour towards them; we tend to like them more, find them more attractive, and are more willing to co-operate with them. It is generally assumed that this effect on behaviour results from alterations in representations of self and others. Specifically, through neurophysiological perception-action matching mechanisms, interpersonal motor co-ordination (IMC) is believed to forge a neural coupling between actor and observer, which serves to blur boundaries in conceptual self-other representations and causes positive views of the self to be projected onto others. An investigation into this potential neural mechanism is lacking, however. Moreover, the specific components of IMC that might influence this mechanism have not yet been specified. In the present study we exploited a robust behavioural phenomenon – automatic imitation – to assess the degree to which IMC influences neural action observation-execution matching mechanisms. This revealed that automatic imitation is reduced when the actions of another individual are perceived to be synchronised in time, but are spatially incongruent, with our own. We interpret our findings as evidence that IMC does indeed exert an effect on neural perception-action matching mechanisms, but this serves to promote better self-other distinction. Our findings demonstrate that further investigation is required to understand the complex relationship between neural perception-action coupling, conceptual self-other representations, and social

The timely and thought-provoking essay by Siri Hustvedt provides a fascinating account of the relationship between imagination and memory and discusses this relationship against the background of different disciplines like psychoanalysis, cognitive neuroscience, and phenomenology. Hustvedt sheds new light from the inside on the process of artistic creativity by emphasizing that the bodily affective self is at the roots of the narrative self. In the present commentary, I present and briefly discuss recent scientific results cor-roborating Hustvedt’s thesis and propose how embodied simulation theory can account for many aspects of the relationship between artistic production and its aesthetic experience.

Movement perception and its role in aesthetic experience have been often studied, within empirical aesthetics, in relation to the human body. No such specificity has been defined in neuroimaging studies with respect to contents lacking a human form. The aim of this work was to explore, through functional magnetic imaging (fMRI), how perceived movement is processed during the aesthetic judgment of paintings using two types of content: human subjects and scenes of nature. Participants, untutored in the arts, were shown the stimuli and asked to make aesthetic judgments. Additionally, they were instructed to observe the paintings and to rate their perceived movement in separate blocks. Observation highlighted spontaneous processes associated with aesthetic experience, whereas movement judgment outlined activations specifically related to movement processing. The ratings recorded during aesthetic judgment revealed that nature scenes received higher scored than human content paintings. The imaging data showed similar activation, relative to baseline, for all stimuli in the three tasks, including