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Boolean games revisited
 In Proc. ECAI ’06
, 2006
"... Abstract. Game theory is a widely used formal model for studying strategical interactions between agents. Boolean games [7] are two players, zerosum static games where player’s utility functions are binary and described by a single propositional formula, and the strategies available to a player co ..."
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Cited by 23 (4 self)
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Abstract. Game theory is a widely used formal model for studying strategical interactions between agents. Boolean games [7] are two players, zerosum static games where player’s utility functions are binary and described by a single propositional formula, and the strategies available to a player consist of truth assignments to each of a given set of propositional variables (the variables controlled by the player.) We generalize the framework to nplayers games which are not necessarily zerosum. We give simple characterizations of Nash equilibria and dominated strategies, and investigate the computational complexity of the related problems. 1
Compact preference representation for boolean games
 In Proceedings of the 9th Pacific Rim International Conference on Artificial Intelligence (PRICAI
, 2006
"... Abstract. Boolean games, introduced by [15, 14], allow for expressing compactly twoplayers zerosum static games with binary preferences: an agent’s strategy consists of a truth assignment of the propositional variables she controls, and a player’s preferences is expressed by a plain propositional ..."
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Cited by 16 (4 self)
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Abstract. Boolean games, introduced by [15, 14], allow for expressing compactly twoplayers zerosum static games with binary preferences: an agent’s strategy consists of a truth assignment of the propositional variables she controls, and a player’s preferences is expressed by a plain propositional formula. These restrictions (twoplayers, zerosum, binary preferences) strongly limit the expressivity of the framework. While the first two can be easily encompassed by defining the agents ’ preferences as an arbitrary nuple of propositional formulas, relaxing the last one needs Boolean games to be coupled with a propositional language for compact preference representation. In this paper, we consider generalized Boolean games where players ’ preferences are expressed within two of these languages: prioritized goals and propositionalized CPnets. 1
Comparing the notions of optimality in CPnets, strategic games and soft constraints
 Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
"... and soft constraints ..."
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Graphical representation of ordinal preferences: Languages and applications
 In ICCS
, 2010
"... The specification of a decision making problem includes the agent’s preferences on the available alternatives. The choice of a model of preferences (e.g., utility functions or binary relations) does not say how preferences should be represented (or specified). A naive idea would consist in writing t ..."
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Cited by 2 (0 self)
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The specification of a decision making problem includes the agent’s preferences on the available alternatives. The choice of a model of preferences (e.g., utility functions or binary relations) does not say how preferences should be represented (or specified). A naive idea would consist in writing them explicitly, simply by enumerating all possible
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"... Comparing the notions of optimality in CPnets, strategic games and soft constraints ..."
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Comparing the notions of optimality in CPnets, strategic games and soft constraints
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, 810
"... A comparison of the notions of optimality in soft constraints and graphical games ..."
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A comparison of the notions of optimality in soft constraints and graphical games