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69
Campaign spending regulation in a model of redistributive politics,
- Economic Theory
, 2006
"... Abstract We consider a model in which parties that differ in perceived valence choose how to allocate electoral promises (money, pork-barrel projects) among voters. The party perceived to be less valent has a greater incentive to "sell out" to a favored minority and completely expropriate ..."
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Cited by 39 (0 self)
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Abstract We consider a model in which parties that differ in perceived valence choose how to allocate electoral promises (money, pork-barrel projects) among voters. The party perceived to be less valent has a greater incentive to "sell out" to a favored minority and completely expropriate a fraction of the electorate. By reducing the difference in perceived valence, campaign-finance regulations may reduce the extent of the expropriation and achieve a more equitable political outcome. We analyze various instruments of campaign-finance regulation from this perspective. * We thank Alessandro Lizzeri, George Mailath, and Andrew Postlewaite for their comments. The second author is grateful to the National Science Foundation for financial support under grant SES-0078870.
Political Motivations
, 2005
"... Are politicians motivated by policy outcomes or by the perks of office? The answer to this question is central to understanding the behavior of office holders and the policies they produce. Despite the question’s importance, however, the existing literature is not well suited to provide an answer. T ..."
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Cited by 21 (0 self)
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Are politicians motivated by policy outcomes or by the perks of office? The answer to this question is central to understanding the behavior of office holders and the policies they produce. Despite the question’s importance, however, the existing literature is not well suited to provide an answer. To shed light on the issue of political motivations I exploit a basic fact: to hold office, one must first win election. By characterizing the types of candidates that succeed in elections, I am able to predict the types that hold office and the policies that are produced. Toward this end, I develop a simple model of two candidate electoral competition in which candidates may be either office or policy motivated. In a second departure from standard formulations, the model incorporates both campaign and post-election behavior of candidates. In this environment I find that office motivated candidates are favored in electoral competition, but that their advantage is limited by the electoral mechanism itself, and policy motivated candidates win a significant fraction of elections. More importantly, I show that the competitive interaction among candidates of different motivations affects the incentives of all candidates — both office and policy motivated — and that this competition affects policy outcomes.
Spatial Competition Between Two Candidates of Different Quality: The Effects of Candidate Ideology and Private Information
- In Social Choice and Strategic Decisions
, 2005
"... This paper examines competition in a spatial model of two-candidate elec-tions, where one candidate enjoys a quality advantage over the other candi-date. The candidates care about winning and also have policy preferences. There is two-dimensional private information. Candidate ideal points as well a ..."
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Cited by 20 (2 self)
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This paper examines competition in a spatial model of two-candidate elec-tions, where one candidate enjoys a quality advantage over the other candi-date. The candidates care about winning and also have policy preferences. There is two-dimensional private information. Candidate ideal points as well as their tradeoffs between policy preferences and winning are private informa-tion. The distribution of this two-dimensional type is common knowledge. The location of the median voter’s ideal point is uncertain, with a distribu-tion that is commonly known by both candidates. Pure strategy equilibria always exist in this model. We characterize the effects of increased uncer-tainty about the median voter, the effect of candidate policy preferences, and the effects of changes in the distribution of private information. We prove that the distribution of candidate policies approaches the mixed equilibrium of Aragones and Palfrey (2002a), when both candidates ’ weights on policy preferences go to zero. Key words: candidate quality; spatial competition; purification
Schilperoord / Spatial models of political competition with endogenous political parties /27
, 2003
"... Two of the most important action selection processes analyzed in the social sciences are the choice by citizens of parties to support in elections and the choice by party leaders of policy “packages ” offered to citizens in order to attract this support. Having reviewed some of the main approaches t ..."
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Two of the most important action selection processes analyzed in the social sciences are the choice by citizens of parties to support in elections and the choice by party leaders of policy “packages ” offered to citizens in order to attract this support. Having reviewed some of the main approaches to analyzing these choices and the reasons for doing this using the methodology of agent-based modeling, we extend a recent agent-based model of party competition to deal with the birth and death of political parties, treating the number and identity of political parties as an output of, rather than an analyst-specified input to, the process of party competition. Party birth is modeled as an endogenous change of agent type from citizen to party leader, which requires describing (cumulative) citizen dissatisfaction with the history of the system. Aggregate outputs are measured in terms the mean and standard deviation of citizens ’ distances from their closest party, and the configuration of party positions is characterized in terms of mean party eccentricity. Endogenous birth and death of parties transforms into a dynamic system even an environment where all agents have otherwise non-responsive adaptive rules. A key parameter is the survival threshold, with lower thresholds leaving citizens on average less dissatisfied. Paradoxically, the adaptive rule most successful for party leaders in winning votes makes citizens on average less happy than under other policy-selection rules in birth-adapted party systems. Draft paper prepared for:
Signaling character in electoral competition
- FORTHCOMING, AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
, 2006
"... We study a one dimensional Hotelling-Downs model of electoral competition with the following innovation: a fraction of candidates have “character ” and are exogenously committed to a campaign platform; this is unobservable to voters. However, character is desirable, and a voter’s utility is a convex ..."
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Cited by 14 (2 self)
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We study a one dimensional Hotelling-Downs model of electoral competition with the following innovation: a fraction of candidates have “character ” and are exogenously committed to a campaign platform; this is unobservable to voters. However, character is desirable, and a voter’s utility is a convex combination of standard policy preferences and her assessment a candidate’s character. This structure generates a signaling game between strategic candidates and voters, since a policy platform not only affects voters’ utilities directly, but also indirectly through inferences about a candidate’s character. The model generates a number of predictions, starting with a failure of the median voter theorem. The results may help explain why candidates sometimes choose non-median platforms, and moreover, why a majority of voters can rationally vote for a non-centrist candidate.
Electoral Contests, Incumbency Advantages and Campaign Finance
, 2007
"... Most campaigns do not revolve around policy commitments; instead, we think of campaigns as contests in which candidates spend time, energy and money to win. This paper develops models of electoral competition in which candidates select levels of effort. The analysis offers insights into which possib ..."
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Cited by 13 (0 self)
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Most campaigns do not revolve around policy commitments; instead, we think of campaigns as contests in which candidates spend time, energy and money to win. This paper develops models of electoral competition in which candidates select levels of effort. The analysis offers insights into which possible causes of the incumbency advantage are consistent with the empirical record. Marginal asymmetries in costs or technology can explain the advantage; asymmetries in voter preferences cannot. The analysis also speaks to the consequences of campaign finance reform. Reforms can be interpreted as shocks to the cost of influencing voter’s perceptions; limits generally increase the likelihood that advantaged incumbents win, and even limits that target incumbents do not actually improve the welfare of disadvantaged challengers. Alternatively caps on the amount of effort can either increase or decrease the probability that the disadvantaged candidate wins. Either type of reform lowers voter welfare. 1
The Effect of Candidate Quality on Electoral Equilibrium: An Experimental Study. American Political Science Review
, 2004
"... 1 When two candidates of different quality compete in a one dimensional policy space, the equilibrium outcomes are asymmetric and do not correspond to the median. There are three main effects. First, the better candidate adopts more centrist policies than the worse candidate. Second, the equilibrium ..."
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Cited by 12 (4 self)
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1 When two candidates of different quality compete in a one dimensional policy space, the equilibrium outcomes are asymmetric and do not correspond to the median. There are three main effects. First, the better candidate adopts more centrist policies than the worse candidate. Second, the equilibrium is statistical, in the sense that it predicts a probability distribution of outcomes rather than a single degenerate outcome. Third, the equilibrium varies systematically with the level of uncertainty about the location of the median voter. We test these three predictions using laboratory experiments, and find strong support for all three. We also observe some biases and show that they can be explained by Quantal Response Equilibrium. 2 Candidate quality differences can produce significant changes in the
Competing on good politicians
- American Political Science Review
, 2011
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