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...e when thescurrent goal had been achieved. It now appears that goals are simply stored in declarative memorysand later retrieved as the participant chooses to work on them (Anderson & Douglass, 2001;s=-=Altmann & Trafton, 2002-=-). Memory for such goals appears to obey all the properties of othersdeclarative memories. This adds further evidence to the view that in many ways the goal system andsdeclarative memory are strongly ...

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...st immediately available for a peripheral task [8, 9]. After interruption, the next schematic event could be quickly recalled from memory and execution could resume with potentially little disruption =-=[1, 26, 30]-=-. The placements of some of the moments for interruption (see Table 2) are similar to those that appear in other studies [3, 11, 23], but they are distinct in a few fundamental ways. Interruption trig...

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...s critical to the ACT–R theory. Until recently, the problem state and the control state were merged into a single goal system. There have been a number of developments to improve ACT–R’s goal system (=-=Altmann & Trafton, 2002-=-; Anderson & Douglass, 2001), and this is another development. There were two reasons for choosing to separate control state (goal buffer) and problem state knowledge (imaginal buffer). First (and thi...

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... and the actual interrupting task (e.g., the phone conversation). They found that, when interrupted, people used the interruption lag to prepare for later resumption of the interrupted task (see also =-=Altmann & Trafton, 2002-=-). In particular, they posit that people use prospective goal encoding as well as retrospective goal rehearsal to maintain a high activation on the interrupted goal, facilitating later retrieval. Such...

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...rruption [27, 29]. Recovering from interruptions Research has shown that inopportune interruptions can increase task performance time, primarily due to increases in the time to resume suspended tasks =-=[1, 19, 20]-=-. Cognitive models suggest that when the workload of the ongoing task is high, interruptions cause users to divert cognitive resources to the interrupting task [31]. On return from the interrupting ta...

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...uitive interaction design is arguably facilitated. A clear example of this comes from spatial reasoning, where in general, people seem to use a combination of spatial and propositional knowledge [9], =-=[31]-=-–[36]. As a matter of practice, though, robotic approaches to spatial reasoning must take into account such factors as the variety and limitations of sensor data, the functional structure of this data...

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...perceptually available during this brief period, and (2) the actual duration of this period. The relevance of these two factors is predicated on a memory model of what makes interruptions disruptive (=-=Altmann & Trafton, 2002-=-; Trafton, Altmann, Brock, & Mintz, 2003). The basic premise of the model is that during an interruption, the cognitive representations that support performance of the primary task will decay, in part...

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...the interruption and the actual resumption of operations associated with the primary task. This time interval, which is a theory-driven metric for interruption recovery, is called the resumption lag (=-=Altmann & Trafton, 2002-=-; Trafton et al., 2003). The model also proposes that people can strategically rehearse their goals to mitigate this decay, which could be critical in terms of minimizing the disruptive effects of int...

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... of the intervals that the driver’s vision is “available” (see Figure 1). In the interruptions research paradigm, there is a measure of task resumption time that is referred to as the resumption lag (=-=Altmann & Trafton, 2002-=-). This lag is the additional time it takes users to resume the task after having switched back from an interruption. As shown in Figure 2, the resumption lags take away from the time-on-task during a...

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...latter would seem to be a substrate on which more complex expressions of cognitive control are built. Indeed, the computational mechanisms we describe here are adapted from a model of puzzle solving (=-=Altmann & Trafton, 2002-=-) in which cognitive control involves suspending and activating subgoals to control search through a problem space. The 1 The authors thank Gordon Logan, Nachshon Meiran, Nick Yeung, and two anonymous...