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205
Explicit Provability And Constructive Semantics
- Bulletin of Symbolic Logic
, 2001
"... In 1933 G odel introduced a calculus of provability (also known as modal logic S4) and left open the question of its exact intended semantics. In this paper we give a solution to this problem. We find the logic LP of propositions and proofs and show that G odel's provability calculus is noth ..."
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In 1933 G odel introduced a calculus of provability (also known as modal logic S4) and left open the question of its exact intended semantics. In this paper we give a solution to this problem. We find the logic LP of propositions and proofs and show that G odel's provability calculus is nothing but the forgetful projection of LP. This also achieves G odel's objective of defining intuitionistic propositional logic Int via classical proofs and provides a Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov style provability semantics for Int which resisted formalization since the early 1930s. LP may be regarded as a unified underlying structure for intuitionistic, modal logics, typed combinatory logic and #-calculus.
Formalizing Context (Expanded Notes)
, 1995
"... this article was going through many versions as the ideas developed, and the mutual influences cannot be specified. This work was partly supported by DARPA contract NAG2-703 and ARPA/ONR grant N00014-94-1-0775 ..."
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Cited by 124 (5 self)
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this article was going through many versions as the ideas developed, and the mutual influences cannot be specified. This work was partly supported by DARPA contract NAG2-703 and ARPA/ONR grant N00014-94-1-0775
Focusing and Polarization in Linear, Intuitionistic, and Classical Logics
, 2009
"... A focused proof system provides a normal form to cut-free proofs in which the application of invertible and non-invertible inference rules is structured. Within linear logic, the focused proof system of Andreoli provides an elegant and comprehensive normal form for cut-free proofs. Within intuitioni ..."
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Cited by 68 (27 self)
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A focused proof system provides a normal form to cut-free proofs in which the application of invertible and non-invertible inference rules is structured. Within linear logic, the focused proof system of Andreoli provides an elegant and comprehensive normal form for cut-free proofs. Within intuitionistic and classical logics, there are various different proof systems in the literature that exhibit focusing behavior. These focused proof systems have been applied to both the proof search and the proof normalization approaches to computation. We present a new, focused proof system for intuitionistic logic, called LJF, and show how other intuitionistic proof systems can be mapped into the new system by inserting logical connectives that prematurely stop focusing. We also use LJF to design a focused proof system LKF for classical logic. Our approach to the design and analysis of these systems is based on the completeness of focusing in linear logic and on the notion of polarity that appears in Girard’s LC and LU proof systems.
The Logic of Justification
- Cornell University
, 2008
"... We describe a general logical framework, Justification Logic, for reasoning about epistemic justification. Justification Logic is based on classical propositional logic augmented by justification assertions t:F that read t is a justification for F. Justification Logic absorbs basic principles origin ..."
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Cited by 44 (5 self)
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We describe a general logical framework, Justification Logic, for reasoning about epistemic justification. Justification Logic is based on classical propositional logic augmented by justification assertions t:F that read t is a justification for F. Justification Logic absorbs basic principles originating from both mainstream epistemology and the mathematical theory of proofs. It contributes to the studies of the well-known Justified True Belief vs. Knowledge problem. We state a general Correspondence Theorem showing that behind each epistemic modal logic, there is a robust system of justifications. This renders a new, evidence-based foundation for epistemic logic. As a case study, we offer a resolution of the Goldman-Kripke ‘Red Barn ’ paradox and analyze Russell’s ‘prime minister example ’ in Justification Logic. Furthermore, we formalize the wellknown Gettier example and reveal hidden assumptions and redundancies in Gettier’s reasoning. 1
Provability logic
- Handbook of Philosophical Logic, 2nd ed
, 2004
"... We describe a general logical framework, Justification Logic, for reasoning about epistemic justification. Justification Logic is based on classical propositional logic augmented by justification assertions t:F that read t is a justification for F. Justification Logic absorbs basic principles origin ..."
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Cited by 44 (14 self)
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We describe a general logical framework, Justification Logic, for reasoning about epistemic justification. Justification Logic is based on classical propositional logic augmented by justification assertions t:F that read t is a justification for F. Justification Logic absorbs basic principles originating from both mainstream epistemology and the mathematical theory of proofs. It contributes to the studies of the well-known Justified True Belief vs. Knowledge problem. As a case study, we formalize Gettier examples in Justification Logic and reveal hidden assumptions and redundancies in Gettier reasoning. We state a general Correspondence Theorem showing that behind each epistemic modal logic, there is a robust system of justifications. This renders a new, evidence-based foundation for epistemic logic. 1
Cut-Elimination and a Permutation-Free Sequent Calculus for Intuitionistic Logic
, 1998
"... We describe a sequent calculus, based on work of Herbelin, of which the cut-free derivations are in 1-1 correspondence with the normal natural deduction proofs of intuitionistic logic. We present a simple proof of Herbelin's strong cutelimination theorem for the calculus, using the recursive ..."
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Cited by 44 (6 self)
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We describe a sequent calculus, based on work of Herbelin, of which the cut-free derivations are in 1-1 correspondence with the normal natural deduction proofs of intuitionistic logic. We present a simple proof of Herbelin's strong cutelimination theorem for the calculus, using the recursive path ordering theorem of Dershowitz.
Deciding regular grammar logics with converse through first-order logic
- JOURNAL OF LOGIC, LANGUAGE AND INFORMATION
, 2005
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Permutability of Proofs in Intuitionistic Sequent Calculi
, 1996
"... We prove a folklore theorem, that two derivations in a cut-free sequent calculus for intuitionistic propositional logic (based on Kleene's G3) are inter-permutable (using a set of basic "permutation reduction rules" derived from Kleene's work in 1952) iff they determine the sa ..."
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Cited by 30 (4 self)
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We prove a folklore theorem, that two derivations in a cut-free sequent calculus for intuitionistic propositional logic (based on Kleene's G3) are inter-permutable (using a set of basic "permutation reduction rules" derived from Kleene's work in 1952) iff they determine the same natural deduction. The basic rules form a confluent and weakly normalising rewriting system. We refer to Schwichtenberg's proof elsewhere that a modification of this system is strongly normalising. Key words: intuitionistic logic, proof theory, natural deduction, sequent calculus. 1 Introduction There is a folklore theorem that two intuitionistic sequent calculus derivations are "really the same" iff they are inter-permutable, using permutations as described by Kleene in [13]. Our purpose here is to make precise and prove such a "permutability theorem". Prawitz [18] showed how intuitionistic sequent calculus derivations determine natural deductions, via a mapping ' from LJ to NJ (here we consider only ...
Alpaca: Extensible authorization for distributed services.
- In Proc. ACM CCS,
, 2007
"... ABSTRACT Traditional Public Key Infrastructures (PKI) have not lived up to their promise because there are too many ways to define PKIs, too many cryptographic primitives to build them with, and too many administrative domains with incompatible roots of trust. Alpaca is an authentication and author ..."
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Cited by 29 (3 self)
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ABSTRACT Traditional Public Key Infrastructures (PKI) have not lived up to their promise because there are too many ways to define PKIs, too many cryptographic primitives to build them with, and too many administrative domains with incompatible roots of trust. Alpaca is an authentication and authorization framework that embraces PKI diversity by enabling one PKI to "plug in" another PKI's credentials and cryptographic algorithms, allowing users of the latter to authenticate themselves to services using the former using their existing, unmodified certificates. Alpaca builds on Proof-Carrying Authorization (PCA)
First-Order Logic of Proofs
, 2011
"... The propositional logic of proofs LP revealed an explicit provability reading of modal logic S4 which provided an indented provability semantics for the propositional intuitionistic logic IPC and led to a new area, Justification Logic. In this paper, we find the first-order logic of proofs FOLP capa ..."
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Cited by 28 (12 self)
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The propositional logic of proofs LP revealed an explicit provability reading of modal logic S4 which provided an indented provability semantics for the propositional intuitionistic logic IPC and led to a new area, Justification Logic. In this paper, we find the first-order logic of proofs FOLP capable of realizing first-order modal logic S4 and, therefore, the first-order intuitionistic logic HPC. FOLP enjoys a natural provability interpretation; this provides a semantics of explicit proofs for first-order S4 and HPC compliant with Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov requirements. FOLP opens the door to a general theory of first-order justification.
