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M.: Game-Theoretic Resource Allocation for Malicious Packet Detection in Computer Networks
- In: Proc. of The 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS
, 2012
"... ABSTRACT We study the problem of optimal resource allocation for packet selection and inspection to detect potential threats in large computer networks with multiple computers of differing importance. An attacker tries to harm these targets by sending malicious packets from multiple entry points of ..."
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ABSTRACT We study the problem of optimal resource allocation for packet selection and inspection to detect potential threats in large computer networks with multiple computers of differing importance. An attacker tries to harm these targets by sending malicious packets from multiple entry points of the network; the defender thus needs to optimally allocate her resources to maximize the probability of malicious packet detection under network latency constraints. We formulate the problem as a graph-based security game with multiple resources of heterogeneous capabilities and propose a mathematical program for finding optimal solutions. We also propose Grande, a novel polynomial time algorithm that uses an approximated utility function to circumvent the limited scalability caused by the attacker's large strategy space and the non-linearity of the aforementioned mathematical program. Grande computes solutions with bounded error and scales up to problems of realistic sizes.
Protecting moving targets with multiple mobile resources
- Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research (JAIR
"... Abstract In recent years, Stackelberg Security Games have been successfully applied to solve resource allocation and scheduling problems in several security domains. However, previous work has mostly assumed that the targets are stationary relative to the defender and the attacker, leading to discr ..."
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Abstract In recent years, Stackelberg Security Games have been successfully applied to solve resource allocation and scheduling problems in several security domains. However, previous work has mostly assumed that the targets are stationary relative to the defender and the attacker, leading to discrete game models with finite numbers of pure strategies. This paper in contrast focuses on protecting mobile targets that leads to a continuous set of strategies for the players. The problem is motivated by several real-world domains including protecting ferries with escort boats and protecting refugee supply lines. Our contributions include: (i) A new game model for multiple mobile defender resources and moving targets with a discretized strategy space for the defender and a continuous strategy space for the attacker. (ii) An efficient linear-programming-based solution that uses a compact representation for the defender's mixed strategy, while accurately modeling the attacker's continuous strategy using a novel sub-interval analysis method. (iii) Discussion and analysis of multiple heuristic methods for equilibrium refinement to improve robustness of defender's mixed strategy. (iv) Discussion of approaches to sample actual defender schedules from the defender's mixed strategy. (iv) Detailed experimental analysis of our algorithms in the ferry protection domain. 1