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Auctions for online display advertising exchanges: Approximations and design. Columbia Business School Research Paper, (2012)

by S Balseiro, O Besbes, G Weintraub
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Buy-it-now or Take-a-chance: Price Discrimination through Randomized Auctions

by L. Elisa Celis , Gregory Lewis , Markus M. Mobius, Hamid Nazerzadeh , 2012
"... Increasingly detailed consumer information makes sophisticated price discrimination possible. At fine levels of aggregation, demand may not obey standard regularity conditions. We propose a new randomized sales mechanism for such environments. Bidders can “buy-it-now ” at a posted price, or “take-a- ..."
Abstract - Cited by 4 (0 self) - Add to MetaCart
Increasingly detailed consumer information makes sophisticated price discrimination possible. At fine levels of aggregation, demand may not obey standard regularity conditions. We propose a new randomized sales mechanism for such environments. Bidders can “buy-it-now ” at a posted price, or “take-a-chance ” in an auction where the top d> 1 bidders are equally likely to win. The randomized allocation incentivizes high valuation bidders to buy-it-now. We analyze equilibrium behavior, and apply our analysis to advertiser bidding data from Microsoft Advertising Exchange. In counterfactual simulations, our mechanism increases revenue by 4.4 % and consumer surplus by 14.5 % compared to an optimal second-price auction.

Bidding with limited statistical knowledge in online auctions. W-PIN+NetEcon: The joint

by Chong Jiang , Carolyn L Beck , R Srikant - Workshop on Pricing and Incentives in Networks and Systems , 2013
"... ABSTRACT We consider online auctions from the point of view of a single bidder who has an average budget constraint. By modeling the rest of the bidders through a probability distribution (often referred to as the mean-field approximation), we develop a simple bidding strategy which can be implemen ..."
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ABSTRACT We consider online auctions from the point of view of a single bidder who has an average budget constraint. By modeling the rest of the bidders through a probability distribution (often referred to as the mean-field approximation), we develop a simple bidding strategy which can be implemented without any statistical knowledge of bids, valuations, and query arrival processes. The key idea is to use stochastic approximation techniques to automatically track long-term averages.
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...ed statistical details. In this short abstract, we present simulation results which suggest that, despite not knowing the statistics fully, the expected regret in the payoff, and any budget overdraft or underdraft are both very small. 1.1 Relationship to Prior Work The distributional assumption that we make about the opponents’ bids is often called the mean-field approximation, which has been studied in a Markov decision problem context in [4, 3]. In [4], the focus is on learning the distribution of the valuation, while the focus of [3] is on budget constraints. Our model is closer to that of [3, 1], but our use of an average budget constraint rather than the strict budget constraint they use allows us to obtain a solution that does not require statistical knowledge of the system parameters. We show that under an average budget constraint, an underbidding factor also appears in the solution, which we then estimate through stochastic approximation (SA) [7, 5, 2]. In [3], a Markov Decision Problem (MDP) must be solved to obtain the factor by which one underbids an item’s true valuation. However, this MDP is nearly intractable and therefore, a fluid approximation is used to calculate this f...

and privacy

by Henk Kox, Bas Straathof, Gijsbert Zwart
"... Targeted advertising, platform competition and privacy ..."
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Targeted advertising, platform competition and privacy
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