Abstract not found

This paper examines whether nancial development facilitates economic growth by scrutinizing one rationale for such a relationship; that nancial development reduces the costs of external nance to rms. Speci cally, we ask whether industrial sectors that are relatively more in need of external nance develop disproportionately faster in countries with more developed nancial markets. We nd this to be true in a large sample of countries over the 1980s. We show this result is unlikely to be driven by omitted variables, outliers, or reverse causality. (JEL O4, F3, G1) A large literature, dating at least as far back as Joseph A. Schumpeter (1911), emphasizes the positive in uence of the development of a country's nancial sector on the level and the rate of growth of its per capita income. The argument essentially is that the services the nancial sector provides { of reallocating capital to the highest value use without substantial risk of loss through moral hazard, adverse selection, or transactions costs { are an essential catalyst of economic growth. Empirical work seems consistent with this argument. For example, on the

We propose a theory of securities market under- and overreactions based on two well-known psychological biases: investor overconfidence about the precision of private information; and biased self-attribution, which causes asymmetric shifts in investors ’ confidence as a function of their investment outcomes. We show that overconfidence implies negative long-lag autocorrelations, excess volatility, and, when managerial actions are correlated with stock mispricing, public-event-based return predictability. Biased self-attribution adds positive short-lag autocorrela-tions ~“momentum”!, short-run earnings “drift, ” but negative correlation between future returns and long-term past stock market and accounting performance. The theory also offers several untested implications and implications for corporate fi-nancial policy. IN RECENT YEARS A BODY OF evidence on security returns has presented a sharp challenge to the traditional view that securities are rationally priced to re-f lect all publicly available information. Some of the more pervasive anoma-

It is well known that firms are more likely to issue equity when their market values are high, relative to book and past market values, and to repurchase equity when their market values are low. We document that the resulting effects on capital structure are very persistent. As a consequence, current capital structure is strongly related to historical market values. The results suggest the theory that capital structure is the cumulative outcome of past attempts to time the equity market.

I argue that hazard models are more appropriate for forecasting bankruptcy than the single-period models used previously. Single-period bankruptcy models give biased and inconsistent probability estimates while hazard models produce consistent estimates. I describe a simple technique for estimating a discrete-time hazard model with a logit model estimation program. Applying my technique, I nd that about half of the accounting ratios that have been used in previous models are not statistically signi cant bankruptcy predictors. Moreover, several market-driven variables are strongly related to bankruptcy probability, including market size, past stock returns, and the idiosyncratic standard deviation of stock returns. I propose a model that uses a combination of accounting ratios and market-driven variables to produce more accurate out-of-sample forecasts than alternative models.

The share of equity issues in total new equity and debt issues is a strong predictor of U.S. stock market returns between 1928 and 1997. In particular, firms issue relatively more equity than debt just before periods of low market returns. The equity share in new issues has stable predictive power in both halves of the sample period and after controlling for other known predictors. We do not find support for efficient market explanations of the results. Instead, the fact that the equity share sometimes predicts significantly negative market returns suggests inefficiency and that firms time the market component of their returns when issuing securities.

We use a simple model to outline the conditions under which corporate investment is sensitive to non-fundamental movements in stock prices. The key prediction is that stock prices have a stronger impact on the investment of “equity dependent ” firms – firms that need external equity to finance marginal investments. Using an index of equity dependence based on the work of Kaplan and Zingales [1997], we find support for this hypothesis. In particular, firms that rank in the top quintile of the KZ index have investment that is almost three times as sensitive to stock prices as firms in the bottom quintile.

From the viewpoint of a company’s controlling shareholder, the optimal ownership structure generally involves some measure of dispersion, to avoid excessive monitoring by other shareholders. The optimal dispersion of share ownership can be achieved by going public, but this choice also entails some costs (the cost of listing and the loss of control over the shareholder register). If the controlling shareholder sells shares privately instead, he avoids the costs of going public but must tolerate large external shareholders who may monitor him too closely. Thus, the owner faces a trade-off between the cost of providing a liquid market and overmonitoring. The incentive to go public is stronger, the larger the amount of external funding required. The listing decision is also affected by the strictness of disclosure rules for public relative to private rms, and the legal limits on bribes aimed at dissuading monitoring by shareholders. I.

To identify the effect of social capital on financial development, we exploit the well-known differences in social capital (Banfield (1958), Putnam (1993)) across different parts of Italy. In areas of the country with high levels of social capital, households invest less in cash and more in stock, are more likely to use checks, have higher access to institutional credit, and make less use of informal credit. The effect of social capital is stronger where legal enforcement is weaker and among less-educated people. These results are not driven by omitted environmental variables, since we show that the behavior of movers is still affected by the level of social capital present in the province where they were born.

This paper develops a rent-protection theory of corporate ownership structure – and in particular, of the choice between concentrated and dispersed ownership of corporate shares and votes. The paper analyzes the decision of a company’s initial owner whether to maintain a lock on control when the company goes public. This decision is shown to be very much influenced by the size that private benefits of control are expected to have. Most importantly, when private benefits of control are large – and when control is thus valuable enough – leaving control up for grabs would attract attempts by rivals to grab control and thereby capture these private benefits; in such circumstances, to preclude a control grab, the initial