In constructing improved models of human behavior, both experimental and behavioral economists have increasingly turned to evolutionary theory for insights into human psychology and preferences. Unfortunately, the existing genetic evolutionary approaches can explain neither the degree of prosociality (altruism and altruistic punishment) observed in humans, nor the patterns of variation in these behaviors across different behavioral domains and social groups. Ongoing misunderstandings about why certain models work, what they predict, and what the place is of “group selection ” in evolutionary theory have hampered the use of insights from biology and anthropology. This paper clarifies some of these issues and proposes an approach to the evolution of prosociality rooted in the interaction between cultural and genetic transmission. I explain how, in contrast to non-cultural species, the details of our evolved cultural learning capacities (e.g., imitative abilities) create the conditions for the cultural evolution of prosociality. By producing multiple behavioral equilibria, including group-beneficial equilibria, cultural evolution endogenously generates a mechanism of equilibrium selection that can favor prosociality. Finally, in the novel social environments left in the wake of these cultural evolutionary processes, natural selection is likely to favor prosocial genes

Abstract not found

This paper introduces the sequential dictator game to study how social influence may affect subjects ' choices when making dictator allocations. Subjects made dictator allocations of 840 before and after learning the allocation made by one other subject in the Relevant Information treatment, or the birthday of one other subject in the Irrelevant Information treatment. Subjects on average become more self-regarding in the Irrelevant Information treatment, but observing relevant information constrains some subjects from moving toward more self-regarding choices. We also find that subjects who exhibit more self-regarding behavior on their first decisions are less likely to change choices between their first and second decisions, and the use of the Strategy Method in this setting does not significantly alter choices. The relationships between our findings and the economic and psychological literature regarding how social influence operates are also explored.

This paper investigates the effect of recipient poverty and medicines on dictator game giving. We develop a new design with three variants: (1) subjects do not know they are participating in an experiment; (2) dictators receive three D 5 bills instead of D 15 coins; (3) three recipients are used instead of one. We performed three different treatments regarding the information about recipients: (i) no-info condition; (ii) poverty: dictators were informed that their recipients were poor; (iii) medicines: donations were given in the form of medicines instead of money. We found that 46 percent of the subjects gave the full endowment in the ‘poverty ’ treatment, while in the ‘medicines ’ treatment this percentage increased to 72 percent.

Empirical evidence is provided for the importance of pro-social behavior of individuals in an anonymous, n-person public good setting. A unique panel data set of 136,000 observations is matched with an extensive survey. Even under anonymous conditions, a large number of individuals are prepared to donate quite a significant sum of money. Cooperation conditional on giving by specific other persons is present, but the causal relationship is ambiguous. The manner in which one is asked to donate is crucial. Identification with the organization, and with specific groups, is also important.

This paper examines possible motives and institutional factors that impact giving. Specifically, I consider alternative theories parallel to dictator experiments that generate evidence on both allocation decisions and their effect on feelings. A number of new empirical findings as well as new interpretations for previously reported findings result. A novel test distinguishes warm glow from impure altruism and rules out the former as the sole motive for giving. Very generous donations to charities that aid the needy (with modal gifts of the entire dictator’s stakes) cannot be attributed to familiarity with the charities. A charity that offers a matching grant increases its revenues by drawing donors and donations away from one that does not, although aggregate charitable donations do not rise. Additional results on emotions paint a picture of “mixed feelings: ” generosity creates good feelings when the recipients are charities and bad feelings when they are fellow students. No group of dictators, however, feels better, on average, than a control group that is given no opportunity to donate. I propose a simple model that accounts for these results on allocation behavior and feelings by incorporating elements of two approaches, unconditional altruism and social preference theories, that to date have mostly

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jesp

We examine experimentally how a person’s generosity depends on the degree of anonymity between giver and recipient, as well as on the parties ’ sexes. Less is given when the giver is paid on stage rather than in private; men receive less than women; fewer men than women give non-zero amounts. The results suggest that it may be problematic to organize experimental data in terms of social distance.

Compassion has been suggested to be a strong motivator for prosocial behavior. While research has demonstrated that compassion training has positive effects on mood and health, we do not know whether it also leads to increases in prosocial behavior. We addressed this question in two experiments. In Experiment 1, we introduce a new prosocial game, the Zurich Prosocial Game (ZPG), which allows for repeated, ecologically valid assessment of prosocial behavior and is sensitive to the influence of reciprocity, helping cost, and distress cues on helping behavior. Experiment 2 shows that helping behavior in the ZPG increased in participants who had received short-term compassion training, but not in participants who had received short-term memory training. Interindividual differences in practice duration were specifically related to changes in the amount of helping under no-reciprocity conditions. Our results provide first evidence for the positive impact of shortterm

We combine data collected on friendship networks and individual characteristics with experimental observations from a sequence of dictator games run at an all-girls school in Pasadena, California. Our analysis provides two sets of insights. First, we find that dictator giving is primarily explained by social distance, defined as the length of the shortest path connecting a dictator and recipient in their (elicited) network of friends. In fact, dictator offers follow a simple inverse distance law. Second, while student demographics play a minor role relative to network effects in explaining offer amounts, individual heterogeneity is important for the network formation process. In particular, we detect significant homophilous behavior – students tend to connect to others similar to them. In addition, the network data reveal a strong preference for cliques – students tend to connect to those that are already close. The study serves as one of the first to identify network architecture with individual behavior and outcomes in a strategic context.