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88
Correct horse battery staple: Exploring the usability of system-assigned passphrases
- SYMPOSIUM ON USABLE PRIVACY & SECURITY (SOUPS)
, 2012
"... Users tend to create passwords that are easy to guess, while systemassigned passwords tend to be hard to remember. Passphrases, space-delimited sets of natural language words, have been suggested as both secure and usable for decades. In a 1,476-participant online study, we explored the usability of ..."
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Cited by 25 (5 self)
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Users tend to create passwords that are easy to guess, while systemassigned passwords tend to be hard to remember. Passphrases, space-delimited sets of natural language words, have been suggested as both secure and usable for decades. In a 1,476-participant online study, we explored the usability of 3- and 4-word systemassigned passphrases in comparison to system-assigned passwords composed of 5 to 6 random characters, and 8-character systemassigned pronounceable passwords. Contrary to expectations, system-assigned passphrases performed similarly to system-assigned passwords of similar entropy across the usability metrics we examined. Passphrases and passwords were forgotten at similar rates, led to similar levels of user difficulty and annoyance, and were both written down by a majority of participants. However, passphrases took significantly longer for participants to enter, and appear to require error-correction to counteract entry mistakes. Passphrase usability did not seem to increase when we shrunk the dictionary from which words were chosen, reduced the number of words in a passphrase, or allowed users to change the order of words.
SoK: SSL and HTTPS: Revisiting past challenges and evaluating certificate trust model enhancements
- IEEE SYMPOSIUM ON SECURITY AND PRIVACY
, 2013
"... Internet users today depend daily on HTTPS for secure communication with sites they intend to visit. Over the years, many attacks on HTTPS and the certificate trust model it uses have been hypothesized, executed, and/or evolved. Meanwhile the number of browser-trusted (and thus, de facto, user-trus ..."
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Cited by 22 (1 self)
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Internet users today depend daily on HTTPS for secure communication with sites they intend to visit. Over the years, many attacks on HTTPS and the certificate trust model it uses have been hypothesized, executed, and/or evolved. Meanwhile the number of browser-trusted (and thus, de facto, user-trusted) certificate authorities has proliferated, while the due diligence in baseline certificate issuance has declined. We survey and categorize prominent security issues with HTTPS and provide a systematic treatment of the history and on-going challenges, intending to provide context for future directions. We also provide a comparative evaluation of current proposals for enhancing the certificate infrastructure used in practice.
The tangled web of password reuse. In
- Symposium on Network and Distributed System Security (NDSS),
, 2014
"... Abstract-Today's Internet services rely heavily on text-based passwords for user authentication. The pervasiveness of these services coupled with the difficulty of remembering large numbers of secure passwords tempts users to reuse passwords at multiple sites. In this paper, we investigate for ..."
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Abstract-Today's Internet services rely heavily on text-based passwords for user authentication. The pervasiveness of these services coupled with the difficulty of remembering large numbers of secure passwords tempts users to reuse passwords at multiple sites. In this paper, we investigate for the first time how an attacker can leverage a known password from one site to more easily guess that user's password at other sites. We study several hundred thousand leaked passwords from eleven web sites and conduct a user survey on password reuse; we estimate that 43-51% of users reuse the same password across multiple sites. We further identify a few simple tricks users often employ to transform a basic password between sites which can be used by an attacker to make password guessing vastly easier. We develop the first cross-site password-guessing algorithm, which is able to guess 30% of transformed passwords within 100 attempts compared to just 14% for a standard password-guessing algorithm without cross-site password knowledge.
Measuring password guessability for an entire university
- In ACM CCS
, 2013
"... Despite considerable research on passwords, empirical studies of password strength have been limited by lack of access to plaintext passwords, small data sets, and password sets specifically collected for a research study or from low-value accounts. Properties of pass-words used for high-value accou ..."
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Cited by 17 (7 self)
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Despite considerable research on passwords, empirical studies of password strength have been limited by lack of access to plaintext passwords, small data sets, and password sets specifically collected for a research study or from low-value accounts. Properties of pass-words used for high-value accounts thus remain poorly understood. We fill this gap by studying the single-sign-on passwords used by over 25,000 faculty, staff, and students at a research university with a complex password policy. Key aspects of our contributions rest on our (indirect) access to plaintext passwords. We describe our data collection methodology, particularly the many precautions we took to minimize risks to users. We then analyze how guessable the collected passwords would be during an offline attack by sub-jecting them to a state-of-the-art password cracking algorithm. We discover significant correlations between a number of demographic and behavioral factors and password strength. For example, we find that users associated with the computer science school make pass-words more than 1.8 times as strong as those of users associated with the business school. In addition, we find that stronger pass-words are correlated with a higher rate of errors entering them. We also compare the guessability and other characteristics of the passwords we analyzed to sets previously collected in controlled experiments or leaked from low-value accounts. We find more con-sistent similarities between the university passwords and passwords collected for research studies under similar composition policies than we do between the university passwords and subsets of pass-words leaked from low-value accounts that happen to comply with the same policies.
On the semantic patterns of passwords and their security impact. NDSS
, 2014
"... Abstract—We present the first framework for segmentation, semantic classification, and semantic generalization of passwords and a model that captures the semantic essence of password samples. Researchers have only touched the surface of patterns in password creation, with the semantics of passwords ..."
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Cited by 9 (0 self)
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Abstract—We present the first framework for segmentation, semantic classification, and semantic generalization of passwords and a model that captures the semantic essence of password samples. Researchers have only touched the surface of patterns in password creation, with the semantics of passwords remaining largely unexplored, leaving a gap in our understanding of their characteristics and, consequently, their security. In this paper, we begin to fill this gap by employing Natural Language Processing techniques to extract and leverage understanding of semantic patterns in passwords. The results of our investigation demonstrate that the knowledge captured by our model can be used to crack more passwords than the state-of-the-art approach. In experiments limited to 3 billion guesses, our approach can guess approximately 67 % more passwords from the LinkedIn leak and 32 % more passwords from the MySpace leak. I.
Strengthening User Authentication through Opportunistic Cryptographic Identity Assertions
"... User authentication systems are at an impasse. The most ubiquitous method – the password – has numerous problems, including susceptibility to unintentional exposure via phishing and cross-site password reuse. Second-factor authentication schemes have the potential to increase security but face usabi ..."
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Cited by 8 (1 self)
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User authentication systems are at an impasse. The most ubiquitous method – the password – has numerous problems, including susceptibility to unintentional exposure via phishing and cross-site password reuse. Second-factor authentication schemes have the potential to increase security but face usability and deployability challenges. For example, conventional second-factor schemes change the user authentication experience. Furthermore, while more secure than passwords, second-factor schemes still fail to provide sufficient protection against (single-use) phishing attacks. We present PhoneAuth, a system intended to provide security assurances comparable to or greater than that of conventional twofactor authentication systems while offering the same authentication experience as traditional passwords alone. Our work leverages the following key insights. First, a user’s personal device (e.g., a phone) can communicate directly with the user’s computer (and hence the remote web server) without any interaction with the user. Second, it is possible to provide a layered approach to security, whereby a web server can enact different policies depending on whether or not the user’s personal device is present. We describe and evaluate our server-side, Chromium web browser, and Android phone implementations of PhoneAuth.
Naturally rehearsing passwords
- CoRR
, 2013
"... Abstract. We introduce quantitative usability and security models to guide the design of password management schemes — systematic strate-gies to help users create and remember multiple passwords. In the same way that security proofs in cryptography are based on complexity-theoretic assumptions (e.g. ..."
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Cited by 8 (5 self)
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Abstract. We introduce quantitative usability and security models to guide the design of password management schemes — systematic strate-gies to help users create and remember multiple passwords. In the same way that security proofs in cryptography are based on complexity-theoretic assumptions (e.g., hardness of factoring and discrete logarithm), we quan-tify usability by introducing usability assumptions. In particular, pass-word management relies on assumptions about human memory, e.g., that a user who follows a particular rehearsal schedule will successfully main-tain the corresponding memory. These assumptions are informed by re-search in cognitive science and can be tested empirically. Given rehearsal requirements and a user’s visitation schedule for each account, we use the total number of extra rehearsals that the user would have to do to remember all of his passwords as a measure of the usability of the pass-word scheme. Our usability model leads us to a key observation: password reuse benefits users not only by reducing the number of passwords that the user has to memorize, but more importantly by increasing the natural rehearsal rate for each password. We also present a security model which accounts for the complexity of password management with multiple ac-counts and associated threats, including online, offline, and plaintext password leak attacks. Observing that current password management schemes are either insecure or unusable, we present Shared Cues — a new scheme in which the underlying secret is strategically shared across accounts to ensure that most rehearsal requirements are satisfied nat-urally while simultaneously providing strong security. The construction uses the Chinese Remainder Theorem to achieve these competing goals.
The emperor’s new password manager: Security analysis of web-based password managers
- In 23rd USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 14
, 2014
"... personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires pri ..."
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Cited by 8 (0 self)
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personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission.
C.: An administrator’s guide to internet password research
- 28th USENIX conference on Large Installation System Administration (LISA’14
"... Abstract. The research literature on passwords is rich but little of it directly aids those charged with securing web-facing services or setting policies. With a view to improving this situation we examine questions of implementation choices, policy and administration using a combination of literat ..."
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Cited by 7 (3 self)
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Abstract. The research literature on passwords is rich but little of it directly aids those charged with securing web-facing services or setting policies. With a view to improving this situation we examine questions of implementation choices, policy and administration using a combination of literature survey and first-principles reasoning to identify what works, what does not work, and what remains unknown. Some of our results are surprising. We find that offline attacks, the justification for great demands of user effort, occur in much more limited circumstances than is generally believed (and in only a minority of recently-reported breaches). We find that an enormous gap exists between the effort needed to withstand online and offline attacks, with probable safety occurring when a password can survive 10 6 and 10 14 guesses respectively. In this gap, eight orders of magnitude wide, there is little return on user effort: exceeding the online threshold but falling short of the offline one represents wasted effort. We find that guessing resistance above the online threshold is also wasted at sites that store passwords in plaintext or reversibly encrypted: there is no attack scenario where the extra effort protects the account.
Towards reliable storage of 56-bit secrets in human memory
"... Challenging the conventional wisdom that users cannot remember cryptographically-strong secrets, we test the hypothesis that users can learn randomly-assigned 56bit codes (encoded as either 6 words or 12 characters) through spaced repetition. We asked remote research participants to perform a distra ..."
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Cited by 7 (2 self)
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Challenging the conventional wisdom that users cannot remember cryptographically-strong secrets, we test the hypothesis that users can learn randomly-assigned 56bit codes (encoded as either 6 words or 12 characters) through spaced repetition. We asked remote research participants to perform a distractor task that required logging into a website 90 times, over up to two weeks, with a password of their choosing. After they entered their chosen password correctly we displayed a short code (4 letters or 2 words, 18.8 bits) that we required them to type. For subsequent logins we added an increasing delay prior to displaying the code, which participants could avoid by typing the code from memory. As participants learned, we added two more codes to comprise a 56.4bit secret. Overall, 94 % of participants eventually typed their entire secret from memory, learning it after a median of 36 logins. The learning component of our system added a median delay of just 6.9 s per login and a total of less than 12 minutes over an average of ten days. 88 % were able to recall their codes exactly when asked at least three days later, with only 21 % reporting having written their secret down. As one participant wrote with surprise, “the words are branded into my brain. ” While our study is preliminary in nature, we believe it debunks the myth that users are inherently incapable of remembering cryptographically-strong secrets for a select few high-stakes scenarios, such as a password for enterprise login or as a master key to protect other credentials (e.g., in a password manager). 1