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204
A conceptual foundation for organizational information security awareness
- Information Management and Computer Security, Vol.8, No.1
, 2000
"... Education The current approaches in terms of information security awareness and education are descriptive (i.e. they are not accomplishment-oriented nor do they recognize the factual/normative dualism); and current research has not explored the possibilities offered by motivation/behavioural theorie ..."
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Cited by 53 (2 self)
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Education The current approaches in terms of information security awareness and education are descriptive (i.e. they are not accomplishment-oriented nor do they recognize the factual/normative dualism); and current research has not explored the possibilities offered by motivation/behavioural theories. The first situation, level of descriptiveness, is deemed to be questionable because it may prove eventually that end-users fail to internalize target goals and do not follow security guidelines, for example ± which is inadequate. Moreover, the role of motivation in the area of information security is not considered seriously enough, even though its role has been widely recognised. To tackle such weaknesses, this paper constructs a conceptual foundation for information systems/organizational security awareness. The normative and prescriptive nature of end-user guidelines will be considered. In order to understand human behaviour, the behavioural science framework, consisting in intrinsic motivation, a theory of planned behaviour and a technology acceptance model, will be depicted and applied. Current approaches (such as the campaign) in the area of information security awareness and education will be analysed from the viewpoint of the theoretical framework, resulting in information on their strengths and weaknesses. Finally, a novel persuasion strategy aimed at increasing users ' commitment to security guidelines is presented.
Moral Conviction: Another Contributor to Attitude Strength or Something More
- Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
, 2005
"... Attitudes held with strong moral conviction (moral mandates) were predicted to have different inter-personal consequences than strong but nonmoral attitudes. After controlling for indices of attitude strength, the authors explored the unique effect of moral conviction on the degree that people prefe ..."
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Cited by 44 (5 self)
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Attitudes held with strong moral conviction (moral mandates) were predicted to have different inter-personal consequences than strong but nonmoral attitudes. After controlling for indices of attitude strength, the authors explored the unique effect of moral conviction on the degree that people preferred greater social (Studies 1 and 2) and physical (Study 3) distance from attitudinally dissimilar others and the effects of moral conviction on group interaction and decision making in attitudinally homogeneous versus heterogeneous groups (Study 4). Results supported the moral mandate hypothesis: Stronger moral conviction led to (a) greater preferred social and physical distance from attitudinally dissimilar others, (b) intolerance of attitudinally dissimilar others in both intimate (e.g., friend) and distant relationships (e.g., owner of a store one frequents), (c) lower levels of good will and cooperativeness in attitudinally heterogeneous groups, and (d) a greater inability to generate procedural solutions to resolve disagree-ments.
The Past and Future of Experimental Philosophy
- Philosophical Explorations
, 2007
"... Experimental philosophy is the name for a recent movement whose participants use the methods of experimental psychology to probe the way people think about philosophical issues and then examine how the results of such studies bear on traditional philosophical debates. Given both the breadth of the r ..."
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Cited by 28 (3 self)
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Experimental philosophy is the name for a recent movement whose participants use the methods of experimental psychology to probe the way people think about philosophical issues and then examine how the results of such studies bear on traditional philosophical debates. Given both the breadth of the research being carried out by experimental philosophers and the controversial nature of some of their central methodological assumptions, it is of no surprise that their work has recently come under attack. In this paper we respond to some criticisms of experimental philosophy that have recently been put forward by Antti Kauppinen. Unlike the critics of experimental philosophy, we do not think the fledgling movement either will or should fall before it has even had a chance to rise up to explain what it is, what it seeks to do (and not to do), and exactly how it plans to do it. Filling in some of the salient details is the main goal of the present paper.
Moral conviction and political engagement
- Political Psychology
, 2008
"... The 2004 presidential election led to considerable discussion about whether moral values motivated people to vote, and if so, whether it led to a conservative electoral advantage. The results of two studies—one conducted in the context of the 2000 presidential election, the other in the context of t ..."
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Cited by 17 (2 self)
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The 2004 presidential election led to considerable discussion about whether moral values motivated people to vote, and if so, whether it led to a conservative electoral advantage. The results of two studies—one conducted in the context of the 2000 presidential election, the other in the context of the 2004 presidential election—indicated that stronger moral convictions associated with candidates themselves and attitudes on issues of the day uniquely predicted self-reported voting behavior and intentions to vote even when control-ling for a host of alternative explanations (e.g., attitude strength, strength of party identi-fication). In addition, we found strong support for the hypothesis that moral convictions equally motivated political engagement for those on the political right and left and little support for the notion that a combination of morality and politics is something more characteristic of the political right than it is of the political left. KEY WORDS: Moral conviction, moral values, electoral politics, political engagement, political participation The 2004 presidential election brought the potential importance of “moral values ” into the spotlight. Results of exit polls indicated that a plurality of voters selected moral values as what mattered most in deciding how they voted in the election relative to other choice alternatives.1 Even more provocative was the finding that of those who mentioned moral values, 80 % voted for President Bush (Media Matters, 2004). Media commentators and pundits were quick to get excited about these findings. For example, Dan Rather (CBS anchor) reported: “moral values—we’ll give you a look at the surprise issue that trumped the war, terror, and
THE TERRIBLE, HORRIBLE, NO GOOD, VERY BAD TRUTH ABOUT MORALITY AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT
, 2002
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Geography and ethics; a moral turn
- Progress in Human Geography 21,4
, 1997
"... I A new disciplinary interface The invitation to write progress reports on geography and ethics recognizes the signifi-cance of a new disciplinary interface. Indications of a `moral turn ' are evident in various conference programmes and publications. It was first clearly signalled in the proce ..."
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I A new disciplinary interface The invitation to write progress reports on geography and ethics recognizes the signifi-cance of a new disciplinary interface. Indications of a `moral turn ' are evident in various conference programmes and publications. It was first clearly signalled in the proceedings of a conference organized by the Social and Cultural Geography Study Group of the Institute of British Geographers, the introduction to which called for an engagement with ethics or moral philosophy, involving `the articulation of the moral and the spatial ' (Philo, 1991: 26). Then there was a session entitled `Rethinking metatheory: ethics, difference and universals ' at the 1994 meeting of the Association of American Geographers, which generated a special issue of Society and Space (15(1), 1997) introduced by an essay on a normative turn in social theory (Sayer and Storper, 1997), along with articles linking social justice with broader considerations of the good life (Smith, 1997), rethinking geopolitical encounters (Slater, 1997), and exploring aspects of identity relevant to a relational ethics (Whatmore, 1997). There was a session on `A/moral geographies ' at the 1995 IBG conference, and links between geography and ethics featured at the 1997 meetings of both the RGS (with IBG) and the AAG, with the promise of more to come in 1998. Social justice has returned to the geographical agenda, heralded by Harvey (1992a; 1993). The diversity of re-engagement with this topic is indicated in a special issue of Urban Geography (15(7)), and in articles on substantive issues such as change in South
2004: The Scope of Instrumental Reason
- Philosophical Perspectives
"... Allow me to rehearse a familiar scenario. We all know that which ends you have has something to do with what you ought to do. If Ronnie is keen on dancing but Bradley can’t stand it, then the fact that there will be dancing at the party tonight affects what Ronnie and Bradley ought to do in differen ..."
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Cited by 12 (2 self)
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Allow me to rehearse a familiar scenario. We all know that which ends you have has something to do with what you ought to do. If Ronnie is keen on dancing but Bradley can’t stand it, then the fact that there will be dancing at the party tonight affects what Ronnie and Bradley ought to do in different ways. In short, (HI) you ought, if you have the end, to take the means. But now trouble looms: what if you have dreadful, murderous ends? Ought you to take the means to them? Seemingly not. But fortunately, an assumption made by deontic logics1 comes to the rescue. Since ‘‘ought’’, according to this assumption, is a sentential operator, HI must really be ambiguous. It could be read either as (Narrow) You have the end! O(you take the means) or as (Wide) O(you have the end! you take the means). Now if Narrow is true, then you really ought to take the means to your murderous ends. But this doesn’t follow from Wide. All that follows from Wide is that you ought to either take the means to these ends or else give them up. Conclusions: (1) Since HI is on some reading true, but Narrow isn’t, Wide is true. (2) Wide accounts for the relationship between your ends and what
IX—HOW DOES COHERENCE MATTER?
"... Recently, much attention has been paid to ‘rational requirements ’ and, especially, to what I call ‘rational requirements of formal coherence as such’. These requirements are satisfied just when our attitudes are formally coherent: for example, when our beliefs do not contradict each other. Neverthe ..."
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Cited by 11 (0 self)
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Recently, much attention has been paid to ‘rational requirements ’ and, especially, to what I call ‘rational requirements of formal coherence as such’. These requirements are satisfied just when our attitudes are formally coherent: for example, when our beliefs do not contradict each other. Nevertheless, these requirements are puzzling. In particular, it is unclear why we should satisfy them. In light of this, I explore the conjecture that there are no requirements of formal coherence. I do so by trying to construct a theory of error for the idea that there are such requirements. In recent work, particularly in value theory, it has become common to say that we are ‘rationally required ’ to see to it that our attitudes are coherently related with one another, whatever else may be the case. The intuitive idea is that incoherent attitudes give rise to a certain normative tension, or exert a kind of rational pressure on each another, and this tension, or pressure, is relieved just when one of the attitudes is revised. 1 The putative rational requirements that have attracted perhaps the most attention are what I will call ‘requirements of formal coherence as such’. Perhaps the simplest of these is: Non-Contradiction (n): One is rationally required (if at t one believes p, then at t one does not believe not-p). 2 There are also said to be requirements of formal coherence as such to avoid beliefs that are logically inconsistent more generally, to have beliefs that are closed under logical consequence, to have degrees of belief that satisfy the axioms of probability, to intend the
Are Ethical Judgments Intrinsically Motivational? Lessons from “Acquired Sociopathy.” Philosophical Psychology 16
, 2003
"... sociopathy ” [1] ..."
