Results 1 
6 of
6
A dynamic analysis of interactive rationality
 In
, 2011
"... Abstract. Epistemic game theory has shown the importance of informational contexts in understanding strategic interaction. We propose a general framework to analyze how such contexts may arise. The idea is to view informational contexts as the fixedpoints of iterated, “rational responses ” to incom ..."
Abstract

Cited by 5 (4 self)
 Add to MetaCart
(Show Context)
Abstract. Epistemic game theory has shown the importance of informational contexts in understanding strategic interaction. We propose a general framework to analyze how such contexts may arise. The idea is to view informational contexts as the fixedpoints of iterated, “rational responses ” to incoming information about the agents ’ possible choices. We show general conditions for the stabilization of such sequences of rational responses, in terms of structural properties of both the decision rule and the information update policy. 1
Interactive Rationality and the Dynamics of Reasons Interactive Rationality and the Dynamics of Reasons]Interactive Rationality and the Dynamics of Reasons Roy, Pacuit]Olivier Roy
"... What does rationality require of an individual decision maker when the consequences of her choices depend on what other rational decision makers decide? Are these requirements different from those that arise in general situations of decision making under risk or uncertainty? This paper argues that t ..."
Abstract
 Add to MetaCart
(Show Context)
What does rationality require of an individual decision maker when the consequences of her choices depend on what other rational decision makers decide? Are these requirements different from those that arise in general situations of decision making under risk or uncertainty? This paper argues that they are. The argument is cast in contemporary epistemic game theory. We first explain how choice rules and solution concepts can be seen as potential sources of rational recommendations, singling out what counts as reasons for action in interactive situations. We then analyze responsiveness to such reasons, from a dynamic perspective. We argue that, against this background, basic observations and theorems from epistemic game theory turn out to be normatively significant. To illustrate that we show how to connect “objective ” reasons with what we call ex post assessments, and how to extract rational requirements of responsiveness
Epistemic Foundations of Game Theory
"... Foundational work in game theory aims at making explicit the assumptions that underlie the basic concepts of the discipline. Noncooperative game theory is the study of individual, rational decision making in situations of strategic interaction. This entry presents the epistemic foundations of nonc ..."
Abstract
 Add to MetaCart
(Show Context)
Foundational work in game theory aims at making explicit the assumptions that underlie the basic concepts of the discipline. Noncooperative game theory is the study of individual, rational decision making in situations of strategic interaction. This entry presents the epistemic foundations of noncooperative game theory (this area of research is called epistemic game theory). Epistemic game theory views rational decision making in games as something not essentially different from rational decision making under uncertainty. As in Decision Theory (Peterson, 2009), to choose rationally in a game is to select the “best ” action in light of one’s beliefs or information. In a decision problem, the decision maker’s beliefs are about a passive state of nature, the state of which determines the consequences of her actions. In a game, the consequences of one’s decision depend on the choices of the other agents involved in the situation (and possibly the state of nature). Recognizing this—i.e., that one is interacting with other agents who try to choose the best course of action in the light of their own beliefs—brings higherorder information into the picture. The players ’ beliefs
1 Title: Institutions, RuleFollowing and Game Theory
"... Abstract: Most gametheoretic accounts of institutions reduce institutions to behavioral patterns the players are incentivized to implement. An alternative account linking institutions to rulefollowing behavior in a gametheoretic framework is developed on the basis of David Lewis ’ and Ludwig Witt ..."
Abstract
 Add to MetaCart
Abstract: Most gametheoretic accounts of institutions reduce institutions to behavioral patterns the players are incentivized to implement. An alternative account linking institutions to rulefollowing behavior in a gametheoretic framework is developed on the basis of David Lewis ’ and Ludwig Wittgenstein’s respective accounts of conventions and language games. Institutions are formalized as epistemic games where the players share some forms of practical reasoning. An institution is a rulegoverned game satisfying three conditions: common understanding, minimal awareness and minimal practical rationality. Common understanding has a strong similarity with Ludwig Wittgenstein’s concept of lebensform while minimal awareness and minimal practical rationality capture the idea that rulefollowing is communitybased.
Paradoxes of Interactive Rationality: A Unified View Extended Abstract
"... An increasingly popular, but of course not uncontroversial1, view is that “the fundamental insight of game theory [is] that a rational player must take into account that the players reason about each other in deciding how to play ” (Aumann and Dreze, 2008, pg. 81). Exactly how the players (should) i ..."
Abstract
 Add to MetaCart
(Show Context)
An increasingly popular, but of course not uncontroversial1, view is that “the fundamental insight of game theory [is] that a rational player must take into account that the players reason about each other in deciding how to play ” (Aumann and Dreze, 2008, pg. 81). Exactly how the players (should) incorporate the fact that they are interacting with other (actively reasoning) agents into their own decision making process is the subject of much debate. A variety of frameworks have been put forward to explicitly model the reasoning of rational agents in a strategic situation. Key examples include Brian Skyrms ’ models of “dynamic deliberation ” (Skyrms, 1990), Ken Binmore’s analysis of “eductive reasoning ” (Binmore, 1987), and Robin Cubitt and Robert Sugden’s “common modes of reasoning ” (Cubitt and Sugden, 2011).Although the details of these frameworks are quite different2, they share a common line of thought: Contrary to classical game theory, solution concepts are no longer the basic object of study. Instead, the “rational solutions ” of a game are the result of individual (rational) decisions in specific informational “contexts”. This perspective on the foundations of game theory is best exemplified by the socalled epistemic program in game theory (cf. Brandenburger, 2007). The central thesis here is that the basic mathematical model of a game should include an explicit parameter describing the players ’ informational attitudes. However, this broadly decisiontheoretic stance does not simply reduce the question of decisionmaking in interaction to that of rational decision making in the face of uncertainty. Crucially, higherorder information (belief about beliefs, etc.) are key components of the informational context of a game: “In any particular structure, certain beliefs, beliefs about belief,..., will be present and others won’t be. So, there is an important implicit assumption behind the choice of a structure. This is that it is “transparent ” to the players that the beliefs in the type structure — and only those beliefs — are possible....The idea is that there is a “context ” to the strategic situation (eg., history, conventions, etc.) and this “context ” causes the players to rule out certain beliefs.”
Varieties of strategic reasoning in games
"... A crucial assumption underlying any gametheoretic analysis is that there is common knowledge that all the players are rational. Rationality here is understood in the decisiontheoretic sense: The players ’ choices are optimal according to some choice rule (such as maximizing subjective expected ut ..."
Abstract
 Add to MetaCart
(Show Context)
A crucial assumption underlying any gametheoretic analysis is that there is common knowledge that all the players are rational. Rationality here is understood in the decisiontheoretic sense: The players ’ choices are optimal according to some choice rule (such as maximizing subjective expected utility). Recent work in epistemic game theory has focused on developing sophisticated mathematical models to study the implications of assuming that all the players are rational and this is commonly known (or commonly believed). 1 However, if common knowledge of rationality is to have an “explanatory ” role in the analysis of a gametheoretic situation, then it is not enough to simply assume that it has obtained in an informational context of a game. It is also important to describe how the players were able to arrive at this crucial state of information. 2 There is now a growing body of literature that analyzes games in terms of the “process of deliberation ” that leads the players to select their component of a rational outcome (see [17] for a discussion). There is a second reason why it is important to develop formal models of the players ’ process of deliberation in game situations. A number of researchers have questioned the usefulness of models that make explicit assumptions about the players ’ higherorder beliefs in game situations. In the end, we are interested only in what (rational) players are going to do. This, in turn, depends only on what the players believe the other players are going to do. A player’s belief about what her opponents are thinking is relevant only because they shape the players’ firstorder beliefs about what her opponents are going to do. Kadane and Larkey explain the issue nicely: “It is true that a subjective Bayesian will have an opinion not only on his opponent’s behavior, but also on his opponent’s belief about his own behavior, his opponent’s belief about his belief about his opponent’s behavior, etc. (He also has opinions about the phase of the moon, tomorrow’s weather and the winner of the next Superbowl). However, in a singleplay game, all aspects of his opinion except his opinion about his 1 See, for example, [20, 9], and the references therein, for a survey of this literature. 2 This