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99
Sharp: An architecture for secure resource peering
- In Proceedings of the 19th ACM Symposium on Operating System Principles
, 2003
"... This paper presents Sharp, a framework for secure distributed resource management in an Internet-scale computing infrastructure. The cornerstone of Sharp is a construct to represent cryptographically protected resource claims— promises or rights to control resources for designated time intervals—tog ..."
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Cited by 193 (36 self)
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This paper presents Sharp, a framework for secure distributed resource management in an Internet-scale computing infrastructure. The cornerstone of Sharp is a construct to represent cryptographically protected resource claims— promises or rights to control resources for designated time intervals—together with secure mechanisms to subdivide and delegate claims across a network of resource managers. These mechanisms enable flexible resource peering: sites may trade their resources with peering partners or contribute them to a federation according to local policies. A separation of claims into tickets and leases allows coordinated resource management across the system while preserving site autonomy and local control over resources. Sharp also introduces mechanisms for controlled, accountable oversubscription of resource claims as a fundamental tool for dependable, efficient resource management. We present experimental results from a Sharp prototype for PlanetLab, and illustrate its use with a decentralized barter economy for global PlanetLab resources. The results demonstrate the power and practicality of the architecture, and the effectiveness of oversubscription for protecting resource availability in the presence of failures.
KARMA: A Secure Economic Framework for Peer-to-Peer Resource Sharing
- 1ST WORKSHOP ON ECONOMICS OF PEER-TO-PEER SYSTEMS
, 2003
"... Peer-to-peer systems are typically designed around the assumption that all peers will willingly contribute resources to a global pool. They thus suffer from freeloaders, that is, participants who consume many more resources than they contribute. In this paper, we propose a general economic framework ..."
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Cited by 118 (0 self)
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Peer-to-peer systems are typically designed around the assumption that all peers will willingly contribute resources to a global pool. They thus suffer from freeloaders, that is, participants who consume many more resources than they contribute. In this paper, we propose a general economic framework for avoiding freeloaders in peer-to-peer systems. Our system works by keeping track of the resource consumption and resource contribution of each participant. The overall standing of each participant in the system is represented by a single scalar value, called their karma. A set of nodes, called a bank-set, keeps track of each node's karma, increasing it as resources are contributed, and decreasing it as they are consumed. Our framework is resistant to malicious attempts by the resource provider, consumer, and a fraction of the members of the bank set. We illustrate the application of this framework to a peer-to-peer filesharing application.
Free Riding in BitTorrent is Cheap
- In HotNets
, 2006
"... While it is well-known that BitTorrent is vulnerable to selfish behavior, this paper demonstrates that even entire files can be downloaded without reciprocating at all in BitTorrent. To this end, we present BitThief, a free riding client that never contributes any real data. First, we show that simp ..."
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Cited by 95 (11 self)
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While it is well-known that BitTorrent is vulnerable to selfish behavior, this paper demonstrates that even entire files can be downloaded without reciprocating at all in BitTorrent. To this end, we present BitThief, a free riding client that never contributes any real data. First, we show that simple tricks suffice in order to achieve high download rates, even in the absence of seeders. We also illustrate how peers in a swarm react to various sophisticated attacks. Moreover, our analysis reveals that sharing communities—communities originally intended to offer downloads of good quality and to promote cooperation among peers—provide many incentives to cheat. 1
Specification Faithfulness in Networks with Rational Nodes
, 2004
"... It is useful to prove that an implementation correctly follows a specification. But even with a provably correct implementation, given a choice, would a node choose to follow it? This paper explores how to create distributed system specifications that will be faithfully implemented in networks with ..."
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Cited by 66 (10 self)
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It is useful to prove that an implementation correctly follows a specification. But even with a provably correct implementation, given a choice, would a node choose to follow it? This paper explores how to create distributed system specifications that will be faithfully implemented in networks with rational nodes, so that no node will choose to deviate. Given a strategyproof centralized mechanism, and given a network of nodes modeled as having rational-manipulation faults, we provide a proof technique to establish the incentive-, communication-, and algorithm-compatibility properties that guarantee that participating nodes are faithful to a suggested specification. As a case study, we apply our methods to extend the strategyproof interdomain routing mechanism proposed by Feigenbaum, Papadimitriou, Sami, and Shenker (FPSS) [7], defining a faithful implementation.
A Game Theoretic Approach to Provide Incentive and
- Service Differentiation in P2P Networks. In SIGMETRICS ‘04: International Conference on Measurement and Modeling of Computer Systems
, 2004
"... Traditional peer-to-peer (P2P) networks do not provide service differentiation and incentive for users. Consequently, users can obtain services without themselves contributing any information or service to a P2P community. This leads to the “free-riding ” and “tragedy of the commons ” problems, in w ..."
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Cited by 57 (4 self)
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Traditional peer-to-peer (P2P) networks do not provide service differentiation and incentive for users. Consequently, users can obtain services without themselves contributing any information or service to a P2P community. This leads to the “free-riding ” and “tragedy of the commons ” problems, in which the majority of information requests are directed towards a small number of P2P nodes willing to share their resources. The objective of this work is to enable service differentiation in a P2P network based on the amount of services each node has provided to its community, thereby encouraging all network nodes to share resources. We first introduce a resource distribution mechanism between all information sharing nodes. The mechanism is driven by a distributed algorithm which has linear time complexity and guarantees Pareto-optimal resource allocation. Besides giving incentive, the mechanism distributes resources in a way that increases the aggregate utility of the whole network. Second, we model the whole resource request and distribution process as a competition game between the competing nodes. We show that this game has a Nash equilibrium and is collusion-proof. To realize the game, we propose a protocol in which all competing nodes interact with the information providing node to reach Nash equilibrium in a dynamic and efficient manner. Experimental results are reported to illustrate that the protocol achieves its service differentiation objective and can induce productive information sharing by rational network nodes. Finally, we show that our protocol can properly adapt to different node arrival and departure events, and to different forms of network congestion.
A taxonomy of rational attacks
- PROCEEDINGS OF THE 4TH INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP ON PEER-TO-PEER SYSTEMS (IPTPS ’05
, 2005
"... Abstract — For peer-to-peer services to be effective, participating nodes must cooperate, but in most scenarios a node represents a self-interested party and cooperation can neither be expected nor enforced. A reasonable assumption is that a large fraction of p2p nodes are rational and will attempt ..."
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Cited by 50 (3 self)
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Abstract — For peer-to-peer services to be effective, participating nodes must cooperate, but in most scenarios a node represents a self-interested party and cooperation can neither be expected nor enforced. A reasonable assumption is that a large fraction of p2p nodes are rational and will attempt to maximize their consumption of system resources while minimizing the use of their own. If such behavior violates system policy then it constitutes an attack. In this paper we identify and create a taxonomy for rational attacks and then identify corresponding solutions if they exist. The most effective solutions directly incentivize cooperative behavior, but when this is not feasible the common alternative is to incentivize evidence of cooperation instead. 1
M-dpop: Faithful distributed implementation of efficient social choice problems
- In AAMAS’06 - Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
, 2006
"... In the efficient social choice problem, the goal is to assign values, subject to side constraints, to a set of variables to maximize the total utility across a population of agents, where each agent has private information about its utility function. In this paper we model the social choice problem ..."
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Cited by 48 (17 self)
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In the efficient social choice problem, the goal is to assign values, subject to side constraints, to a set of variables to maximize the total utility across a population of agents, where each agent has private information about its utility function. In this paper we model the social choice problem as a distributed constraint optimization problem (DCOP), in which each agent can communicate with other agents that share an interest in one or more variables. Whereas existing DCOP algorithms can be easily manipulated by an agent, either by misreporting private information or deviating from the algorithm, we introduce M-DPOP, the first DCOP algorithm that provides a faithful distributed implementation for efficient social choice. This provides a concrete example of how the methods of mechanism design can be unified with those of distributed optimization. Faithfulness ensures that no agent can benefit by unilaterally deviating from any aspect of the protocol, neither informationrevelation, computation, nor communication, and whatever the private information of other agents. We allow for payments by agents to a central bank, which is the only central authority that we require. To achieve faithfulness, we carefully integrate the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism with the DPOP algorithm, such that each agent is only asked to perform computation, report
Faithfulness in Internet Algorithms
- SIGCOMM '04
, 2004
"... Proving or disproving faithfulness (a property describing robustness to rational manipulation in action as well as information revelation) is an appealing goal when reasoning about distributed systems containing rational participants. Recent work formalizes the notion of faithfulness and its founda ..."
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Cited by 40 (4 self)
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Proving or disproving faithfulness (a property describing robustness to rational manipulation in action as well as information revelation) is an appealing goal when reasoning about distributed systems containing rational participants. Recent work formalizes the notion of faithfulness and its foundation properties, and presents a general proof technique in the course of proving the ex post Nash faithfulness of a theoretical routing problem [11]. In this paper, we use a less formal approach and take some first steps in faithfulness analysis for existing algorithms running on the Internet. To this end, we consider the expected faithfulness of BitTorrent, a popular file download system, and show how manual backtracing (similar to the the ideas behind program slicing [22]) can be used to find rational manipulation problems. Although this primitive technique has serious drawbacks, it can be useful in disproving faithfulness. Building provably faithful Internet protocols and their corresponding specifications can be quite difficult depending on the system knowledge assumptions and problem complexity. We present some of the open problems that are associated with these challenges.
Strategyproof computing: Systems infrastructures for self-interested parties
- In Workshop on Economics of Peer-toPeer Systems
, 2003
"... (Article begins on next page) The Harvard community has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters. ..."
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Cited by 39 (8 self)
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(Article begins on next page) The Harvard community has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters.
D.S.: Scrivener: Providing incentives in cooperative content distribution systems. In: Middleware.
, 2005
"... Abstract. Cooperative peer-to-peer (p2p) applications are designed to share the resources of participating computers for the common good of all users. However, users do not necessarily have an incentive to donate resources to the system if they can use the system's services for free. In this p ..."
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Cited by 37 (7 self)
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Abstract. Cooperative peer-to-peer (p2p) applications are designed to share the resources of participating computers for the common good of all users. However, users do not necessarily have an incentive to donate resources to the system if they can use the system's services for free. In this paper, we describe Scrivener, a fully decentralized system that ensures fair sharing of bandwidth in cooperative content distribution networks. We show how participating nodes, tracking only first-hand observed behavior of their peers, can detect when their peers are behaving selfishly and refuse to provide them service. Simulation results show that our mechanisms effectively limit the quality of service received by a user to a level that is proportional to the amount of resources contributed by that user, while incurring modest overhead.