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391
Integration of the cognitive and the psychodynamic unconscious
- American Psychologist
, 1994
"... Cognitive-experiential self-theory integrates the cognitive and the psychodynamic unconscious by assuming the ex-istence of two parallel, interacting modes of information processing: a rational system and an emotionally driven experiential system. Support for the theory is provided by the convergenc ..."
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Cited by 450 (1 self)
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Cognitive-experiential self-theory integrates the cognitive and the psychodynamic unconscious by assuming the ex-istence of two parallel, interacting modes of information processing: a rational system and an emotionally driven experiential system. Support for the theory is provided by the convergence of a wide variety of theoretical positions on two similar processing modes; by real-life phenom-ena—such as conflicts between the heart and the head; the appeal of concrete, imagistic, and narrative represen-tations; superstitious thinking; and the ubiquity of religion throughout recorded history—and by laboratory research, including the prediction of new phenomena in heuristic reasoning. N early 100 years ago, Freud introduced a dualtheory of information processing that placeddeviant behavior squarely in the realm of the natural sciences and, more particularly, in psychology.
A neuropsychological theory of multiple systems in category learning
- PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW
, 1998
"... A neuropsychological theory is proposed that assumes category learning is a competition between separate verbal and implicit (i.e., procedural-learning-based) categorization systems. The theory assumes that the caudate nucleus is an important component of the implicit system and that the anterior ci ..."
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Cited by 328 (30 self)
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A neuropsychological theory is proposed that assumes category learning is a competition between separate verbal and implicit (i.e., procedural-learning-based) categorization systems. The theory assumes that the caudate nucleus is an important component of the implicit system and that the anterior cingulate and prefrontal cortices are critical to the verbal system. In addition to making predictions for normal human adults, the theory makes specific predictions for children, elderly people, and patients suffering from Parkinson's disease, Huntington's disease, major depression, amnesia, or lesions of the prefrontal cortex. Two separate formal descriptions of the theory are also provided. One describes trial-by-trial learning, and the other describes global dynamics. The theory is tested on published neuropsychological data and on category learning data with normal adults.
Contextual Cueing: Implicit Learning and Memory of Visual Context Guides Spatial Attention
, 1998
"... this article. This paper has also benefited greatly from constructive feedback from Gordon Logan, Mike Stadler, and our other reviewers. We thank Joanie Sanchez for her assistance in running Experiment 1. This research was supported by a Social Science Faculty Research Award from Yale University. ..."
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Cited by 282 (25 self)
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this article. This paper has also benefited greatly from constructive feedback from Gordon Logan, Mike Stadler, and our other reviewers. We thank Joanie Sanchez for her assistance in running Experiment 1. This research was supported by a Social Science Faculty Research Award from Yale University. Portions of this research were presented at the Annual Meeting of the Association for Research in Ophthalmology and Vision, Fort Lauderdale, FL, in May, 1997, and at the Annual Meeting of the Psychonomic Society, Philadelphia, PA, in November, 1997
A rational analysis of the selection task as optimal data selection
- 67 – 215535 Deliverable 4.1
, 1994
"... Human reasoning in hypothesis-testing tasks like Wason's (1966, 1968) selection task has been depicted as prone to systematic biases. However, performance on this task has been assessed against a now outmoded falsificationist philosophy of science. Therefore, the experimental data is reassessed ..."
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Cited by 238 (16 self)
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Human reasoning in hypothesis-testing tasks like Wason's (1966, 1968) selection task has been depicted as prone to systematic biases. However, performance on this task has been assessed against a now outmoded falsificationist philosophy of science. Therefore, the experimental data is reassessed in the light of a Bayesian model of optimal data selection in inductive hypothesis testing. The model provides a rational analysis (Anderson, 1990) of the selection task that fits well with people's performance on both abstract and thematic versions of the task. The model suggests that reasoning in these tasks may be rational rather than subject to systematic bias. Over the past 30 years, results in the psychology of reasoning have raised doubts about human rationality. The assumption of human rationality has a long history. Aristotle took the capacity for rational thought to be the defining characteristic of human beings, the capacity that separated us from the animals. Descartes regarded the ability to use language and to reason as the hallmarks of the mental that separated it from the merely physical. Many contemporary philosophers of mind also appeal to a basic principle of rationality in accounting for everyday, folk psychological explanation whereby we explain each other's behavior in terms of our beliefs and desires (Cherniak, 1986; Cohen, 1981; Davidson, 1984; Dennett, 1987; but see Stich, 1990). These philosophers, both ancient and modern, share a common view of rationality: To be rational is to reason according to rules (Brown, 1989). Logic and mathematics provide the normative rules that tell us how we should reason. Rationality therefore seems to demand that the human cognitive system embodies the rules of logic and mathematics. However, results in the psychology of reasoning appear to show that people do not reason according to these rules. In both deductive (Evans, 1982, 1989;
Learning the structure of event sequences
- JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY: GENERAL
, 1991
"... How is complex sequential material acquired, processed, and represented when there is no intention to learn? Two experiments exploring a choice reaction time task are reported. Unknown to Ss, successive stimuli followed a sequence derived from a "noisy " finite-state grammar. After ..."
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Cited by 208 (28 self)
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How is complex sequential material acquired, processed, and represented when there is no intention to learn? Two experiments exploring a choice reaction time task are reported. Unknown to Ss, successive stimuli followed a sequence derived from a "noisy " finite-state grammar. After considerable practice (60,000 exposures) with Experiment 1, Ss acquired a complex body of procedural knowledge about the sequential structure of the material. Experiment 2 was an attempt to identify limits on Ss ability to encode the temporal context by using more distant contingencies that spanned irrelevant material. Taken together, the results indicate that Ss become increasingly sensitive to the temporal context set by previous elements of the sequence, up to 3 elements. Responses are also affected by priming effects from recent trials. A connectionist model that incorporates sensitivity to the sequential structure and to priming effects is shown to capture key aspects of both acquisition and processing and to account for the interaction between attention and sequence structure reported by Cohen, Ivry, and Keele (1990).
From Implicit Skills to Explicit Knowledge: A Bottom-Up Model of Skill Learning
, 1999
"... This paper presents a skill learning model CLARION. Different from existing models of mostly high-level skill learning that use a top-down approach (that is, turning declarative knowledge into procedural knowledge through practice), we adopt a bottom-up approach toward low-level skill learning, wher ..."
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Cited by 130 (39 self)
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This paper presents a skill learning model CLARION. Different from existing models of mostly high-level skill learning that use a top-down approach (that is, turning declarative knowledge into procedural knowledge through practice), we adopt a bottom-up approach toward low-level skill learning, where procedural knowledge develops first and declarative knowledge develops later. Our model is formed by integrating connectionist, reinforcement, and symbolic learning methods to perform on-line reactive learning. It adopts a two-level dual-representation framework (Sun, 1995), with a combination of localist and distributed representation. We compare the model with human data in a minefield navigation task, demonstrating some match between the model and human data in several respects.
Artificial Grammar Learning by 1-Year-Olds Leads to Specific and Abstract Knowledge
- Cognition
, 1999
"... Four experiments used the head-turn preference procedure to assess whether infants could extract and remember information from auditory strings produced by a miniature artificial grammar. In all four experiments, infants generalized to new structure by discriminating new grammatical strings from ung ..."
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Cited by 119 (7 self)
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Four experiments used the head-turn preference procedure to assess whether infants could extract and remember information from auditory strings produced by a miniature artificial grammar. In all four experiments, infants generalized to new structure by discriminating new grammatical strings from ungrammatical ones after less than 2 min exposure to the grammar. Infants acquired specific information about the grammar as demonstrated by the ability to discriminate new grammatical strings from those with illegal endpoints (Experiment 1). Infants also discriminated new grammatical strings from those with string-internal pairwise violations (Experiments 2 and 3). Infants in Experiment 4 abstracted beyond specific word order as demonstrated by the ability to discriminate new strings produced by their training grammar from strings produced by another grammar despite a change in vocabulary between training and test. We discuss the implications of these findings for the study of language
Synthetic grammar learning: Implicit rule abstraction or explicit fragmentary knowledge
- Journal of Experimental Psychology: General
, 1990
"... 3 experiments were designed to demonstrate that classifying new letter strings as grammatical (i.e., conforming to a set of rules called a synthetic grammar) or ungrammatical may proceed from fragmentary conscious knowledge of the bigrams constituting the grammatical strings displayed in the study p ..."
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Cited by 113 (7 self)
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3 experiments were designed to demonstrate that classifying new letter strings as grammatical (i.e., conforming to a set of rules called a synthetic grammar) or ungrammatical may proceed from fragmentary conscious knowledge of the bigrams constituting the grammatical strings displayed in the study phase, rather than from an unconscious structured representation of the grammar, as Reber (1989) contended. In Experiment 1, grammaticality judgments of subjects initially studying grammatical letter strings did not differ from judgments by subjects learning from a list of the bigrams making up these strings. In Experiment 2, judgments about nongram-matical strings composed of valid bigrams placed in invalid locations were extremely poor, although better than chance. In Experiment 3 the explicit knowledge of bigrams as assessed by a recognition procedure appeared sufficient to account for observed performance on a standard test of grammaticality. A widely held model of cognition endows human subjects with the ability to implicitly abstract the regularities or high-level rules embodied in richly structured stimulus domains. Over the last 20 years, this general model has received strong
Learning artificial grammars with competitive chunking
- Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition
, 1990
"... When exposed to a regular stimulus field, for instance, that generated by an artificial grammar, subjects unintentionally learn to respond efficiently to the underlying structure (Miller, 1958; Reber 1967). We explored the hypothesis that the learning process is chunking and that grammatical knowled ..."
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Cited by 99 (0 self)
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When exposed to a regular stimulus field, for instance, that generated by an artificial grammar, subjects unintentionally learn to respond efficiently to the underlying structure (Miller, 1958; Reber 1967). We explored the hypothesis that the learning process is chunking and that grammatical knowledge is implicitly encoded in a hierarchical network of chunks. We trained subjects on exemplar sentences while inducing them to form specific chunks. Their knowledge was then assessed through judgments ofgrammaticality. We found that subjects were less sensitive to violations that preserved their chunks than to violations that did not. We derived the theory of competitive chunking (CC) and found that it successfully reproduces, via computer simula-tions, both Miller's experimental results and our own. In CC, chunks are hierarchical structures strengthened with use by a bottom-up perception process. Strength-mediated competitions determine which chunks are created and which are used by the perception process. The world is regular, and people are efficient regularity detectors. Sometimes people are intentionally looking for structural regularities. Other times, however, people learn to respond to structured stimuli even though they do not suspect
