Abstract not found

We study noncooperative household models with two agents and several voluntarily con-tributed public goods, deriving the counterpart to the Slutsky matrix and demonstrating the nature of the deviation of its properties from those of a true Slutsky matrix in the unitary model. We provide results characterising both cases in which there are and are not jointly contributed public goods. Demand properties are contrasted with those for collective models and conclusions drawn regarding the possibility of empirically testing the collective model against noncooperative alternatives and the noncooperative model against a general alternative.

Distributional e¤ects in household models: separate spheres and income pooling.

(ESRC) is gratefully acknowledged. The work was part of the

We derive distributional e¤ects for a non-cooperative alternative to the unitary model of household behaviour. We consider the Nash equilibria of a voluntary contributions to public goods game. Our main result is that, in general, the two partners either choose to contribute to di¤erent public goods or they contribute to at most one common good. The former case corresponds to the separate spheres case of Lundberg and Pollak (1993). The second outcome yields (local) income pooling. A household will be in di¤erent regimes depending on the distribution of income within the household. Any bargaining model with this non-cooperative case as a breakdown point will inherit the local income pooling. We conclude that targeting bene…ts such as child bene…ts to one household member may not always have an e¤ect on outcomes.

Abstract not found

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The paper proposes a model of household behavior with both private and public consumption where the spouses independently maximize their utilities, but taking into account, together with their own individual budget constraints, the collective household budget constraint with public goods evaluated at Lindahl prices. The Lagrange multipliers associated with these constraints are used to parameterize the set of equilibria, in addition to the usual parameterization by income shares. The proposed game generalizes both the ‘collective ’ model of household behavior and the non-cooperative game with voluntary contributions to public goods.

We develop a revealed preference approach to analyze non-unitary household consumption behavior that is not cooperative (or Pareto e ¢ cient). We derive global and necessary and su ¢ cient conditions for data consistency with the model. Interestingly, contrary to existing results for the di¤erential approach, these revealed preference conditions for the noncooperative model are independent from (or non-nested with) the conditions for the cooperative model. We show that the conditions can be veri…ed by means of relatively straightforward mixed integer programming (MIP) methods, which is particularly attractive in view of empirical analysis. Our framework extends to tests for separate spheres and joint contribution to public goods. An application to data drawn from the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) demonstrates the empirical relevance of the noncooperative consumption model. To the best of our knowledge, this is the …rst empirical application of the noncooperative consumption model. JEL Classi…cation: D11, D12, D13, C14. We are grateful to the editor David Myatt and two anonymous referees for helpful suggestions. This is a shortened version of the working paper that circulated under the title "Degrees of cooperation in household consumption models: a revealed preference analysis". We thank Claude

e¤ects in household models: separate spheres and income pooling.