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How causal knowledge affects classification: A generative theory of categorization (2006)

by B Rehder, S Kim
Venue:JEP: LMC
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Analogical and category-based inference: A theoretical integration with Bayesian causal models

by Keith J. Holyoak, Hee Seung Lee, Hongjing Lu - Journal of Experimental Psychology: General , 2010
"... A fundamental issue for theories of human induction is to specify constraints on potential inferences. For inferences based on shared category membership, an analogy, and/or a relational schema, it appears that the basic goal of induction is to make accurate and goal-relevant inferences that are sen ..."
Abstract - Cited by 10 (1 self) - Add to MetaCart
A fundamental issue for theories of human induction is to specify constraints on potential inferences. For inferences based on shared category membership, an analogy, and/or a relational schema, it appears that the basic goal of induction is to make accurate and goal-relevant inferences that are sensitive to uncertainty. People can use source information at various levels of abstraction (including both specific instances and more general categories), coupled with prior causal knowledge, to build a causal model for a target situation, which in turn constrains inferences about the target. We propose a computational theory in the framework of Bayesian inference and test its predictions (parameter-free for the cases we consider) in a series of experiments in which people were asked to assess the probabilities of various causal predictions and attributions about a target on the basis of source knowledge about generative and preventive causes. The theory proved successful in accounting for systematic patterns of judgments about interrelated types of causal inferences, including evidence that analogical inferences are partially dissociable from overall mapping quality.
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...ries (Kemp, Goodman, & Tenenbaum, 2007; Lien & Cheng, 2000; Waldmann et al., 1995) and inferences based on learned categories (Ahn, 1999; Heit, 1998; Rehder, 2006, 2007, 2009; Rehder & Burnett, 2005; =-=Rehder & Kim, 2006-=-; Tenenbaum, Kemp, & Shafto, 2007) are guided by causal models (for a recent review see Lagnado, Waldmann, Hagmayer, & Sloman, 2007). For example, Rehder (2006) taught participants the causal relation...

doi:10.3758/MC.37.6.715 Classification as diagnostic reasoning

by Bob Rehder, Shinwoo Kim
"... An ongoing goal in the field of categorization has been to determine how objects ’ features provide evidence of membership in one category versus another. Well-known findings include that feature diagnosticity is a function of how often the feature appears in category members versus nonmembers, thei ..."
Abstract - Cited by 10 (6 self) - Add to MetaCart
An ongoing goal in the field of categorization has been to determine how objects ’ features provide evidence of membership in one category versus another. Well-known findings include that feature diagnosticity is a function of how often the feature appears in category members versus nonmembers, their perceptual salience, how features are used in support of inferences, and how observable features are related to other observable features. We tested how diagnosticity is affected by causal relations between observable and unobserved features. Consistent with our view of classification as diagnostic reasoning, we found that observable features are more diagnostic to the extent that they are caused by underlying features that define category membership, because the presence of the latter can be (causally) inferred from the former. Implications of these results for current views of conceptual structure and models of categorization are discussed. It is generally accepted that people’s concepts include not only the features and attributes of the entity being represented, but also the ways in which those features are related to one another. For example, we know that hormones can alter a person’s behavior, that chemical structure can affect a substance’s hardness, and that processor
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...ultiple causes. For example, flying may become more important than wings if flying has additional causes (e.g., having the right body size relative to wing span; Rehder, 2003b; Rehder & Hastie, 2001; =-=Rehder & Kim, 2006-=-). Finally, the coherence effect is the phenomenon in which causal relations make objects exhibiting certain combinations of features better category members—namely, those that manifest the interfeatu...

Causal-based property generalization

by Bob Rehder - Cognitive Science , 2009
"... A central question in cognitive research concerns how new properties are generalized to categories. This article introduces a model of how generalizations involve a process of causal inference in which people estimate the likely presence of the new property in individual category exemplars and then ..."
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A central question in cognitive research concerns how new properties are generalized to categories. This article introduces a model of how generalizations involve a process of causal inference in which people estimate the likely presence of the new property in individual category exemplars and then the prevalence of the property among all category members. Evidence in favor of this causalbased generalization (CBG) view included effects of an existing feature’s base rate (Experiment 1), the direction of the causal relations (Experiments 2 and 4), the number of those relations (Experiment 3), and the distribution of features among category members (Experiments 4 and 5). The results provided no support for an alternative view that generalizations are promoted by the centrality of the to-be-generalized feature. However, there was evidence that a minority of participants based their judgments on simpler associative reasoning processes. Keywords: Causal-based induction; Generalization; Causal reasoning 1.
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...particular representation of causal relations first introduced by Cheng (1997) and later applied to a variety of categorybased tasks, including classification (Rehder, 2003a,b; Rehder & Hastie, 2001; =-=Rehder & Kim, 2006-=-) and feature prediction (Rehder & Burnett, 2005). On this account, the presence of some cause C enables a causal mechanism which brings about (with some probability m representing the strength or pow...

Causal Status and Coherence in Causal-Based Categorization

by Bob Rehder, Shinwoo Kim - Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition , 2010
"... Research has documented two effects of interfeature causal knowledge on classification. A causal status effect occurs when features that are causes are more important to category membership than their effects. A coherence effect occurs when combinations of features that are consistent with causal la ..."
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Research has documented two effects of interfeature causal knowledge on classification. A causal status effect occurs when features that are causes are more important to category membership than their effects. A coherence effect occurs when combinations of features that are consistent with causal laws provide additional evidence of category membership. In this study, we found that stronger causal relations led to a weaker causal status effect and a stronger coherence effect (Experiment 1), that weaker alternative causes led to stronger causal status and coherence effects (Experiment 2), and that “essentialized” categories led to a stronger causal status effect (Experiment 3), albeit only for probabilistic causal links
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... three experiments). The second question of course concerns why a full causal status effect obtained in some studies (e.g., Ahn et al., 2000; Sloman et al., 1998) but not others (e.g., Rehder, 2003b; =-=Rehder & Kim, 2006-=-). Conceivably, these differences could be due to how the causal links were described. For example, whereas Ahn et al. described the causal relationships in probabilistic terms by use of the phrase “t...

What is Typical About the Typicality Effect in Category-based Induction?

by Jonathan R. Rein, Micah B. Goldwater, Arthur B. Markman - IN PRESS AT MEMORY & COGNITION
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Learning Structured Generative Concepts

by Andreas Stuhlmüller, Joshua B. Tenenbaum, Noah D. Goodman - In Proceedings of the Thirty-Second Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society , 2010
"... Many real world concepts, such as “car”, “house”, and “tree”, are more than simply a collection of features. These objects are richly structured, defined in terms of systems of relations, subparts, and recursive embeddings. We describe an approach to concept representation and learning that attempts ..."
Abstract - Cited by 4 (3 self) - Add to MetaCart
Many real world concepts, such as “car”, “house”, and “tree”, are more than simply a collection of features. These objects are richly structured, defined in terms of systems of relations, subparts, and recursive embeddings. We describe an approach to concept representation and learning that attempts to capture such structured objects. This approach builds on recent probabilistic approaches, viewing concepts as generative processes, and on recent rule-based approaches, constructing concepts inductively from a language of thought. Concepts are modeled as probabilistic programs that describe generative processes; these programs are described in a compositional language. In an exploratory concept learning experiment, we investigate human learning from sets of tree-like objects generated by processes that vary in their abstract structure, from simple prototypes to complex recursions. We compare human categorization judgements to predictions of the true generative process as well as a variety of exemplar-based heuristics.
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...denote distributions. Finally, the probabilistic program approach can be seen as a generalization of previous approaches to generative representations of concepts (Kemp, Bernstein, & Tenenbaum, 2005; =-=Rehder & Kim, 2006-=-; Feldman, 1997). We investigate human learning for classes of generating processes that vary in their abstract structure, from simple prototypes to complex multiply recursive programs. We compare pre...

Category Transfer in Sequential Causal Learning: The Unbroken Mechanism Hypothesis

by York Hagmayer, A Björn Meder, B Momme Von Sydow, Michael R. Waldmann A
"... The goal of the present set of studies is to explore the boundary conditions of category transfer in causal learning. Previous research has shown that people are capable of inducing categories based on causal learning input, and they often transfer these categories to new causal learning tasks. Howe ..."
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The goal of the present set of studies is to explore the boundary conditions of category transfer in causal learning. Previous research has shown that people are capable of inducing categories based on causal learning input, and they often transfer these categories to new causal learning tasks. However, occasionally learners abandon the learned categories and induce new ones. Whereas previously it has been argued that transfer is only observed with essentialist categories in which the hidden properties are causally relevant for the target effect in the transfer relation, we here propose an alternative explanation, the unbroken mechanism hypothesis. This hypothesis claims that categories are transferred from a previously learned causal relation to a new causal relation when learners assume a causal mechanism linking the two relations that is continuous and unbroken. The findings of two causal learning experiments support the unbroken mechanism hypothesis.
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...ort psychological essentialism (Medin & Ortony, 1989), which is claimed to underlie the naïve representation of natural kinds from childhood on (see also Ahn et al., 2001; Gelman, 2003; Rehder, 2007; =-=Rehder & Kim, 2006-=-). According to this theory, people tend to ascribe stable hidden essences to natural kind categories, such as viruses, which may cause various visible features. Once learners believe that their categ...

The Development of Causal Categorization

by Brett K. Hayes, A Bob Rehder B
"... Two experiments examined the impact of causal relations between features on categorization in 5- to 6-year-old children and adults. Participants learned artificial categories containing instances with causally related features and noncausal features. They then selected the most likely category membe ..."
Abstract - Cited by 1 (0 self) - Add to MetaCart
Two experiments examined the impact of causal relations between features on categorization in 5- to 6-year-old children and adults. Participants learned artificial categories containing instances with causally related features and noncausal features. They then selected the most likely category member from a series of novel test pairs. Classification patterns and logistic regression were used to diagnose the presence of independent effects of causal coherence, causal status, and relational centrality. Adult classification was driven primarily by coherence when causal links were deterministic (Experiment 1) but showed additional influences of causal status when links were probabilistic (Experiment 2). Children’s classification was based primarily on causal coherence in both cases. There was no effect of relational centrality in either age group. These results suggest that the generative model (Rehder, 2003a) provides a good account of causal categorization in children as well as adults.
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... that causal knowledge might affect categorization. First, Ahn and colleagues have documented a causal status effect (Ahn, Kim, Lassaline, & Dennis, 2000; Sloman et al., 1998; also see Rehder, 2003a; =-=Rehder & Kim, 2006-=-, 2010). In this effect, causal features at lower levels of a causal chain are given more weight when deciding category membership than effect features that are dependent on the cause. For example, Ah...

Reasoning with Conjunctive Causes

by Bob Rehder
"... Conjunctive causes are causes that all need to be present for an effect to occur. They contrast with independent causes that by themselves can each bring about an effect. We extend existing “causal power ” representations of independent causes to include a representation of conjunctive causes. We th ..."
Abstract - Cited by 1 (1 self) - Add to MetaCart
Conjunctive causes are causes that all need to be present for an effect to occur. They contrast with independent causes that by themselves can each bring about an effect. We extend existing “causal power ” representations of independent causes to include a representation of conjunctive causes. We then demonstrate how independent vs. conjunctive representations imply sharply different patterns of reasoning (e.g., explaining away effects for independent causes as compared to exoneration effects for conjunctive causes). An experiment testing how people reason with independent and conjunctive causes found that their inferences generally matched the model’s prediction, albeit with some important exceptions. Rather than operating in a vacuum, causes frequently interact with other factors to produce their effects. For example, the conjunction of two or more variables is often necessary for an outcome to occur. A spark may only produce fire if there is fuel to ignite, a virus may only cause disease if one’s immune system is suppressed, the motive to commit murder may result in death only if the means to carry out the crime are available. Sometimes, conjunctive causes take the form of enablers. For example, the presence of oxygen enables fire given spark and fuel. In contrast, disablers interact with existing causes by preventing normal outcomes. Although the eight ball’s path to the side pocket may appear inevitable, it may be interrupted by an earthquake, a falling ceiling tile, or a spilled beer. The last 20 years has seen a growing interest in the role of causal knowledge in numerous areas of cognition. Many studies have investigated how causal relations are learned from observed correlations (Cheng, 1997; Gopnik et al.,
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...oman & Lagnado, 2005; Waldmann & Hagmeyer, 2005), analogy (Holyoak et al., 2010; Lee & Holyoak, 2008), generalization (Rehder, 2006; 2009), and classification (Rehder & Hastie, 2001; Rehder 2003a; b; =-=Rehder & Kim, 2006-=-; 2009; 2010). But although some studies have investigated the learning of interactive causes (e.g., Novick & Cheng, 2004), their role in reasoning has received little attention. This article tests ho...

Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect Cognitive Psychology journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/cogpsych

by Alan Jern, Charles Kemp
"... ..."
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...nowledge about categories. For example, category knowledge is used for feature inference (Yamauchi & Markman, 2000; Yamauchi & Yu, 2008), problem solving (Ross, 1999), causal reasoning (Rehder, 2003; =-=Rehder & Kim, 2006-=-), and explanation (Lombrozo, 2009; Williams & Lombrozo, 2010). We propose that generation is another fundamental way in which people use their category knowledge. There are important connections betw...

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