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2009) Social Identity and Preferences over Redistribution, The Hebrew University mimeo
"... We design an experiment to study the effects of social identity on preferences over redistribution. The experiment highlights the trade-off between social identity concerns and maximization of monetary payoffs. Subjects belonging to two distinct natural groups are randomly assigned gross incomes an ..."
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Cited by 19 (0 self)
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We design an experiment to study the effects of social identity on preferences over redistribution. The experiment highlights the trade-off between social identity concerns and maximization of monetary payoffs. Subjects belonging to two distinct natural groups are randomly assigned gross incomes and vote over alternative redistributive tax regimes, where the regime is chosen by majority rule. We find that a significant subset of the subjects systematically deviate from monetary payoff maximization towards the tax rate that benefits their group when the monetary cost of doing so is not too high. These deviations cannot be explained by efficiency concerns, inequality aversion, reciprocity, social learning or conformity. Finally, we show that behavior in the lab helps explain the relationship between reported income and stated preferences over redistribution observed in survey data.
Expressive behavior in economics and politics.
- European Journal of Political Economy,
, 2010
"... Abstract Expressive behavior provides expressive utility by confirming identity. Aspects of identity are predetermined. I focus on attributes of identity that people choose, to be pleasing to themselves or pleasing to others. All people are expressive insofar as behavior is predicated on identity. ..."
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Cited by 17 (5 self)
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Abstract Expressive behavior provides expressive utility by confirming identity. Aspects of identity are predetermined. I focus on attributes of identity that people choose, to be pleasing to themselves or pleasing to others. All people are expressive insofar as behavior is predicated on identity. Expressive behavior can however be deceptive and can be the source of externalities. I use expressive voting to illustrate expressive behavior and generalize the model of expressive utility to behavior that I call expressive rhetoric and expressive generosity. Experimental evidence on expressive behavior and a reinterpretation of other experimental evidence reveals extensive prevalence of decisions predicated on expressive utility. Expressive behavior can coexist with altruism or malice. I enquire into remedies for the social costs of expressive behavior.
Competitive preferences and status as an incentive: Experimental evidence. GATE Working Paper no
, 2011
"... Abstract: In this paper, we investigate individuals ’ investment in status in an environment where no monetary return can possibly be derived from reaching a better relative position. We use a real-effort experiment in which we permit individuals to learn and potentially improve their status (rank). ..."
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Cited by 12 (4 self)
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Abstract: In this paper, we investigate individuals ’ investment in status in an environment where no monetary return can possibly be derived from reaching a better relative position. We use a real-effort experiment in which we permit individuals to learn and potentially improve their status (rank). We find that people express both intrinsic motivation and a taste for status. Indeed, people increase their effort when they are simply informed about their relative performance, and people pay both to sabotage others ’ output and to artificially increase their own relative performance. In addition, stronger group identity favors positive rivalry and discourages sabotage among peers.
Competition between organizational groups: Its impact on altruistic and antisocial motivations
- Management Science
, 2012
"... mnsc.1110.1466 Full terms and conditions of use: ..."
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Communication and Efficiency in Competitive Coordination Games
, 2010
"... Costless pre-play communication has been found to effectively facilitate coordination and enhance efficiency in games with Pareto-ranked equilibria. We report an experiment in which two groups compete in a weakest-link contest by expending costly efforts. Allowing intra-group communication leads to ..."
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Cited by 11 (5 self)
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Costless pre-play communication has been found to effectively facilitate coordination and enhance efficiency in games with Pareto-ranked equilibria. We report an experiment in which two groups compete in a weakest-link contest by expending costly efforts. Allowing intra-group communication leads to more aggressive competition and greater coordination than control treatments without any communication. On the other hand, allowing inter-group communication leads to less destructive competition. As a result, intra-group communication decreases while inter-group communication increases payoffs. Our experiment thus provides evidence that communication can either reduce or increase efficiency in competitive coordination games depending on different communication boundaries. This contrasts sharply with experimental findings from public goods and other coordination games, where communication always enhances efficiency and often leads to socially optimal outcomes.
The Dark Side of Competition for Status
, 2013
"... Abstract: Unethical behavior within organizations is not rare. We investigate experimentally the role of status-seeking behavior in sabotage and cheating activities aiming at improving one’s performance ranking in a flat-wage environment. We find that average effort is higher when individuals are in ..."
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Cited by 7 (0 self)
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Abstract: Unethical behavior within organizations is not rare. We investigate experimentally the role of status-seeking behavior in sabotage and cheating activities aiming at improving one’s performance ranking in a flat-wage environment. We find that average effort is higher when individuals are informed about their relative performance. However, ranking feedback also favors disreputable behavior. Some individuals do not hesitate to incur a cost to improve their rank by sabotaging others ’ work or by increasing artificially their own performance. Introducing sabotage opportunities has a strong detrimental effect on performance. Therefore, ranking incentives should be used with care. Inducing group identity discourages sabotage among peers but increases in-group rivalry.
PAYING TO BE NICE: CONSISTENCY AND COSTLY PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR
"... Building on previous research in economics and psychology, we propose that the costliness of initial prosocial behavior positively influences whether that behavior leads to consistent future behaviors. We suggest that costly prosocial behaviors serve as a signal of prosocial identity and that people ..."
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Building on previous research in economics and psychology, we propose that the costliness of initial prosocial behavior positively influences whether that behavior leads to consistent future behaviors. We suggest that costly prosocial behaviors serve as a signal of prosocial identity and that people subsequently behave in line with that self-perception. In contrast, costless prosocial acts do not signal much about one’s prosocial identity, so subsequent behavior is less likely to be consistent and may even show the reductions in prosocial behavior associated with licensing. The results of a laboratory experiment and a large field experiment converge to support our account.
Gender differences in cooperation with group membership
- Games and Economic Behavior
, 2011
"... Abstract We study experimentally how males and females differ in the way same-gender peers observing their action affects their social behavior. In our experiment, people play a Prisoner's Dilemma Game with a partisan audience watching the choice. ..."
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Cited by 5 (0 self)
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Abstract We study experimentally how males and females differ in the way same-gender peers observing their action affects their social behavior. In our experiment, people play a Prisoner's Dilemma Game with a partisan audience watching the choice.
Team competition: Eliminating the gender gap in competitiveness ∗
, 2009
"... Recent experimental results indicate that women do not like competitive environments as much as men. This paper presents an experimental design giving participants the opportunity to enter a tournament as part of a team rather than alone. While a large and significant gender gap in entry in the Indi ..."
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Recent experimental results indicate that women do not like competitive environments as much as men. This paper presents an experimental design giving participants the opportunity to enter a tournament as part of a team rather than alone. While a large and significant gender gap in entry in the Individual Tournament is found in line with the literature, no gender gap is found in entry in the Team Tournament. Women do not enter the tournament significantly more often when it is team-based but men enter significantly less when they are part of a team rather than alone. Changes in overconfidence as well as in risk, ambiguity and feedback aversion and the difference in men’s and women’s taste for competition all account for part of the disappearance of the gender gap in tournament entry. A remaining explanation is that men, and more precisely, high-performing dislike the uncertainty about their teammate’s ability more than women. The results suggest that men’s distaste for the Team Tournament is mainly caused by high-performing men not wanting to help a less deserving participant get higher payoffs.
How Competitive are Female Professionals? A Tale of Identity Conflict
, 2012
"... *The alphabetical ordering of the authors denotes equal co-authorship. We gratefully ..."
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Cited by 4 (1 self)
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*The alphabetical ordering of the authors denotes equal co-authorship. We gratefully
