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The relation between essentialist beliefs and evolutionary reasoning. (2008)

by A Shtulman, L Schulz
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The Feasibility of Folk Science

by Frank C Keil - Cognitive science , 2010
"... Abstract If folk science means individuals having well worked out mechanistic theories of the workings of the world, then it is not feasible. Laypeople's explanatory understandings are remarkably coarse, full of gaps, and often full of inconsistencies. Even worse, most people overestimate thei ..."
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Abstract If folk science means individuals having well worked out mechanistic theories of the workings of the world, then it is not feasible. Laypeople's explanatory understandings are remarkably coarse, full of gaps, and often full of inconsistencies. Even worse, most people overestimate their own understandings. Yet recent views suggest that formal scientists may not be so different. In spite of these limitations, science somehow works and its success offers hope for the feasibility of folk science as well. The success of science arises from the ways in which scientists learn to leverage understandings in other minds and to outsource explanatory work through sophisticated methods of deference and simplification of complex systems. Three studies ask whether analogous processes might be present not only in laypeople but also in young children and thereby form a foundation for supplementing explanatory understandings almost from the start of our first attempts to make sense of the world.
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...-specific principles. However, such domain-specific constraints may not be sufficient for something to count as an intuitive theory, especially given that aspects of them may operate in other species as well (Carey & Spelke, 1996). Naıve theories can also lead people astray. Indeed, a large subspecialty of cognitive science focusing on misconceptions has documented how laypeople and children make systematic mistakes in their reasoning about physical mechanics (e.g., Caramazza, McCloskey, & Green, 1981; Bertamini, Spooner, & Hecht, 2004), biology (e.g., Inagaki & Hatano, 2002; Shtulman, 2006; Shtulman & Schulz, 2008), and psychology (e.g., Leslie, Friedman, & German, 2004; Malle, Knobe, & Nelson, 2007). Although such misconceptions may lead to misleading ‘‘deficit models’’ of cognitive development and instruction (Zimmerman, 2007), they certainly do exist and have been argued to serve as evidence for the coherence of folk science domains; coherence that drives people to make mistakes even in the face of real-world counter-evidence. Thus, misconceptions sometimes have been used as evidence for intuitive theories. In short, there seems to be an emerging consensus about the existence of many folk sciences ac...

Getting to Darwin: Obstacles to Accepting Evolution by Natural Selection

by Sci Educ, Paul Thagard, Æ Scott Findlay, Ó Springer, Science+business Media B. V
"... Abstract Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection is central to modern biology, but is resisted by many people. This paper discusses the major psychological obstacles to accepting Darwin’s theory. Cognitive obstacles to adopting evolution by natural selection include conceptual difficulties ..."
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Abstract Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection is central to modern biology, but is resisted by many people. This paper discusses the major psychological obstacles to accepting Darwin’s theory. Cognitive obstacles to adopting evolution by natural selection include conceptual difficulties, methodological issues, and coherence problems that derive from the intuitiveness of alternative theories. The main emotional obstacles to accepting evolution are its apparent conflict with valued beliefs about God, souls, and morality. We draw on the philosophy of science and on a psychological theory of cognitive and emotional belief revision to make suggestions about what can be done to improve acceptance of
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...population genetics. There is psychological research showing that conceptualization of species in terms of essences (inner natures) is an impediment to understanding natural selection (Shtulman 2006; =-=Shtulman and Schulz 2008-=-). Even when students accept evolution, they may continue to believe that it operates on a species’ essence rather than on its members. In addition to being inherently statistical, evolutionary explan...

Death and Science: The Existential Underpinnings of Belief in Intelligent Design and Discomfort with Evolution

by Jessica L. Tracy, Joshua Hart, Jason P. Martens , 2011
"... The present research examined the psychological motives underlying widespread support for intelligent design theory (IDT), a purportedly scientific theory that lacks any scientific evidence; and antagonism toward evolutionary theory (ET), a theory supported by a large body of scientific evidence. We ..."
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The present research examined the psychological motives underlying widespread support for intelligent design theory (IDT), a purportedly scientific theory that lacks any scientific evidence; and antagonism toward evolutionary theory (ET), a theory supported by a large body of scientific evidence. We tested whether these attitudes are influenced by IDT’s provision of an explanation of life’s origins that better addresses existential concerns than ET. In four studies, existential threat (induced via reminders of participants ’ own mortality) increased acceptance of IDT and/or rejection of ET, regardless of participants ’ religion, religiosity, educational background, or preexisting attitude toward evolution. Effects were reversed by teaching participants that naturalism can be a source of existential meaning (Study 4), and among natural-science students for whom ET may already provide existential meaning (Study 5). These reversals suggest that the effect of heightened mortality awareness on attitudes toward ET and IDT is due to a desire to find greater meaning and purpose in science when existential threats are activated.

Rethinking the role of resubsumption in conceptual change

by Andrew Shtulman - Educational Psychologist , 2009
"... Why is conceptual change difficult yet possible? Ohlsson (2009/this issue) proposes that the answer can be found in the dynamics of resubsumption, or the process by which a domain of experience is resubsumed under an intuitive theory originally constructed to explain some other domain of experience. ..."
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Why is conceptual change difficult yet possible? Ohlsson (2009/this issue) proposes that the answer can be found in the dynamics of resubsumption, or the process by which a domain of experience is resubsumed under an intuitive theory originally constructed to explain some other domain of experience. Here, it is argued that conceptual change is difficult in two distinct senses—that is, difficult to initiate and difficult to complete—and that Ohlsson’s proposal addresses the latter but not the former. The implications of this argument for how conceptual change might be best facilitated in the science classroom are discussed as well. In a classic study by McCloskey, Caramazza, and Green (1980), college undergraduates were asked to draw the tra-jectory of a ball shot through a curved tube resting on a flat surface. Although most participants had taken one or more physics courses prior to the study, many still drew physi-cally impossible trajectories—that is, trajectories in which the ball continued to travel in a curved motion after exiting the tube. This intuition is inconsistent not only with the way objects actually move but also with the Newtonian principles these students had presumably learned in their prior course-work. From where do such misconceptions arise? Why do such misconceptions persist in the face of contrary experi-ence and instruction? And how might such misconceptions be eliminated? These are the questions at the heart of science education research, both in the physical sciences (Clement, 1982; Hal-loun & Hestenes, 1985; Vosniadou & Brewer, 1992) and the
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...ns of natural selection, students of evolution in today’s science classrooms take many months to do the same. Recent research on evolutionary reasoning (e.g., Shtulman, 2006; Shtulman & Calabi, 2008; =-=Shtulman & Schulz, 2008-=-) has shown that most introductory biology students hold a naı̈ve theory of evolution incompatible with natural selection. Rather than conceptualize evolution as the selective propagation of within-sp...

The Implications of the Cognitive Sciences for the Relation Between Religion and Science Education: The Case of Evolutionary Theory

by Stefaan Blancke, Johan De, Smedt Helen, De Cruz, Maarten Boudry, Johan Braeckman , 2011
"... Abstract This paper discusses the relationship between religion and science education in the light of the cognitive sciences. We challenge the popular view that science and religion are compatible, a view that suggests that learning and understanding evolutionary theory has no effect on students ’ r ..."
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Abstract This paper discusses the relationship between religion and science education in the light of the cognitive sciences. We challenge the popular view that science and religion are compatible, a view that suggests that learning and understanding evolutionary theory has no effect on students ’ religious beliefs and vice versa. We develop a cognitive perspective on how students manage to reconcile evolutionary theory with their religious beliefs. We underwrite the claim developed by cognitive scientists and anthropologists that religion is natural because it taps into people’s intuitive understanding of the natural world which is constrained by essentialist, teleological and intentional biases. After contrasting the naturalness of religion with the unnaturalness of science, we discuss the difficulties cognitive and developmental scientists have identified in learning and accepting evolu-tionary theory. We indicate how religious beliefs impede students ’ understanding and acceptance of evolutionary theory. We explore a number of options available to students for reconciling an informed understanding of evolutionary theory with their religious beliefs. To conclude, we discuss the implications of our account for science and biology teachers. 1

Epistemic Similarities Between Students ’ Scientific and Supernatural Beliefs

by Andrew Shtulman
"... The evidential support for scientific claims is quantitatively and qualitatively superior to that for supernatural claims, yet students may not appreciate this difference in light of the fact that both types of claims are learned in similar ways (through testimony rather than firsthand observation) ..."
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The evidential support for scientific claims is quantitatively and qualitatively superior to that for supernatural claims, yet students may not appreciate this difference in light of the fact that both types of claims are learned in similar ways (through testimony rather than firsthand observation) and perform similar functions (explaining observed phenomena in terms of unobservable entities). The present study addressed this issue by comparing students ’ scientific beliefs with their supernatural beliefs along 4 dimensions of epistemic import: personal confidence, perceived consensus, means of justification, and openness to revision. Participants ’ scientific beliefs were strongly differentiated from their supernatural beliefs along the dimensions of confidence and consensus but only weakly differentiated along the dimensions of justification and revision, particularly for participants with (a) higher levels of supernatural belief and (b) lower levels of understanding of the nature of science. Moreover, participants ’ confidence in both types of beliefs was associated with their consensus estimates but not with their ability to cite evidence in support of, or potentially in conflict with, those beliefs. These findings imply that many students ’ scientific beliefs are qualitatively similar to their supernatural beliefs, despite self-perceptions to the contrary.
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...ch is known, for instance, about the cognitive constraints that shape students’ understanding of evolutionary phenomena, like adaptation and speciation (Novick, Shade, & Catley, 2010; Shtulman, 2006; =-=Shtulman & Schulz, 2008-=-), but much less is known about the epistemic considerations behind students’ acceptance (or denial) of the actual occurrence of evolution. Likewise, much is known about the cognitive constraints that...

The implications of the cognitive sciences for the relation between religion and science education: the case of evolutionary theory

by Blancke Johan, De Smedt, Helen De Cruz, Maarten Boudry, Johan Braeckman
"... This paper has been accepted for publication in Science & Education. The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com ..."
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This paper has been accepted for publication in Science & Education. The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com

unknown title

by Stefaan Blancke, Ronald Soetaert, Hilde Van Keer
"... This paper has been accepted for publication in Science & Education. The final ..."
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This paper has been accepted for publication in Science & Education. The final

Gelman & Rhodes 1

by S. Brem, E. M. Evans, Susan A. Gelman, Marjorie Rhodes, Nichd R, Hd Gelman Gelman
"... "Two-‐thousand years of stasis”: How psychological essentialism impedes evolutionary understanding ..."
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"Two-‐thousand years of stasis”: How psychological essentialism impedes evolutionary understanding
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... ontological beliefs about the structure of the world. This work draws on both philosophicalGelman & Rhodes 3 analyses (e.g., Sober, 1980; Ghiselin, 1969; Okasha, 2002) and psychological data (e.g., =-=Shtulman & Schulz, 2008-=-; Shtulman, this volume; Medin, 1989). Some of the obstacles impede acceptance of evolutionary theory; others impede understanding evolutionary theory. By “acceptance” we refer to endorsing evolutiona...

Original Article Understanding of Evolution May Be Improved by Thinking about People

by Daniel Nettle
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...ulman, 2006). Shtulman and Schulz have recently shown that students who appreciate the extent of individual-level variability are more likely to have a correct mechanistic grasp of natural selection (=-=Shtulman and Schulz, 2008-=-). They suggest variation is under-appreciated because our habitual cognition about non-human animals tracks properties mainly at the species level. This may be pragmatically useful (deer are good to ...

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