a b s t r a c t a r t i c l e i n f o We conduct a field experiment to evaluate the effect of extrinsic rewards, both financial and non-financial, on the performance of agents recruited by a public health organization to promote HIV prevention and sell condoms. In this setting: (i) non-financial rewards are effective at improving performance; (ii) the effect of both types of rewards is stronger for pro-socially motivated agents; and (iii) both types of rewards are effective when their relative value is high. The findings illustrate that extrinsic rewards can improve the performance of agents engaged in public service delivery, and that non-financial rewards can be effective in settings where the power of financial incentives is limited.

There has been an enormous amount of experimental research devoted to “other-regarding preferences ” since the publication of the first Handbook of Experimental Economics (1995). This literature’s daunting size poses serious problems in terms of developing a survey since it is necessary to ignore (or only mention in passing) many worthwhile experiments, along