Results 1 - 10
of
16
No margin, no mission? A field experiment on incentives for public service delivery”, forthcoming
- Journal of Public Economics.
, 2014
"... a b s t r a c t a r t i c l e i n f o We conduct a field experiment to evaluate the effect of extrinsic rewards, both financial and non-financial, on the performance of agents recruited by a public health organization to promote HIV prevention and sell condoms. In this setting: (i) non-financial re ..."
Abstract
-
Cited by 28 (6 self)
- Add to MetaCart
(Show Context)
a b s t r a c t a r t i c l e i n f o We conduct a field experiment to evaluate the effect of extrinsic rewards, both financial and non-financial, on the performance of agents recruited by a public health organization to promote HIV prevention and sell condoms. In this setting: (i) non-financial rewards are effective at improving performance; (ii) the effect of both types of rewards is stronger for pro-socially motivated agents; and (iii) both types of rewards are effective when their relative value is high. The findings illustrate that extrinsic rewards can improve the performance of agents engaged in public service delivery, and that non-financial rewards can be effective in settings where the power of financial incentives is limited.
2012), “Long-Term Effects of Teacher Performance Pay: Experimental Evidence from India.” mimeo
"... Abstract: We present results from a five-year long randomized evaluation of group and individual teacher performance pay programs implemented across a large representative sample of government-run rural primary schools in the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh. We find consistently positive and signifi ..."
Abstract
-
Cited by 10 (5 self)
- Add to MetaCart
Abstract: We present results from a five-year long randomized evaluation of group and individual teacher performance pay programs implemented across a large representative sample of government-run rural primary schools in the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh. We find consistently positive and significant impacts of the individual teacher incentive program on student learning outcomes across all durations of program exposure. Students who completed their full five years of primary school under the program performed significantly better than those in control schools by 0.54 and 0.35 standard deviations in math and language tests respectively. These students also scored 0.52 and 0.3 standard deviations higher in science and social studies tests even though there were no incentives on these subjects. The group teacher incentive program also had positive (and mostly significant) effects on student test scores, but the effect sizes were always smaller than that of the individual incentive program, and were not significant at the end of primary school for the cohort exposed to the program for five years.
that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source.
, 2014
"... views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National ..."
Abstract
- Add to MetaCart
(Show Context)
views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National
Authority, Incentives, and Performance: Evidence from a Chinese Newspaper
"... Abstract This paper examines how the allocation of authority within an organization a¤ects workers'incentives and performance, using personnel data from a Chinese newspaper. Relying on an authority change that transferred the right of making editorial decisions from mid-level editors to top ed ..."
Abstract
- Add to MetaCart
Abstract This paper examines how the allocation of authority within an organization a¤ects workers'incentives and performance, using personnel data from a Chinese newspaper. Relying on an authority change that transferred the right of making editorial decisions from mid-level editors to top editors in four of the eight divisions in the newspaper, I …nd that the authority change 1) improves reporters'performance, while reducing their activities for private gain; and 2) decreases mid-level editors'journalistic initiative. To reconcile these …ndings, a synthesis of two theories on authority and incentives -the vertical and the horizontal allocation of authority -is needed.
Understanding what...
, 2012
"... A substantial body of research investigates the design of incentives in firms, yet less is known about incentives in organizations that hire individuals to perform tasks with positive social spillovers. We conduct a field experiment in which agents hired by a public health organization are randomly ..."
Abstract
- Add to MetaCart
A substantial body of research investigates the design of incentives in firms, yet less is known about incentives in organizations that hire individuals to perform tasks with positive social spillovers. We conduct a field experiment in which agents hired by a public health organization are randomly allocated to four groups. Agents in the control group receive a standard volunteer contract often offered for this type of task, whereas agents in the three treatment groups receive small financial rewards, large financial rewards, and non-financial rewards, respectively. The analysis yields three main findings. First, non-financial rewards are more effective at eliciting effort than either financial rewards or the volunteer contract. The effect of financial rewards, both large and small, is much smaller and not significantly different from zero. Second, non-financial rewards elicit effort both by leveraging intrinsic motivation for the cause and by facilitating social comparison among agents. Third, contrary to existing laboratory evidence,
The Suntory Centre
"... Haji, Holly Hickling, and all of the monitors. The authors would like to especially acknowledge the A substantial body of research investigates the design of incentives in firms, yet less is known about incentives in organizations that hire individuals to perform tasks with positive social spillover ..."
Abstract
- Add to MetaCart
Haji, Holly Hickling, and all of the monitors. The authors would like to especially acknowledge the A substantial body of research investigates the design of incentives in firms, yet less is known about incentives in organizations that hire individuals to perform tasks with positive social spillovers. We conduct a field experiment in which agents hired by a public health organization are randomly allocated to four groups. Agents in the control group receive a standard volunteer contract often offered for this type of task, whereas agents in the three treatment groups receive small financial rewards, large financial rewards, and non-financial rewards, respectively. The analysis yields three main findings. First, non-financial rewards are more effective at eliciting effort than either financial rewards or the volunteer contract. The effect of financial rewards, both large and small, is much smaller and not significantly different from zero. Second, non-financial rewards elicit effort both by leveraging intrinsic motivation for the cause and by facilitating social comparison among agents. Third,
unknown title
"... No part of this book may be distributed, posted, or reproduced in any form by digital or mechanical means without prior written permission of the publisher. ..."
Abstract
- Add to MetaCart
(Show Context)
No part of this book may be distributed, posted, or reproduced in any form by digital or mechanical means without prior written permission of the publisher.
Motivating Knowledge Agents: Can Incentive Pay Overcome Social Distance? ∗
, 2013
"... This paper studies the interaction of incentive pay and social distance in the dissemination of information. We analyse theoretically as well as empirically the effect of incentive pay when agents have pro-social objectives, but also preferences over dealing with one social group relative to another ..."
Abstract
- Add to MetaCart
This paper studies the interaction of incentive pay and social distance in the dissemination of information. We analyse theoretically as well as empirically the effect of incentive pay when agents have pro-social objectives, but also preferences over dealing with one social group relative to another. In a randomised field experiment undertaken across 151 villages in South India, local agents were hired to spread information about a public health insurance programme. Relative to flat pay, incentive pay improves knowledge transmission to households that are socially distant from the agent, but not to households similar to the agent.
