Results 1 
8 of
8
Bidder optimal assignments for general utilities, in:
 Proceedings of the 5th Workshop on Internet and Network Economics,
, 2009
"... a b s t r a c t We study the problem of matching bidders to items where each bidder i has general, strictly monotonic utility functions u i,j (p j ) expressing his utility of being matched to item j at price p j . For this setting we prove that a bidder optimal outcome always exists, even when the ..."
Abstract

Cited by 4 (4 self)
 Add to MetaCart
(Show Context)
a b s t r a c t We study the problem of matching bidders to items where each bidder i has general, strictly monotonic utility functions u i,j (p j ) expressing his utility of being matched to item j at price p j . For this setting we prove that a bidder optimal outcome always exists, even when the utility functions are nonlinear and noncontinuous. We give sufficient conditions under which every mechanism that finds a bidder optimal outcome is incentive compatible. We also give a mechanism that finds a bidder optimal outcome if the conditions for incentive compatibility are satisfied. The running time of this mechanism is exponential in the number of items, but polynomial in the number of bidders.
Optimal Auctions via the Multiplicative Weight Method
, 2013
"... We show that the multiplicative weight update method provides a simple recipe for designing and analyzing optimal Bayesian Incentive Compatible (BIC) auctions, and reduces the time complexity of the problem to pseudopolynomial in parameters that depend on single agent instead of depending on the si ..."
Abstract

Cited by 3 (0 self)
 Add to MetaCart
We show that the multiplicative weight update method provides a simple recipe for designing and analyzing optimal Bayesian Incentive Compatible (BIC) auctions, and reduces the time complexity of the problem to pseudopolynomial in parameters that depend on single agent instead of depending on the size of the joint type space. We use this framework to design computationally efficient optimal auctions that satisfy expost Individual Rationality in the presence of constraints such as (hard, private) budgets and envyfreeness. We also design optimal auctions when buyers and a seller’s utility functions are nonlinear. Scenarios with such functions include (a) auctions with “quitting rights”, (b) cost to borrow money beyond budget, (c) a seller’s and buyers’ risk aversion. Finally, we show how our framework also yields optimal auctions for variety of
Expressiveness and Robustness of FirstPrice Position Auctions∗
"... Since economic mechanisms are often applied to very different instances of the same problem, it is desirable to identify mechanisms that work well in a wide range of circumstances. We pursue this goal for a position auction setting and specifically seek mechanisms that guarantee good outcomes under ..."
Abstract

Cited by 1 (1 self)
 Add to MetaCart
Since economic mechanisms are often applied to very different instances of the same problem, it is desirable to identify mechanisms that work well in a wide range of circumstances. We pursue this goal for a position auction setting and specifically seek mechanisms that guarantee good outcomes under both complete and incomplete information. A variant of the generalized firstprice mechanism with multidimensional bids turns out to be the only standard mechanism able to achieve this goal, even when types are onedimensional. The fact that expressiveness beyond the type space is both necessary and sufficient for this kind of robustness provides an interesting counterpoint to previous work on position auctions that has highlighted the benefits of simplicity. From a technical perspective our results are interesting because they establish equilibrium existence for a multidimensional bid space, where standard techniques break down. The structure of the equilibrium bids moreover provides an intuitive explanation for why firstprice payments may be able to support equilibria in a wider range of circumstances than secondprice payments. 1
A Study on Potential Head Advertisers in Sponsored Search
"... Abstract. This paper studies the advertisers from whom the search engine may increase the revenue by offering an advanced sponsored search service. We divide them into head and tail advertisers according to their contributions to the search engine revenue. Data analysis shows that some tail adverti ..."
Abstract
 Add to MetaCart
(Show Context)
Abstract. This paper studies the advertisers from whom the search engine may increase the revenue by offering an advanced sponsored search service. We divide them into head and tail advertisers according to their contributions to the search engine revenue. Data analysis shows that some tail advertisers have large amount of budgets and low budget usage ratios, who aimed to achieve the planned campaign goals (e.g., a large number of clicks), but they finally failed in doing so due to wronglyselected bid keywords, inappropriate bid prices, and/or lowquality ad creatives. In this paper, we conduct a deep analysis on these advertisers. Specially, we define the measures to distinguish potential head advertisers from tail advertisers, and then run simulation experiments on the potential head advertisers by applying different improvements. Encouraging results have been achieved by our diagnosing approaches. We also show that a decision tree model can be implemented for a better improvement to those advertisers.
Truthful unitdemand auctions with budgets revisited $
"... Abstract We consider auctions of indivisible items to unitdemand bidders with budgets. This setting was suggested as an expressive model for single sponsored search auctions. Prior work presented mechanisms that compute bidderoptimal outcomes and are truthful for a restricted set of inputs, i.e., ..."
Abstract
 Add to MetaCart
(Show Context)
Abstract We consider auctions of indivisible items to unitdemand bidders with budgets. This setting was suggested as an expressive model for single sponsored search auctions. Prior work presented mechanisms that compute bidderoptimal outcomes and are truthful for a restricted set of inputs, i.e., inputs in socalled general position. This condition is easily violated. We provide the first mechanism that is truthful in expectation for all inputs and achieves for each bidder no worse utility than the bidderoptimal outcome. Additionally we give a complete characterization for which inputs mechanisms that compute bidderoptimal outcomes are truthful.
A Survey on Sponsored Search Advertising in Large Commercial Search Engines
, 2013
"... Large commercial search engines such as Google Search, Microsoft’s Bing, and Yahoo! Search have recently emerged as information gateways for millions of Internet users. Their unique role as an intermediary between Internet users and the vast Web content has created exciting marketing opportunities ..."
Abstract
 Add to MetaCart
(Show Context)
Large commercial search engines such as Google Search, Microsoft’s Bing, and Yahoo! Search have recently emerged as information gateways for millions of Internet users. Their unique role as an intermediary between Internet users and the vast Web content has created exciting marketing opportunities for many commercial firms that wish to advertise their product or service. As a result, a new multibillion dollar market for sponsored search has been established, where advertisers pay a fee determined by an auction in order to be displayed in highlighted textual content or alongside the Web search results. Motivated by its unprecedented proliferation and enormous success, we conduct a survey on the newly introduced paradigm of sponsored search advertising. Our contributions are twofold. On the one hand, we provide an extensive and selfcontained survey on the sponsored search market, covering as diverse topics as the structure of sponsored search advertising, practical issues that major search engines need to deal with, and even a brief history of the market for paid links. On the other hand, we investigate several auction designs for the sponsored search market, and discuss their properties and mathematical underpinnings. We conclude with future directions and challenges.
Simple Position Auctions and Approximate Full Implementation?
"... Abstract. We consider a standard position auction setting and seek simple mechanisms that obtain the truthful outcome of the VCG mechanism in some equilibrium and high revenue in every equilibrium. Here, a simple mechanism is one that solicits a single, onedimensional bid from each agent which is ..."
Abstract
 Add to MetaCart
Abstract. We consider a standard position auction setting and seek simple mechanisms that obtain the truthful outcome of the VCG mechanism in some equilibrium and high revenue in every equilibrium. Here, a simple mechanism is one that solicits a single, onedimensional bid from each agent which is then multiplied by a fixed vector α to obtain bids for the different positions. Under complete information a generalized secondprice mechanism with α = (1,..., 1) guarantees revenue at least half the truthful VCG revenue for all positions but the first. This improves on earlier work, which had respectively shown the same bound for efficient equilibria of the same mechanism and for equilibria of a mechanism where α corresponds to the true relative values of the positions. Under incomplete information, a generalized firstprice mechanism, again with α = (1,..., 1), obtains the truthful VCG outcome in its unique equilibrium. 1