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Efficient power control via pricing in wireless data networks
 IEEE Trans. on Commun
, 2002
"... Abstract—A major challenge in the operation of wireless communications systems is the efficient use of radio resources. One important component of radio resource management is power control, which has been studied extensively in the context of voice communications. With the increasing demand for wir ..."
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Cited by 339 (8 self)
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Abstract—A major challenge in the operation of wireless communications systems is the efficient use of radio resources. One important component of radio resource management is power control, which has been studied extensively in the context of voice communications. With the increasing demand for wireless data services, it is necessary to establish power control algorithms for information sources other than voice. We present a power control solution for wireless data in the analytical setting of a game theoretic framework. In this context, the quality of service (QoS) a wireless terminal receives is referred to as the utility and distributed power control is a noncooperative power control game where users maximize their utility. The outcome of the game results in a Nash equilibrium that is inefficient. We introduce pricing of transmit powers in order to obtain Pareto improvement of the noncooperative power control game, i.e., to obtain improvements in user utilities relative to the case with no pricing. Specifically, we consider a pricing function that is a linear function of the transmit power. The simplicity of the pricing function allows a distributed implementation where the price can be broadcast by the base station to all the terminals. We see that pricing is especially helpful in a heavily loaded system. Index Terms—Game theory, Pareto efficiency, power control, pricing, wireless data. I.
Rationalizability, learning, and equilibrium in games with strategic complementarities
 ECONOMETRICA  JOURNAL OF THE ECONOMETRIC SOCIETY
, 1990
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Single Crossing Properties And The Existence Of Pure Strategy Equilibria In Games Of Incomplete Information
 Econometrica
, 1997
"... This paper analyzes a class of games of incomplete information where each agent has ..."
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Cited by 249 (11 self)
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This paper analyzes a class of games of incomplete information where each agent has
Equilibrium Selection in Global Games with Strategic Complementarities
 Journal of Economic Theory
, 2003
"... We study games with strategic complementarities, arbitrary numbers of players and actions, and slightly noisy payoff signals. We prove limit uniqueness: as the signal noise vanishes, the game has a unique strategy profile that survives iterative dominance. This generalizes a result of Carlsson and v ..."
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Cited by 136 (18 self)
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We study games with strategic complementarities, arbitrary numbers of players and actions, and slightly noisy payoff signals. We prove limit uniqueness: as the signal noise vanishes, the game has a unique strategy profile that survives iterative dominance. This generalizes a result of Carlsson and van Damme (1993) for two player, two action games. The surviving profile, however, may depend on fine details of the structure of the noise. We provide sufficient conditions on payoffs for there to be noiseindependent selection.
What happens when WalMart comes to town: An empirical analysis of the discount retailing industry
, 2006
"... In the past few decades multistore retailers, especially those with a hundred or more stores, have experienced substantial growth. At the same time, there is widely reported public outcry over the impact of these chain stores on small retailers and local communities. This paper develops an empirica ..."
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Cited by 120 (0 self)
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In the past few decades multistore retailers, especially those with a hundred or more stores, have experienced substantial growth. At the same time, there is widely reported public outcry over the impact of these chain stores on small retailers and local communities. This paper develops an empirical model to assess the impact of chain stores on the profitability and entry/exit decisions of small discount retailers and to quantify the size of the scale economies within a chain. The model has two key features. First, it allows for flexible competition patterns among all players. Second, for chains, it incorporates the scale economies that arise from operating multiple stores in nearby regions. In doing so, the model relaxes the commonly used assumption that entry in different markets is independent. The estimation exploits a unique data set that covers the discount retail industry from 1988 to 1997 and yields interesting results. First, WalMart’s expansion from the late 1980s to the late 1990s explains about fifty to seventy percent of the net change in the number of small discount retailers. Failure to address the endogeneity of the firms ’ entry decisions would result in underestimating this impact by fifty to sixty percent. Second, scale economies were important for both Kmart and WalMart, but the magnitude did not grow proportionately with the chains ’ sizes. Finally, direct government subsidies to either chains or small retailers are unlikely to be cost effective in increasing the number of firms or the level of employment.
On the Global Convergence of Stochastic Fictitious Play
 ECONOMETRICA
, 2002
"... We establish global convergence results for stochastic fictitious play for four classes of games: games with an interior ESS, zero sum games, potential games, and supermodular games. We do so by appealing to techniques from stochastic approximation theory, which relate the limit behavior of a stocha ..."
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Cited by 92 (16 self)
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We establish global convergence results for stochastic fictitious play for four classes of games: games with an interior ESS, zero sum games, potential games, and supermodular games. We do so by appealing to techniques from stochastic approximation theory, which relate the limit behavior of a stochastic process to the limit behavior of a differential equation defined by the expected motion of the process. The key result in our analysis of supermodular games is that the relevant differential equation defines a strongly monotone dynamical system. Our analyses of the other cases combine Lyapunov function arguments with a discrete choice theory result: that the choice probabilities generated by any additive random utility model can be derived from a deterministic model based on payoff perturbations that depend nonlinearly on the vector of choice probabilities.
Networks in Labor Markets: Wage and Employment Dynamics and Inequality
 CALVÓARMENGOL, ANTONI AND YANNIS IOANNIDES (2005) “SOCIAL NETWORKS IN LABOR MARKETS,” IN THE NEW PALGRAVE, L. BLUME AND S. DURLAUF (EDS), LONDON: MACMILLAN PRESS (IN PRESS) GRANOVETTER, MARK
, 2003
"... We present a model of labor markets that accounts for the social network through which agents hear about jobs. We show that an improvement in the wage or employment status of either an agent's direct or indirect contacts leads to an increase in the agent's employment probability and exp ..."
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Cited by 74 (4 self)
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We present a model of labor markets that accounts for the social network through which agents hear about jobs. We show that an improvement in the wage or employment status of either an agent's direct or indirect contacts leads to an increase in the agent's employment probability and expected wages, in the sense of first order stochastic dominance. A similar effect results from an increase in the network contacts of an agent. In terms of dynamics and patterns, we show that both wages and employment are positively associated (a strong form of correlation) across time and agents. We also analyze the decisions of agents regarding staying in the labor market or dropping out. If there are costs to staying in the labor market, and we compare two networks of agents that are identical except that one group starts with a worse wage status, then that group's dropout rate will be higher than the other's and there will be a persistent di#erence in wages between the groups.
Competition and Efficiency in Congested Markets
"... We study the efficiency of oligopoly equilibria in congested markets. The motivating examples are the allocation of network flows in a communication network or of traffic in a transportation network. We show that increasing competition among oligopolists can reduce efficiency, measured as the differ ..."
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Cited by 65 (9 self)
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We study the efficiency of oligopoly equilibria in congested markets. The motivating examples are the allocation of network flows in a communication network or of traffic in a transportation network. We show that increasing competition among oligopolists can reduce efficiency, measured as the difference between users ’ willingness to pay and delay costs. We characterize a tight bound of 5/6 on efficiency in pure strategy equilibria when there is zero latency at zero flow and a tight bound of 2 √ 2 − 2 with positive latency at zero flow. These bounds are tight even when the numbers of routes and oligopolists are arbitrarily large.