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..., and (2) constructing and evaluating a simple and light-weight content ranking technique. Anticipated contributions are as follows: • First study of NDN’s vulnerability to content poisoning attacks and their impact on quality of service. • First steps towards a concrete and comprehensive solution against content poisoning attacks in NDN via a lightweight statistical content-ranking algorithm for router caches. • Evaluation of the proposed technique under a variety of topologies and cache contamination assumptions. 1It also facilitates attacks on consumer and producer privacy, as discussed in [6], [7], [8]. Permission to freely reproduce all or part of this paper for noncommercial purposes is granted provided that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Reproduction for commercial purposes is strictly prohibited without the prior written consent of the Internet Society, the first-named author (for reproduction of an entire paper only), and the authors employer if the paper was prepared within the scope of employment. SENT 14, 23 February 2014, San Diego, CA, USA Copyright 2014 Internet Society, ISBN 1-891562-36-3 http://dx.doi.org/10.14722/sent.2014.23014 NDN ...

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...ose attacks. To counter longstanding threats of content piracy, τ can be renewed at regular intervals and content re-encrypted. Several user privacy threats have been identified in the ICN literature =-=[2, 12]-=-. We do not discuss them as they are outside the scope of this paper. 5. IMPLEMENTATION RESULTS IN CCNX We implemented our framework in our CCNx-0.7 [17] testbed, which currently consists of three nod...

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... from a publicly available list, serves as the anonymizer. This is analogous to what happens today: users evade traffic censorship by choosing an anonymizing service, such as anonymizer.com [3], as a proxy, and bypass the censors by tunneling their traffic (e.g., Facebook, Youtube) through the anonymizer’s servers. A content provider can also operate as the anonymizer. We note that our design has a trade-off between user privacy and caching (network) efficiency. It has been shown that to guarantee strong unlinkability of users’ identity with their requests in-network caching should be avoided [2, 5]. In our framework, if a user does not trust the network, it can request the content provider to be its anonymizer. This would guarantee strong unlinkability in the network, however, the corresponding cached data at intermediate routers is unusable to serve new requests. This is true with Tor and ANDaNA. The multi-layered onion-routing based encryptions render the cached private data unusable for satis1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 (i) E C F A D B (ii) 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 F C B E D A Figure 1: Key Convention: On the left, Huffman tree (i) is shown with the key 0101100110; On the right, Huffman tree (ii) ...