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On the control of automatic processes: A parallel distributed processing account of the Stroop effect
- Psychological Review
, 1990
"... Traditional views of automaticity are in need of revision. For example, automaticity otten has been treated as an all-or-none phenomenon, and traditional ~es have held that automatic processes are independent of attention. Yet recent empirical data suggest that automatic processes are continu-ous, a ..."
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Cited by 511 (45 self)
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Traditional views of automaticity are in need of revision. For example, automaticity otten has been treated as an all-or-none phenomenon, and traditional ~es have held that automatic processes are independent of attention. Yet recent empirical data suggest that automatic processes are continu-ous, and furthermore are subject to attentional control. A model of attention is presented to address these issues. Within a parallel distributed processing framework, it is proposed that the attributes of automaticity depend on the strength of a processing pathway and that strength increases with train-ing. With the Stroop effect as an example, automatic processes are shown to be continuous and to emerge gradually with practice. Specifically, a computational model of the Stroop task simulates the time course of processing as well as the effects of learning. This was accomplished by combining the cascade mechanism described by McCleUand (1979) with the backpropagation learning algorithm (Rumelhart, Hinton, & Williams, 1986). The model can simulate performance in the standard Stroop task, as well as aspects of performance in variants of this task that manipulate stimulus-onset asynchrony, response set, and degree of practice. The model presented is contrasted against other models, and its relation to many of the central issues in the literature on attention, automaticity, and interference is discussed.
A Computational Theory of Executive Cognitive Processes and Multiple-Task Performance: Part 2. . .
- PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW
, 1997
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The role of prefrontal cortex in working-memory capacity, executive attention, and general fluid intelligence: An individual-differences perspective
, 2002
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Working-memory capacity and the control of attention: The contributions of goal neglect, response competition, and task set to Stroop interference
- JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY GENERAL
, 2003
"... Individual differences in working-memory (WM) capacity predicted performance on the Stroop task in 5 experiments, indicating the importance of executive control and goal maintenance to selective attention. When the Stroop task encouraged goal neglect by including large numbers of congruent trials (R ..."
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Cited by 169 (9 self)
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Individual differences in working-memory (WM) capacity predicted performance on the Stroop task in 5 experiments, indicating the importance of executive control and goal maintenance to selective attention. When the Stroop task encouraged goal neglect by including large numbers of congruent trials (RED presented in red), low WM individuals committed more errors than did high WM individuals on the rare incongruent trials (BLUE in red) that required maintaining access to the “ignore-the-word ” goal for accurate responding. In contrast, in tasks with no or few congruent trials, or in high-congruency tasks that followed low-congruency tasks, WM predicted response-time interference. WM was related to latency, not accuracy, in contexts that reinforced the task goal and so minimized the difficulty of actively maintaining it. The data and a literature review suggest that Stroop interference is jointly determined by 2 mechanisms, goal maintenance and competition resolution, and that the dominance of each depends on WM capacity, as well as the task set induced by current and previous contexts.
Resolving emotional conflict: A role for the rostral anterior cingulated cortex in modulating activity in the amygdala
- Neuron
, 2006
"... Effective mental functioning requires that cognition be protected from emotional conflict from interference by task-irrelevant emotionally salient stimuli. The neural mechanisms by which the brain detects and resolves emotional conflict are still largely unknown, however. Drawing on the classic Stro ..."
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Cited by 160 (9 self)
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Effective mental functioning requires that cognition be protected from emotional conflict from interference by task-irrelevant emotionally salient stimuli. The neural mechanisms by which the brain detects and resolves emotional conflict are still largely unknown, however. Drawing on the classic Stroop conflict task, we developed a protocol that allowed us to dissociate the generation and monitoring of emotional conflict from its resolution. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), we find that activity in the amygdala and dorsomedial and dorsolateral prefrontal cortices reflects the amount of emotional conflict. By contrast, the resolution of emotional conflict is associated with activation of the rostral anterior cingulate cortex. Activation of the rostral cingulate is predicted by the amount of previous-trial conflict-related neural activity and is accompanied by a simultaneous and correlated reduction of amygdalar activity. These data suggest that emotional conflict is resolved through top-down inhibition of amygdalar activity by the rostral cingulate cortex.
Synaesthesia -- A Window Into Perception, Thought and Language
, 2001
"... We investigated grapheme--colour synaesthesia and found that: (1) The induced colours led to perceptual grouping and pop-out, (2) a grapheme rendered invisible through `crowding' or lateral masking induced synaesthetic colours --- a form of blindsight --- and (3) peripherally presented grapheme ..."
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Cited by 158 (4 self)
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We investigated grapheme--colour synaesthesia and found that: (1) The induced colours led to perceptual grouping and pop-out, (2) a grapheme rendered invisible through `crowding' or lateral masking induced synaesthetic colours --- a form of blindsight --- and (3) peripherally presented graphemes did not induce colours even when they were clearly visible. Taken collectively, these and other experiments prove conclusively that synaesthesia is a genuine perceptual phenomenon, not an effect based on memory associations from childhood or on vague metaphorical speech. We identify different subtypes of number--colour synaesthesia and propose that they are caused by hyperconnectivity between colour and number areas at different stages in processing; lower synaesthetes may have cross-wiring (or cross-activation) within the fusiform gyrus, whereas higher synaesthetes may have cross-activation in the angular gyrus. This hyperconnectivity might be caused by a genetic mutation that causes defective pruning of connections between brain maps. The mutation may further be expressed selectively (due to transcription factors) in the fusiform or angular gyri, and this may explain the existence of different forms of synaesthesia. If expressed very diffusely, there may be extensive cross-wiring between brain regions that represent abstract concepts, which would explain the link between creativity, metaphor and synaesthesia (and the higher incidence of synaesthesia among artists and poets). Also, hyperconnectivity between the sensory cortex and amygdala would explain the heightened aversion synaesthetes experience when seeing numbers printed in the `wrong' colour. Lastly, kindling (induced hyperconnectivity in the temporal lobes of temporal lobe epilepsy [TLE] patients) may explain the purp...
The relations among inhibition and interference control functions: A latent variable analysis
- Journal of Experimental Psychology: General
, 2004
"... All in-text references underlined in blue are linked to publications on ResearchGate, letting you access and read them immediately. ..."
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Cited by 149 (1 self)
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All in-text references underlined in blue are linked to publications on ResearchGate, letting you access and read them immediately.
Threat-related attentional bias in anxious and nonanxious individuals: A metaanalytic study
- Psychological Bulletin
, 2007
"... This meta-analysis of 172 studies (N � 2,263 anxious, N � 1,768 nonanxious) examined the boundary conditions of threat-related attentional biases in anxiety. Overall, the results show that the bias is reliably demonstrated with different experimental paradigms and under a variety of experimental con ..."
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Cited by 149 (3 self)
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This meta-analysis of 172 studies (N � 2,263 anxious, N � 1,768 nonanxious) examined the boundary conditions of threat-related attentional biases in anxiety. Overall, the results show that the bias is reliably demonstrated with different experimental paradigms and under a variety of experimental conditions, but that it is only an effect size of d � 0.45. Although processes requiring conscious perception of threat contribute to the bias, a significant bias is also observed with stimuli outside awareness. The bias is of comparable magnitude across different types of anxious populations (individuals with different clinical disorders, high-anxious nonclinical individuals, anxious children and adults) and is not observed in nonanxious individuals. Empirical and clinical implications as well as future directions for research are discussed.
JW (2006) The restless mind
- Psychol Bull
"... This article reviews the hypothesis that mind wandering can be integrated into executive models of attention. Evidence suggests that mind wandering shares many similarities with traditional notions of executive control. When mind wandering occurs, the executive components of attention appear to shif ..."
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Cited by 142 (13 self)
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This article reviews the hypothesis that mind wandering can be integrated into executive models of attention. Evidence suggests that mind wandering shares many similarities with traditional notions of executive control. When mind wandering occurs, the executive components of attention appear to shift away from the primary task, leading to failures in task performance and superficial representations of the external environment. One challenge for incorporating mind wandering into standard executive models is that it often occurs in the absence of explicit intention—a hallmark of controlled processing. However, mind wandering, like other goal-related processes, can be engaged without explicit awareness; thus, mind wandering can be seen as a goal-driven process, albeit one that is not directed toward the primary task.
