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Musango L: Output-based payment to boost staff productivity in public health centres: contracting in Kabutare district, (0)

by B Meessen, Kashala JP
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Performance-based financing as a health system reform: mapping the key dimensions for monitoring and evaluation.

by Sophie Witter , Jurrien Toonen , Bruno Meessen , Jean Kagubare , György Fritsche , Kelsey Vaughan - BMC Health Serv Res , 2013
"... Abstract Background: Performance-based financing is increasingly being applied in a variety of contexts, with the expectation that it can improve the performance of health systems. However, while there is a growing literature on implementation issues and effects on outputs, there has been relativel ..."
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Abstract Background: Performance-based financing is increasingly being applied in a variety of contexts, with the expectation that it can improve the performance of health systems. However, while there is a growing literature on implementation issues and effects on outputs, there has been relatively little focus on interactions between PBF and health systems and how these should be studied. This paper aims to contribute to filling that gap by developing a framework for assessing the interactions between PBF and health systems, focusing on low and middle income countries. In doing so, it elaborates a general framework for monitoring and evaluating health system reforms in general.
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...in reform packages such as those implemented at scale in Central and West Africa, are summarized as follows: They take a supply-side approach, meaning performance-based incentives are earned by service providers Payments are targeted at individual health facilities and administrations, often with trickle-down to health workers There is most often some split of functions between regulation, purchasing, fund-holding, verification and service delivery, although the practices vary by context Payments are linked to outputs, modified by quality indicators PBF can have a number of objectives [6,7,19], including: to increase the allocative efficiency of health services (by encouraging the provision of high priority and cost effective services) Witter et al. BMC Health Services Research 2013, 13:367 Page 3 of 10 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/13/367 to increase their technical efficiency (by increasing the productivity of existing resources at facility level such as building, equipment and health staff ) to improve effectiveness of services by greater attention to quality of care to improve both coverage rates and equity of outcomes (for example, by encouraging expansion of s...

Provider Payment Methods and Incentives

by All P. Ellis, Michelle Mckinnon Miller , 2007
"... selection, capitation, incentives, risk adjustment. Diverse provider payment systems create incentives that affect the quantity and quality of health care services provided. Payments can be based on provider characteristics, which tend to minimize incentives for quality and quantity. Or payments can ..."
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selection, capitation, incentives, risk adjustment. Diverse provider payment systems create incentives that affect the quantity and quality of health care services provided. Payments can be based on provider characteristics, which tend to minimize incentives for quality and quantity. Or payments can be based on quantities of services provided and patient characteristics, which provide stronger incentives for quality and quantity. Payments methods using both broader bundles of services and larger numbers of payment categories are growing in prevalence. The recent innovation of performance-based payment attempts to target payments on key patient attributes so as to improve incentives, better manage patients, and control costs. 2 There are many ways that health care providers can be paid. In India, government physicians are paid a salary and in Canada physicians are generally paid according to a government-regulated fee schedule. In the Netherlands however, office-based physicians receive capitated payments for much of their revenue. Similar variations are seen in

Eff ect on maternal and child health services in Rwanda of payment to primary health-care providers for performance: an impact evaluation

by Rwanda , PhD P Basinga , Prof Paul J Gertler , Haas , Paulin Basinga , Paul J Gertler , Agnes Binagwaho , Agnes L B Soucat , Jennifer Sturdy , Christel M J Vermeersch
"... Summary Background Evidence about the best methods with which to accelerate progress towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals is urgently needed. We assessed the eff ect of performance-based payment of health-care providers (payment for performance; P4P) on use and quality of child and ma ..."
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Summary Background Evidence about the best methods with which to accelerate progress towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals is urgently needed. We assessed the eff ect of performance-based payment of health-care providers (payment for performance; P4P) on use and quality of child and maternal care services in health-care facilities in Rwanda.

Financial Incentives are Counterproductive in Non-Profit Sectors: Evidence from a Health Experiment *

by Elise Huillery , Juliette Seban
"... Abstract Financial incentives for service providers are becoming a common strategy to improve service delivery. However, this strategy will only work if demand for the service responds as expected. Using a field experiment in the Democratic Republic of Congo, we show that introducing a performance- ..."
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Abstract Financial incentives for service providers are becoming a common strategy to improve service delivery. However, this strategy will only work if demand for the service responds as expected. Using a field experiment in the Democratic Republic of Congo, we show that introducing a performance-based financing mechanism in the health sector has counterproductive effects because demand is non-standard: despite reduced prices and eased access, demand for health decreased, child health deteriorated, workers' revenue dropped. Ironically, expected perverse effects of incentives on worker behavior were not realized: incentives led to more effort from health workers on rewarded activities without deterring effort on non-rewarded activities, nor inducing significant score manipulation or free-riding. We also find a decline in worker motivation following the removal of the incentives, below what it would have been in the absence of exposure to the incentives. Management tools used in for-profit sectors are thus inappropriate in non-profit sectors such as health where user and worker rationalities are specific.

unknown title

by Antony Opwora, Margaret Kabare, Sassy Molyneux, Catherine Goodman , 2009
"... doi:10.1093/heapol/czq009 Direct facility funding as a response to user fee reduction: implementation and perceived impact among Kenyan health centres and dispensaries ..."
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doi:10.1093/heapol/czq009 Direct facility funding as a response to user fee reduction: implementation and perceived impact among Kenyan health centres and dispensaries

Implementation Science STUDY PROTOCOL Open Access

by unknown authors
"... for improving malaria management in rural Kenya: protocol for a cluster randomized controlled trial ..."
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for improving malaria management in rural Kenya: protocol for a cluster randomized controlled trial
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...increase adherence to the results of diagnostic tests. Personal incentive schemes to healthcare providers have been shown to improve patient volume and uptake of interventions in developing countries =-=[5,7,8]-=-. In most reports, the measures of performance did not include technical quality, and there is a lack of methodologically rigorous evaluations of incentive programs, either personal or institutional, ...

STUDY PROTOCOL Protocol

by unknown authors
"... for the evaluation performance programme f te Implementation Science Borghi et al. Implementation Science 2013, 8:80 ..."
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for the evaluation performance programme f te Implementation Science Borghi et al. Implementation Science 2013, 8:80
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...hen validation of performance reports is conducted internally by actors benefiting from the bonus system, and/or when transaction costs of validation are high, limiting the conduct of such activities =-=[9,14]-=-. Pay for Performance (P4P) in Tanzania The Ministry of Health and Social Welfare (MOHSW) in Tanzania with support from the Clinton Health Access Initiative (CHAI) launched a P4P programme in one regi...

Performance-based Contracting: a Case Study of Non-profit Hospitals in Uganda.

by Freddie Peter Ssengooba
"... I Freddie Peter Ssengooba confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis. 2 Acknowledgements Gratitude go to London University for its contribution to my education and to the UK&apo ..."
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I Freddie Peter Ssengooba confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis. 2 Acknowledgements Gratitude go to London University for its contribution to my education and to the UK's DFID for its financial support for the knowledge programmes in particular, the Health System Development Programme at London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine (LSHTM) which enabled me to undertake this study. Tremendous thanks go to Makerere University and its School of Public Health for allowing me the time to undertake this study. I am very honoured for the teachings, kindnesses, and advice of some of the very best in this academic field. Most gratitude go to my Supervisors Dr. Natasha Palmer and Prof. Barbara Isobel McPake and to the staff and fellow students of Dept. of Global Health and Development (GHD)- formally Health Policy Unit at LSHTM for the enduring support and

for Programme Managers

by Low-income Countries, Bruno Meessen , 2009
"... This is a working document. It has been prepared to facilitate the exchange of knowledge and to stimulate discussion. The text has not been edited to official publication standards and UNICEF accepts no responsibility for errors. The designations in this publication do not imply an opinion on legal ..."
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This is a working document. It has been prepared to facilitate the exchange of knowledge and to stimulate discussion. The text has not been edited to official publication standards and UNICEF accepts no responsibility for errors. The designations in this publication do not imply an opinion on legal status of any country or territory, or of its authorities, or the delimitation of frontiers.

reduction: implementation and perceived

by Antony Opwora, Margaret Kabare, Sassy Molyneux, Catherine Goodman , 2009
"... Direct facility funding as a response to user fee ..."
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Direct facility funding as a response to user fee
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