Results 1  10
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150
An efficient ascendingbid auction for multiple objects
 AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
, 1997
"... In multipleobject environments where individual bidders may demand more than one object, standard methods of auction generally result in allocative inefficiency. This paper proposes a new ascendingbid method for auctioning homogeneous goods, such as Treasury bills or communications spectrum. The a ..."
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Cited by 283 (31 self)
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In multipleobject environments where individual bidders may demand more than one object, standard methods of auction generally result in allocative inefficiency. This paper proposes a new ascendingbid method for auctioning homogeneous goods, such as Treasury bills or communications spectrum. The auctioneer announces a current price, bidders report back the quantity demanded at that price, and the auctioneer raises the price. Objects are awarded to bidders at the current price whenever they are “clinched,” and the process continues until the market clears. With pure private values, the proposed (dynamic) auction yields the same outcome as the (sealedbid) Vickrey auction, but may be simpler for bidders to understand and has the advantage of assuring the privacy of the upper portions of bidders ’ demand curves. With interdependent values, the proposed auction may still yield efficiency, whereas the Vickrey auction fails due to a problem which could be described as the “Generalized Winner’s Curse.”
Combinatorial auctions for supply chain formation
 in: Second ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2000
"... Supply chain formation presents difficult coordination issues for distributed negotiation protocols. Agents must simultaneously negotiate production relationships at multiple levels, with important interdependencies among inputs and outputs at each level. Combinatorial auctions address this problem ..."
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Cited by 62 (2 self)
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Supply chain formation presents difficult coordination issues for distributed negotiation protocols. Agents must simultaneously negotiate production relationships at multiple levels, with important interdependencies among inputs and outputs at each level. Combinatorial auctions address this problem by global optimization over expressed offers to engage in compound exchanges. Optimizing with respect to offers results in optimal allocations if the offers reflect true values and costs. But autonomous selfinterested agents have an incentive to bid strategically in an attempt to gain
Bundling Equilibrium in Combinatorial Auctions
, 2001
"... This paper analyzes individuallyrational ex post equilibrium in the VC (VickreyClarke) combinatorial auctions. If \Sigma is a family of bundles of goods, the organizer may restrict the participants by requiring them to submit their bids only for bundles in \Sigma. The \SigmaVC combinatorial aucti ..."
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Cited by 60 (10 self)
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This paper analyzes individuallyrational ex post equilibrium in the VC (VickreyClarke) combinatorial auctions. If \Sigma is a family of bundles of goods, the organizer may restrict the participants by requiring them to submit their bids only for bundles in \Sigma. The \SigmaVC combinatorial auctions (multigood auctions) obtained in this way are known to be individuallyrational truthtelling mechanisms. In contrast, this paper deals with nonrestricted VC auctions, in which the buyers restrict themselves to bids on bundles in \Sigma, because it is rational for them to do so. That is, it may be that when the buyers report their valuation of the bundles in \Sigma, they are in an equilibrium. We fully characterize those \Sigma that induce individually rational equilibrium in every VC auction, and we refer to the associated equilibrium as a bundling equilibrium. The number of bundles in \Sigma represents the communication complexity of the equilibrium. A special case of bundling equilibrium is partitionbased equilibrium, in which \Sigma is a field, that is, it is generated by a partition. We analyze the tradeoff between communication complexity and economic efficiency of bundling equilibrium, focusing in particular on partitionbased equilibrium.
Compilation complexity of common voting rules
, 2010
"... In computational social choice, one important problem is to take the votes of a subelectorate (subset of the voters), and summarize them using a small number of bits. This needs to be done in such a way that, if all that we know is the summary, as well as the votes of voters outside the subelectorat ..."
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Cited by 58 (13 self)
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In computational social choice, one important problem is to take the votes of a subelectorate (subset of the voters), and summarize them using a small number of bits. This needs to be done in such a way that, if all that we know is the summary, as well as the votes of voters outside the subelectorate, we can conclude which of the m alternatives wins. This corresponds to the notion of compilation complexity, the minimum number of bits required to summarize the votes for a particular rule, which was introduced by Chevaleyre et al. [IJCAI09]. We study three different types of compilation complexity. The first, studied by Chevaleyre et al., depends on the size of the subelectorate but not on the size of the complement (the voters outside the subelectorate). The second depends on the size of the complement but not on the size of the subelectorate. The third depends on both. We first investigate the relations among the three types of compilation complexity. Then, we give upper and lower bounds on all three types of compilation complexity for the most prominent voting rules. We show that for lapproval (when l ≤ m/2), Borda, and Bucklin, the bounds for all three types are asymptotically tight, up to a multiplicative constant; for lapproval (when l> m/2), plurality with runoff, all Condorcet consistent rules that are based on unweighted majority graphs (including Copeland and voting trees), and all Condorcet consistent rules that are based on the order of pairwise elections (including ranked pairs and maximin), the bounds for all three types are asymptotically tight up to a multiplicative constant when the sizes of the subelectorate and its complement are both larger than m 1+ǫ for some ǫ> 0.
Online Ascending Auctions for Gradually Expiring Items
 In SODA
, 2004
"... In this paper we consider online auction mechanisms for the allocation of M items that are identical to each other except for the fact that the items have dierent expiration times, and each item must be allocated before it expires. A computational application is the allocation of time slots in a ..."
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Cited by 55 (6 self)
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In this paper we consider online auction mechanisms for the allocation of M items that are identical to each other except for the fact that the items have dierent expiration times, and each item must be allocated before it expires. A computational application is the allocation of time slots in a scheduling problem, and an economic application is the allocation of transportation tickets.
Stable schedule matching under revealed preference
 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY 112 (2003) 289–306
, 2003
"... Baiou and Balinski (Math. Oper. Res., 27 (2002) 485) studied schedule matching where one determines the partnerships that form and how much time they spend together, under the assumption that each agent has a ranking on all potential partners. Here we study schedule matching under more general prefe ..."
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Cited by 46 (0 self)
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Baiou and Balinski (Math. Oper. Res., 27 (2002) 485) studied schedule matching where one determines the partnerships that form and how much time they spend together, under the assumption that each agent has a ranking on all potential partners. Here we study schedule matching under more general preferences that extend the substitutable preferences in Roth (Econometrica 52 (1984) 47) by an extension of the revealed preference approach in Alkan (Econom. Theory 19 (2002) 737). We give a generalization of the Gale–Shapley algorithm and show that some familiar properties of ordinary stable matchings continue to hold. Our main result is that, when preferences satisfy an additional property called size monotonicity, stable matchings are a lattice under the joint preferences of all agents on each side and have other interesting structural properties.
Decentralized supply chain formation: A market protocol and competitive equilibrium analysis
 Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
, 2003
"... Supply chain formation is the process of determining the structure and terms of exchange relationships to enable a multilevel, multiagent production activity. We present a simple model of supply chains, highlighting two characteristic features: hierarchical subtask decomposition, and resource conten ..."
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Cited by 45 (4 self)
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Supply chain formation is the process of determining the structure and terms of exchange relationships to enable a multilevel, multiagent production activity. We present a simple model of supply chains, highlighting two characteristic features: hierarchical subtask decomposition, and resource contention. To decentralize the formation process, we introduce a market price system over the resources produced along the chain. In a competitive equilibrium for this system, agents choose locally optimal allocations with respect to prices, and outcomes are optimal overall. To determine prices, we define a market protocol based on distributed, progressive auctions, and myopic, nonstrategic agent bidding policies. In the presence of resource contention, this protocol produces better solutions than the greedy protocols common in the artificial intelligence and multiagent systems literature. The protocol often converges to highvalue supply chains, and when competitive equilibria exist, typically to approximate competitive equilibria. However, complementarities in agent production technologies can cause the protocol to wastefully allocate inputs to agents that do not produce their outputs. A subsequent decommitment phase recovers a significant fraction of the lost surplus. 1.
Preference Elicitation and Query Learning
 Journal of Machine Learning Research
, 2004
"... In this paper we explore the relationship between "preference elicitation", a learningstyle problem that arises in combinatorial auctions, and the problem of learning via queries studied in computational learning theory. Preference elicitation is the process of asking questions about th ..."
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Cited by 39 (7 self)
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In this paper we explore the relationship between "preference elicitation", a learningstyle problem that arises in combinatorial auctions, and the problem of learning via queries studied in computational learning theory. Preference elicitation is the process of asking questions about the preferences of bidders so as to best divide some set of goods. As a learning problem, it can be thought of as a setting in which there are multiple target concepts that can each be queried separately, but where the goal is not so much to learn each concept as it is to produce an "optimal example". In this work, we prove a number of similarities and differences between twobidder preference elicitation and query learning, giving both separation results and proving some connections between these problems.