Results 1  10
of
12
Bargaining over an Endogenous Agenda
, 2011
"... The focus for the Centre is research into individual and strategic decision‐making using a combination of theoretical and experimental methods. On the theory side, members of the Centre investigate individual choice under uncertainty, cooperative and non‐cooperative game theory, as well as theories ..."
Abstract

Cited by 2 (2 self)
 Add to MetaCart
The focus for the Centre is research into individual and strategic decision‐making using a combination of theoretical and experimental methods. On the theory side, members of the Centre investigate individual choice under uncertainty, cooperative and non‐cooperative game theory, as well as theories of psychology, bounded rationality and evolutionary game theory. Members of the Centre have applied experimental methods in the fields of public economics, individual choice under risk and uncertainty, strategic interaction, and the performance of auctions, markets and other economic institutions. Much of the Centre's research involves collaborative projects with researchers from other departments in the UK and overseas. Please visit
Original
, 2008
"... Generous legislators?: a description of vote trading agreements (theory and experiments) Working paper ..."
Abstract
 Add to MetaCart
Generous legislators?: a description of vote trading agreements (theory and experiments) Working paper
The Roman Metro Problem: Dynamic Voting and the Limited Power of Commitment ∗
, 2013
"... A frequently heard explanation for the underdeveloped metro system in Rome is the following one: “If we tried to build a new metro line, it would probably be stopped by archeological finds that are too valuable to destroy, so the investment would be wasted. ” This statement, which seems selfcontrad ..."
Abstract
 Add to MetaCart
(Show Context)
A frequently heard explanation for the underdeveloped metro system in Rome is the following one: “If we tried to build a new metro line, it would probably be stopped by archeological finds that are too valuable to destroy, so the investment would be wasted. ” This statement, which seems selfcontradictory from the perspective of a single decision maker, can be rationalized in a voting model with diverse constituents. One would think that commitment to finishing the metro line (no matter what is discovered in the process) can resolve this inefficiency. We show, however, that a Condorcet cycle occurs among the plans of action one could feasibly commit to, precisely when the metro project is defeated in stepbystep voting (that is, when commitment is needed). More generally, we prove a theorem for binarychoice trees and arbitrary learning, establishing that no plan of action which is majoritypreferred to the equilibrium play without commitment can be a Condorcet winner among all possible plans. Hence, surprisingly, commitment has no power in a large class of voting problems.
Bargaining over an Endogenous Agenda
, 2012
"... The focus for the Centre is research into individual and strategic decisionmaking using a combination of theoretical and experimental methods. On the theory side, members of the Centre investigate individual choice under uncertainty, cooperative and noncooperative game theory, as well as theories ..."
Abstract
 Add to MetaCart
The focus for the Centre is research into individual and strategic decisionmaking using a combination of theoretical and experimental methods. On the theory side, members of the Centre investigate individual choice under uncertainty, cooperative and noncooperative game theory, as well as theories of psychology, bounded rationality and evolutionary game theory. Members of the Centre have applied experimental methods in the fields of public economics, individual choice under risk and uncertainty, strategic interaction, and the performance of auctions, markets and other economic institutions. Much of the Centre's research involves collaborative projects with researchers from other departments in the UK and overseas. Please visit
Voting in Collective Stopping Games
, 2013
"... At each moment of timean alternative fromafiniteset ischosen bysomedynamic process. Players observe the alternative selected and sequentially cast a yes or a no vote. If the set of players casting a yes–vote is decisive for the alternative in question, the alternative is accepted and the game ends. ..."
Abstract
 Add to MetaCart
At each moment of timean alternative fromafiniteset ischosen bysomedynamic process. Players observe the alternative selected and sequentially cast a yes or a no vote. If the set of players casting a yes–vote is decisive for the alternative in question, the alternative is accepted and the game ends. Otherwise the next period begins. We refer to this class of problems as collective stopping problems. Collective choice games, quitting games, and coalition formation games are particular examples that fit nicely into this more general framework. When an appropriately defined notion of the core of this game is non–empty, a stationary equilibrium in pure strategies is shown to exist. But in general, stationary equilibria may not exist in collective stopping games and if they do exist, they may all involve mixed strategies. We consider strategies that are pure and action–independent, and allow for a limited degree of history dependence. Under such individual behavior, aggregate behavior can be conveniently summarized by a collective strategy. We consider collective strategies that are simple and induced by two–step game–plans with a finite threshold. The collection of such strategies is finite. We provide a constructive proof that this collection always contains a subgame perfect equilibrium. The existence of such an equilibrium is shown to imply the existence of a sequential equilibrium in an extended model with incomplete information. Collective equilibria are shown to be robust to perturbations in utilities. When we apply our construction to the case with three alternatives exhibiting a Condorcet cycle, we obtain immediate acceptance of any alternative.
The Roman Metro Problem
, 2012
"... In Rome, if you start digging, chances are you will find things. We consider a famous complaint that justifies the underdeveloped Roman metro system: “if we tried to build a new metro line, it would probably be stopped by archeological finds that are too valuable to destroy, so we would have wasted ..."
Abstract
 Add to MetaCart
In Rome, if you start digging, chances are you will find things. We consider a famous complaint that justifies the underdeveloped Roman metro system: “if we tried to build a new metro line, it would probably be stopped by archeological finds that are too valuable to destroy, so we would have wasted the money. ” Although this statement appears to be selfcontradictory, we show that it can be rationalized in a voting model with diverse constituents. Even when there is a majority preference for a metro line, and discovery of an antiquity has the character of a positive option, a majority may oppose construction. We give sufficient conditions for this inefficiency to occur. One might think it arises from the inability to commit to finishing the metro (no matter what is discovered in the process). We show, however, that the inefficient choice is made in voting over immediate actions precisely when there is no Condorcet winner in voting over contingent plans with commitment. Hence, surprisingly, commitment cannot really solve the problem. Our results extend to other common dynamic voting scenarios, such as the academic job market, which share the essential features of the Roman metro game. JEL classification: D70, H41, C70. 1
and
, 2007
"... We dene and explore the notion of a Dynamic Condorcet Winner (DCW), which extends the notion of a Condorcet winner to dynamic settings. We show that, for every DCW, every member of a large class of dynamic majoritarian games has an equivalent equilibrium, and that other equilibria are not similarly ..."
Abstract
 Add to MetaCart
We dene and explore the notion of a Dynamic Condorcet Winner (DCW), which extends the notion of a Condorcet winner to dynamic settings. We show that, for every DCW, every member of a large class of dynamic majoritarian games has an equivalent equilibrium, and that other equilibria are not similarly portable across this class of games. Existence of DCWs is guaranteed when members of the community are su!ciently patient. We characterize sustainable and unsustainable outcomes, study the e"ects of changes in the discount factor, investigate e!ciency properties, and explore the potential for achieving renegotiationproof outcomes. We apply this solution concept to a standard onedimensional choice problem wherein agents have singlepeaked preferences, as well as to one involving the division of a xed aggregate payo".!We would like to thank Avinash Dixit, Roger Myerson, Antonio Rangel, members of the Public Economics Group at Stanford University, participants at various seminar presentations, and several anonymous referees for helpful comments. This paper was prepared in part while Bernheim was
and
, 2007
"... We define and explore the notion of a Dynamic Condorcet Winner (DCW), which extends the notion of a Condorcet winner to dynamic settings. We show that, for every DCW, every member of a large class of dynamic majoritarian games has an equivalent equilibrium, and that other equilibria are not similarl ..."
Abstract
 Add to MetaCart
We define and explore the notion of a Dynamic Condorcet Winner (DCW), which extends the notion of a Condorcet winner to dynamic settings. We show that, for every DCW, every member of a large class of dynamic majoritarian games has an equivalent equilibrium, and that other equilibria are not similarly portable across this class of games. Existence of DCWs is guaranteed when members of the community are sufficiently patient. We characterize sustainable and unsustainable outcomes, study the effects of changes in the discount factor, investigate efficiency properties, and explore the potential for achieving renegotiationproof outcomes. We apply this solution concept to a standard onedimensional choice problem wherein agents have singlepeaked preferences, as well as to one involving the division of a fixed aggregate payoff. ∗We would like to thank Avinash Dixit, Roger Myerson, Antonio Rangel, members of the Public Economics Group at Stanford University, participants at various seminar presentations, and several anonymous referees for helpful comments. This paper was prepared in part while Bernheim was
Can Commitment Resolve Political Inertia?∗
, 2014
"... Dynamic collective decision making often entails inefficient policy choices and political inertia. This paper investigates whether longterm commitment can resolve this problem, and provides a mostly negative answer: Whenever a longterm commitment is preferred, by a majority of voters, to the majo ..."
Abstract
 Add to MetaCart
Dynamic collective decision making often entails inefficient policy choices and political inertia. This paper investigates whether longterm commitment can resolve this problem, and provides a mostly negative answer: Whenever a longterm commitment is preferred, by a majority of voters, to the majority choices in a dynamic voting equilibrium without commitment, a Condorcet cycle over all relevant longterm policies arises. Thus, allowing for longterm commitment turns any inefficiency problem into one of indeterminacy. The result applies even when different decisions require different voting rules or, more generally, different winning coalitions, under a power consistency condition which links the static problem of committing to a longterm policy to the dynamic problem of shortterm choices. Violations of power consistency occur whenever initial decision makers are not perfect representatives of future decision makers. Thus, commitment has the power to improve outcomes only if there is time inconsistency through changing rules or preferences. Various examples illustrate the theorem, from the inadequate provision of a public good and the avoidance of socially beneficial reforms to the stability of unpopular dictatorships and the failure to hire the best job