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Multiunit Bayesian Auction with Demand or Budget Constraints
"... Abstract. In this work, we study multiple item auctions in a setting where items are distinguished by their relative values; any pair of items have the same ratio of values to all buyers. Buyers have additive valuations for multiple items. The application we have in mind is that items are positions ..."
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Abstract. In this work, we study multiple item auctions in a setting where items are distinguished by their relative values; any pair of items have the same ratio of values to all buyers. Buyers have additive valuations for multiple items. The application we have in mind is that items are positions in an ad auction, and an item’s value corresponds to its clickthrough rate. Buyers have various perclick valuations, which is their private information. We consider a Bayesian model for the values of buyers on the positions. We develop the optimal (maximum revenue) auction for a relaxed demand model (where each buyer i wants at most di items) and a sharp demand model (where buyer i wants exactly di items). We also find a 1/2 approximation for the case when the buyers are budget constrained. 1
Pricing Ad Slots with Consecutive Multiunit Demand
 6th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT
, 2013
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Approximating the Revenue Maximization Problem with Sharp Demands
"... Abstract. We consider the revenue maximization problem with sharp multidemand, in which m indivisible items have to be sold to n potential buyers. Each buyer i is interested in getting exactly di items, and each item j gives a benefit vij to buyer i. We distinguish between unrelated and related val ..."
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Abstract. We consider the revenue maximization problem with sharp multidemand, in which m indivisible items have to be sold to n potential buyers. Each buyer i is interested in getting exactly di items, and each item j gives a benefit vij to buyer i. We distinguish between unrelated and related valuations. In the former case, the benefit vij is completely arbitrary, while, in the latter, each item j has a quality qj, each buyer i has a value vi and the benefit vij is defined as the product viqj. The problem asks to determine a price for each item and an allocation of bundles of items to buyers with the aim of maximizing the total revenue, that is, the sum of the prices of all the sold items. The allocation must be envyfree, that is, each buyer must be happy with her assigned bundle and cannot improve her utility. We first prove that, for related valuations, the problem cannot be approximated to a factor O(m 1−ɛ), for any ɛ> 0, unless P = NP and that such result is asymptotically tight. In fact we provide a simple mapproximation algorithm even for unrelated valuations. We then focus on an interesting subclass of ”proper ” instances, that do not contain buyers a priori known not being able to receive any item. For such instances, we design an interesting 2approximation algorithm and show that no (2 − ɛ)approximation is possible for any 0 < ɛ ≤ 1, unless P = NP. We observe that it is possible to efficiently check if an instance is proper, and if discarding useless buyers is allowed, an instance can be made proper in polynomial time, without worsening the value of its optimal solution. 1