A fruitful direction for future data mining research will be the development of techniques that incorporate privacy concerns. Specifically, we address the following question. Since the primary task in data mining is the development of models about aggregated data, can we develop accurate models without access to precise information in individual data records? We consider the concrete case of building a decision-tree classifier from tredning data in which the values of individual records have been perturbed. The resulting data records look very different from the original records and the distribution of data values is also very different from the original distribution. While it is not possible to accurately estimate original values in individual data records, we propose a-novel reconstruction procedure to accurately estimate the distribution of original data values. By using these reconstructed distributions, we are able to build classifiers whose accuracy is comparable to the accuracy of classifiers built with the original data.

Database management systems will continue to manage large data volumes. Thus, efficient algorithms for accessing and manipulating large sets and sequences will be required to provide acceptable performance. The advent of object-oriented and extensible database systems will not solve this problem. On the contrary, modern data models exacerbate it: In order to manipulate large sets of complex objects as efficiently as today’s database systems manipulate simple records, query processing algorithms and software will become more complex, and a solid understanding of algorithm and architectural issues is essential for the designer of database management software. This survey provides a foundation for the design and implementation of query execution facilities in new database management systems. It describes a wide array of practical query evaluation techniques for both relational and post-relational database systems, including iterative execution of complex query evaluation plans, the duality of sort- and hash-based set matching algorithms, types of parallel query execution and their implementation, and special operators for emerging database application domains.

Publishing data about individuals without revealing sensitive information about them is an important problem. In recent years, a new definition of privacy called k-anonymity has gained popularity. In a k-anonymized dataset, each record is indistinguishable from at least k − 1 other records with respect to certain “identifying ” attributes. In this paper we show using two simple attacks that a k-anonymized dataset has some subtle, but severe privacy problems. First, an attacker can discover the values of sensitive attributes when there is little diversity in those sensitive attributes. This kind of attack is a known problem [60]. Second, attackers often have background knowledge, and we show that k-anonymity does not guarantee privacy against attackers using background knowledge. We give a detailed analysis of these two attacks and we propose a novel and powerful privacy criterion called ℓ-diversity that can defend against such attacks. In addition to building a formal foundation for ℓ-diversity, we show in an experimental evaluation that ℓ-diversity is practical and can be implemented efficiently.

Abstract. We continue a line of research initiated in [10, 11] on privacypreserving statistical databases. Consider a trusted server that holds a database of sensitive information. Given a query function f mapping databases to reals, the so-called true answer is the result of applying f to the database. To protect privacy, the true answer is perturbed by the addition of random noise generated according to a carefully chosen distribution, and this response, the true answer plus noise, is returned to the user. Previous work focused on the case of noisy sums, in which f =P i g(xi), where xi denotes the ith row of the database and g maps data-base rows to [0, 1]. We extend the study to general functions f, proving that privacy can be preserved by calibrating the standard deviation of the noise according to the sensitivity of the function f. Roughly speaking, this is the amount that any single argument to f can change its output. The new analysis shows that for several particular applications substantially less noise is needed than was previously understood to be the case. The first step is a very clean characterization of privacy in terms of indistinguishability of transcripts. Additionally, we obtain separation results showing the increased value of interactive sanitization mechanisms over non-interactive. 1 Introduction We continue a line of research initiated in [10, 11] on privacy in statistical data-bases. A statistic is a quantity computed from a sample. Intuitively, if the database is a representative sample of an underlying population, the goal ofa privacy-preserving statistical database is to enable the user to learn properties of the population as a whole while protecting the privacy of the individualcontributors.

Abstract not found

We describe schemes that enable a user to access k replicated copies of a database ( k * 2) and privately retrieve informationstored in the database. This means that each individual database gets no information on the identity of the item retrieved by the user. For a single database, achieving this type of privacy requires communicating the whole database, or n bits (where n is the number of bits in the database). Our schemes use the replication to gain substantial saving. In particular, we have ffl A two database scheme with communication complexity of O(n1=3).ffl

Today’s globally networked society places great demand on the dissemination and sharing of information. While in the past released information was mostly in tabular and statistical form, many situations call today for the release of specific data (microdata). In order to protect the anonymity of the entities (called respondents) to which information refers, data holders often remove or encrypt explicit identifiers such as names, addresses, and phone numbers. De-identifying data, however, provides no guarantee of anonymity. Released information often contains other data, such as race, birth date, sex, and ZIP code, that can be linked to publicly available information to re-identify respondents and inferring information that was not intended for disclosure. In this paper we address the problem of releasing microdata while safeguarding the anonymity of the respondents to which the data refer. The approach is based on the definition of k-anonymity. A table provides k-anonymity if attempts to link explicitly identifying information to its content map the information to at least k entities. We illustrate how k-anonymity can be provided without compromising the integrity (or truthfulness) of the information released by using generalization and suppression techniques. We introduce the concept of minimal generalization that captures the property of the release process not to distort the data more than needed to achieve k-anonymity, and present an algorithm for the computation of such a generalization. We also discuss possible preference policies to choose among different minimal generalizations. Index terms:

We present a framework for mining association rules from transactions consisting of categorical items where the data has been randomized to preserve privacy of individual transactions. While it is feasible to recover association rules and preserve privacy using a straightforward "uniform" randomization, the discovered rules can unfortunately be exploited to find privacy breaches. We analyze the nature of privacy breaches and propose a class of randomization operators that are much more effective than uniform randomization in limiting the breaches. We derive formulae for an unbiased support estimator and its variance, which allow us to recover itemset supports from randomized datasets, and show how to incorporate these formulae into mining algorithms. Finally, we present experimental results that validate the algorithm by applying it on real datasets.

Today's globally networked society places great demand on the dissemination and sharing of person-specific data. Situations where aggregate statistical information was once the reporting norm now rely heavily on the transfer of microscopically detailed transaction and encounter information. This happens at a time when more and more historically public information is also electronically available. When these data are linked together, they provide an electronic shadow of a person or organization that is as identifying and personal as a fingerprint, even when the sources of the information contains no explicit identifiers, such as name and phone number. In order to protect the anonymity of individuals to whom released data refer, data holders often remove or encrypt explicit identifiers such as names, addresses and phone numbers. However, other distinctive data, which we term quasi-identifiers, often combine uniquely and can be linked to publicly available information to re-identify indiv...

Abstract not found