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15
The Strategic Positioning of Store Brands in Retailer–Manufacturer Negotiations
"... Abstract. Store brands are the only brands for which the retailer is responsible not only for promotion, shelf placement, and pricing, but also for positioning the brand in product space. We argue that retailers strongly value control over store brand positioning because they will be unable to sourc ..."
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Abstract. Store brands are the only brands for which the retailer is responsible not only for promotion, shelf placement, and pricing, but also for positioning the brand in product space. We argue that retailers strongly value control over store brand positioning because they will be unable to source a national brand with their desired product positioning. This is because retailers have an incentive to position store brands as close substitutes to leading national brands – a location in product space which other national brand manufacturers would not find profitable. We present empirical evidence that is consistent with the results of our model.
New Product Development Under Channel Acceptance
- INFORMS 163 Sudhir,
, 2007
"... I n channel structures characterized by a powerful retailer (e.g., Wal-Mart, Home Depot), the dominant retailer's acceptance of a manufacturer's new product often determines the success of the new offering. Focusing on a manufacturer in such a market, we develop an approach to positioning ..."
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I n channel structures characterized by a powerful retailer (e.g., Wal-Mart, Home Depot), the dominant retailer's acceptance of a manufacturer's new product often determines the success of the new offering. Focusing on a manufacturer in such a market, we develop an approach to positioning and pricing a new product that directly incorporates the retailer's acceptance criteria into the development process. Our method also accounts for the retailer's product assortment and the competing manufacturers' potential reactions in wholesale prices. Our method merges individual-level conjoint models of preference with game-theoretic models of retailer and manufacturer behavior that are specific to the institutional setting of the focal manufacturer. The application of our approach in the context of a new power tool development project undertaken by this manufacturer also highlights the potential of our approach to other analogous institutional settings.
The Role of Within-Brand and Cross-Brand Communications in Competitive Growth
, 2008
"... reviewers, and the participants of the seminar at Erasmus University, NYU, MIT, and Washington University in St. Louis for a number of helpful comments and suggestions. This ..."
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reviewers, and the participants of the seminar at Erasmus University, NYU, MIT, and Washington University in St. Louis for a number of helpful comments and suggestions. This
Online Keyword Based Advertising: Impact of Ad Impressions on Own‐ Channel and Cross‐Channel Click‐ Through Rates
"... Abstract: Keyword-based ads are becoming the dominant form of advertising online as they enable customization and tailoring of messages relevant to potential consumers. Two prominent channels within this sphere are the search network and the content network. We empirically examine the interaction be ..."
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Abstract: Keyword-based ads are becoming the dominant form of advertising online as they enable customization and tailoring of messages relevant to potential consumers. Two prominent channels within this sphere are the search network and the content network. We empirically examine the interaction between these two channels. Our results indicate significant cannibalization across the two channels, as well as significant diminishing returns to impressions within each channel. This suggests that under certain conditions, both channels may need to be used to optimize returns to advertising, both for advertisers and service providers such as Google. Our game theoretic analysis reveals that for intermediate budget values, it is optimal to use both channels, whereas for very low (very high) budget values, it is optimal to use only the content (search) channel. Further, as budget increases, the advertiser should offer more for ads displayed on the search network to optimally incentivize the service provider.
The Diffusion of Electronic Business in the United States
"... The authors provide a recent account of the diffusion of electronic business in the U.S. economy using new data from the U.S. Bureau of the Census. They document the extent of the diffusion in three main sectors of the economy: retail, services, and manufacturing. For manufacturing, they also analyz ..."
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The authors provide a recent account of the diffusion of electronic business in the U.S. economy using new data from the U.S. Bureau of the Census. They document the extent of the diffusion in three main sectors of the economy: retail, services, and manufacturing. For manufacturing, they also analyze plants ’ patterns of adoption of several Internet-based processes and conclude with a look at the future of the Internet’s diffusion and a prospect for further data collection by the U.S. Census Bureau. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, January/February 2005, 87(1), pp. 11-34. The commercial use of the Internet has been diffusing rapidly among consumers and businesses in the United States. As the dust of the shakeout in Internet-based industries settled, both firms and consumers started to increase their understanding of what the Internet is capable of and which Internet businesses are likely to be viable. Partly
Advertising competition and industry channel structure ∗
, 2010
"... The introduction of independent retailers has long been recognized as a buffer that alleviates the price competition between channels. In this paper, we argue that this effect may be counter-balanced if the manufacturers compete along dimensions that differ from prices (such as advertising). We find ..."
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The introduction of independent retailers has long been recognized as a buffer that alleviates the price competition between channels. In this paper, we argue that this effect may be counter-balanced if the manufacturers compete along dimensions that differ from prices (such as advertising). We find that delegating to retailers may intensify other non-price competition between the manufacturers and therefore make the manufacturers worse off. Our analysis shows that the “retailer buffer ” may be a two-edged sword and thus suggests that channel structure may critically depend on the specific dimensions along which the manufacturers compete with each other.
RETAIL-259; No. of Pages 17
, 2008
"... Abstract This paper models multiple service providers who use an intermediary to sell an opaque product. An opaque product is a product whose identity is concealed from consumers until after purchase. I find that an opaque good may allow finer segmentation of a service provider's customer base ..."
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Abstract This paper models multiple service providers who use an intermediary to sell an opaque product. An opaque product is a product whose identity is concealed from consumers until after purchase. I find that an opaque good may allow finer segmentation of a service provider's customer base, lead to market expansion, and/or reduce price rivalry. However, if there is little brand-loyalty in an industry, an opaque good increases the degree of price rivalry and reduces total industry profit. The paper also discusses issues regarding channel structure and outlines managerial implications of this research.
Photo courtesy of The Gateway Arch, St. Louis, MO. www.gatewayarch.comThe Diffusion of Electronic Business in the U.S. ∗
, 2004
"... The views expressed are those of the individual authors and do not necessarily reflect official positions of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, the Federal Reserve System, or the Board of Governors. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Working Papers are preliminary materials circulated to stimulat ..."
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The views expressed are those of the individual authors and do not necessarily reflect official positions of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, the Federal Reserve System, or the Board of Governors. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Working Papers are preliminary materials circulated to stimulate discussion and critical comment. References in publications to Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Working Papers (other than an acknowledgment that the writer has had access to unpublished material) should be cleared with the author or authors.
Comparative Advertising and Retailer Participation
, 2002
"... Studies find that about 20-30 % of all advertising is comparative in nature. Many of the comparisons are on products sold with the help of retailers. For a retailer, a manufacturer’s comparative ad campaign is a double-edged sword: an increase in its sales of the favored manufacturer’s product is of ..."
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Studies find that about 20-30 % of all advertising is comparative in nature. Many of the comparisons are on products sold with the help of retailers. For a retailer, a manufacturer’s comparative ad campaign is a double-edged sword: an increase in its sales of the favored manufacturer’s product is often accompanied by a decrease in its sales of the product of comparison. In this paper, we consider when a retailer will gain from, and when it will lose from, a manufacturer’s comparative ad campaign. Since the success of the manufacturer’s campaign will often depend on enlisting the support of its retailers, we also consider a retailer’s participation decision (will the retailer inform consumers of the manufacturer’s campaign at the point-of-sale). We find that (1) a retailer may want to participate in the manufacturer’s campaign even if the campaign makes it worse off, (2) the group of consumers to whom the comparative ads are targeted is crucial in determining whether a retailer gains or loses, (3) the same comparative ad campaign can affect a retailer’s profit and participation decision differently depending on the market share of the manufacturer
Profit-enhancing know-how disclosure: A strategic view∗
, 2008
"... In general, the disclosure of know-how and technological knowledge could harm the disclosing firm. Firms, however, often share their know-how freely and yet enhance their profits. We provide a theoretical framework and a new insight into know-how disclosure. We consider a multiproduct oligopolistic ..."
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In general, the disclosure of know-how and technological knowledge could harm the disclosing firm. Firms, however, often share their know-how freely and yet enhance their profits. We provide a theoretical framework and a new insight into know-how disclosure. We consider a multiproduct oligopolistic market in which an incumbent firm that can disclose its cost-reducing know-how and several new entrants exist. Each firm supplies products in two separate markets. The incumbent firm has already allocated its production resources to one market (market A) and discloses its know-how concerning production in market A. We show that the disclosure of know-how for cost reduction can enhance the profit of the incumbent (the disclosing) firm. Using the disclosed know-how, the entrants can produce for a low cost in market A and allocate their production resources to the other market. As a result, competition in market A is less severe than that in the case in which the incumbent does not disclose its know-how. We also provide several extensions of the basic scenario.
