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238
Environmental and technology policies for climate mitigation, RFF Discussion Paper 04-05 (revised), Resources for the Future,
, 2007
"... Abstract We assess different policies for reducing carbon dioxide emissions and promoting innovation and diffusion of renewable energy. We evaluate the relative performance of policies according to incentives provided for emissions reduction, efficiency, and other outcomes. We also assess how the n ..."
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Cited by 145 (15 self)
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Abstract We assess different policies for reducing carbon dioxide emissions and promoting innovation and diffusion of renewable energy. We evaluate the relative performance of policies according to incentives provided for emissions reduction, efficiency, and other outcomes. We also assess how the nature of technological progress through learning and research and development (R&D), and the degree of knowledge spillovers, affects the desirability of different policies. Due to knowledge spillovers, optimal policy involves a portfolio of different instruments targeted at emissions, learning, and R&D. Although the relative cost of individual policies in achieving reductions depends on parameter values and the emissions target, in a numerical application to the U.S. electricity sector, the ranking is roughly as follows: (1) emissions price, (2) emissions performance standard, (3) fossil power tax, (4) renewables share requirement, (5) renewables subsidy, and (6) R&D subsidy. Nonetheless, an optimal portfolio of policies achieves emissions reductions at a significantly lower cost than any single policy.
Instrument choice for environmental protection when technological innovation is endogenous
- Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
, 2003
"... No portion of this paper may be reproduced without permission of the authors. Discussion papers are research materials circulated by their authors for purposes of information and discussion. They have not undergone formal peer review or the editorial treatment accorded RFF books and other publicatio ..."
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Cited by 112 (13 self)
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No portion of this paper may be reproduced without permission of the authors. Discussion papers are research materials circulated by their authors for purposes of information and discussion. They have not undergone formal peer review or the editorial treatment accorded RFF books and other publications. ii
Environmental controls, scarcity rents, and pre-existing distortions
, 1997
"... The debate in the literature about the Double Dividend Hypothesis has focused on whether an environmental policy raises revenue that can be used to cut other distorting taxes. In this paper, we show that this focus is misplaced. We derive welfare results for alternative policies in a series of analy ..."
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Cited by 96 (26 self)
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The debate in the literature about the Double Dividend Hypothesis has focused on whether an environmental policy raises revenue that can be used to cut other distorting taxes. In this paper, we show that this focus is misplaced. We derive welfare results for alternative policies in a series of analytical general equilibrium models with clean and dirty goods that might be produced using emissions as well as other resources, in the presence of other pre-existing distortions such as labor taxes or even monopoly pricing. We show that revenue-raising and non-revenue-raising policies can achieve equivalent welfare-raising effects of environmental protection without exacerbating the labor distortion. These favorable effects can be achieved by taxes that raise revenue, certain command and control regulations that raise no revenue, and even subsidies that cost revenue. Instead, the exacerbation of the pre-existing labor tax distortion is associated with policies that generate privately-retained scarcity rents. These rents raise costs of production, raise equilibrium output prices, and thus reduce the real net wage. Such policies include both quantity-restricting command and control policies and certain marketable permit policies.
2001): The effect of allowance allocation on the cost of carbon emission trading, Discussion paper 01-30, Resources for the Future
"... portion of this paper may be reproduced without permission of the authors. Discussion papers are research materials circulated by their authors for purposes of information and discussion. They have not necessarily undergone formal peer review or editorial treatment. ..."
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Cited by 70 (17 self)
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portion of this paper may be reproduced without permission of the authors. Discussion papers are research materials circulated by their authors for purposes of information and discussion. They have not necessarily undergone formal peer review or editorial treatment.
The General Equilibrium Incidence of Environmental Taxes,” Working
, 2004
"... is preliminary, and not for quotation, but comments are welcome. We are grateful for ..."
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Cited by 57 (17 self)
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is preliminary, and not for quotation, but comments are welcome. We are grateful for
Efficiency Costs of Meeting Industry-Distributional Constraints under Environmental Permits and Taxes
, 2003
"... mous referees, and seminar participants at the NBER Summer Institute Workshop on Public Policy and the Environment for helpful comments. We also thank Mark Jacob-sen for excellent research assistance and the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation and National Science Foundation (grant SES-0112102) for ..."
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Cited by 47 (4 self)
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mous referees, and seminar participants at the NBER Summer Institute Workshop on Public Policy and the Environment for helpful comments. We also thank Mark Jacob-sen for excellent research assistance and the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation and National Science Foundation (grant SES-0112102) for financial support. Many pollution-related industries wield strong political power and can thus effec-tively block policies that would harm their profits. A politically realistic approach to environmental policy seems to require the avoidance of significant profit-losses in these industries. Using analytically and numerically solved equilibrium models, we examine the added efficiency costs of avoiding profit-losses in key pollution-related industries, beyond the costs that would apply under simpler emissions permits or tax policies that do not insulate profits. We find that the relative increase in efficiency cost (compared to the cost in the case where profits are not protected) is highly sensitive to the extent of pollution abatement, ranging from above 100 percent when the required pollution abatement is modest to below 10 percent when the abatement requirement is extensive. Expanded opportunities for end-of-pipe treatment of pollution reduce the absolute ef-ficiency costs of abatement policies, but have little impact on the relative increase in efficiency costs attributable to the constraint on profits. 11
Policy analysis in the presence of distorting taxes
- Journal of Policy Analysis and Management
, 2000
"... prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtai ..."
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Cited by 44 (8 self)
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prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at
The Incidence of US Climate Policy: Alternative Uses of Revenues from a Cap-and-Trade Auction
- National Tax Jounal
, 2009
"... Federal climate policy in the U.S. is now under serious discussion with several bills introduced in Congress in the past two years. Cap and trade appears to be the policy instrument of choice and discussions now center on several key design features, not the least of which is the allocation of carbo ..."
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Cited by 43 (10 self)
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Federal climate policy in the U.S. is now under serious discussion with several bills introduced in Congress in the past two years. Cap and trade appears to be the policy instrument of choice and discussions now center on several key design features, not the least of which is the allocation of carbon allowances. Whether allowances will be fully auctioned by the government
Pollution regulation and the efficiency gains from technological innovation
- Journal of Regulatory Economics
, 1998
"... No portion of this paper may be reproduced without permission of the author. Discussion papers are research materials circulated by their authors for purposes of information and discussion. They have not undergone formal peer review or the editorial treatment accorded RFF books and other publication ..."
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Cited by 42 (4 self)
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No portion of this paper may be reproduced without permission of the author. Discussion papers are research materials circulated by their authors for purposes of information and discussion. They have not undergone formal peer review or the editorial treatment accorded RFF books and other publications. ii
Instrument Choice in Environmental Policy
, 2008
"... We examine the extent to which various environmental policy instruments meet major evaluation criteria, including cost-effectiveness, distributional equity, minimization of risk in the presence of uncertainty, and political feasibility. Instruments considered include emissions taxes, tradable emissi ..."
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Cited by 37 (2 self)
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We examine the extent to which various environmental policy instruments meet major evaluation criteria, including cost-effectiveness, distributional equity, minimization of risk in the presence of uncertainty, and political feasibility. Instruments considered include emissions taxes, tradable emissions allowances, subsidies for emissions reductions, performance standards, technology mandates, and research and development subsidies. Several themes emerge. First, no single instrument is clearly superior along all the criteria. Second, significant trade-offs arise in the choice of instrument; for example, assuring a reasonable degree of distributional equity often will require a sacrifice of cost-effectiveness. Third, it is possible and sometimes desirable to design hybrid instruments that combine features of various instruments in their “pure ” form. Fourth, for many pollution problems, more than one market failure may be involved, which may justify (on efficiency grounds, at least) employing more than one instrument. Finally, potential overlaps and undesirable interactions among environmental policy instruments are sometimes a matter of concern.
