(e-mail: karp @ are.berkeley.edu)

• from the RePEc website: www.RePEc.org • from the CESifo website: Twww.CESifo-group.org/wpT CESifo Working Paper No. 3233 Taxes versus Cap-and-Trade in Climate Policy when only some Fuel Importers Abate I study climate policy choices for a “policy bloc ” of fuel-importers, when a “fringe ” of other fuel importers have no climate policy, fuel exporters consume no fossil fuels, and importers produce no such fuels. The policy bloc and exporter blocs act strategically in fossil fuel markets. When the policy bloc sets a carbon tax, the fuel import price set by the exporter is reduced, and more so when the policy bloc is larger. The carbon tax then serves to extract the exporter’s rent. The fringe also gains from reduced fuel import prices, and gains more when the policy bloc is larger. When the policy bloc sets an emissions cap, fuel demand becomes less price elastic. In response, a monopolistic exporter sets the fuel export price higher than under a tax, which hurts both the policy bloc and the fringe. This effect can be stronger when the policy bloc is larger, so that the fringe loses when the policy bloc is larger, opposite to the tax policy case. Overall, a cap is inferior to a tax for fossil fuel importers, both those that implement a climate policy, and those that do not.

Learning and taking action are generally treated as separate choices in adaptive management and decision-making under uncertainty. When management actions produce information, this dichotomous choice is no longer optimal the value of information and immediate returns should be considered simultaneously. Profiling of trade partners for invasive species risk is an example of such an endogenous learning problem, highlighting the central tradeoff between exploitation and exploration. Selective examination of imports for invasive species provides both for immediate interceptions of infested shipments and data to reduce uncertainty over risks, improving future targeting decisions. We develop a Bayesian learning model of infestation risk and use advances in multi-armed bandit methodology to balance the objectives of exploitation and exploration. A solution approach, using approximate dynamic programming to decompose the large problem, is given a new interpretation, which takes advantage of intuition from aggregation of individual demand in microeconomic theory. Our integrated approach endogenizes learning to the targeting decision exploration is constantly considered but only pursued when explicitly worth the opportunity cost of forgoing greater immediate payoffs. A demonstration of the multi-armed bandit model provides insight into when the riskiest shipment should not be the highest inspection priority. Expected gains in performance from the approach are analyzed using U.S. customs data on inspections and interceptions of invasive pests.

This paper discusses short-run and long-run effects of “green stimulus ” efforts, and compares these effects with “non-green ” fiscal stimuli. Green stimulus is defined here as short-run fiscal stimuli that also serve a “green ” or environmental purpose in a situation of “crisis ” characterized by temporary under-employment. A number of recently enacted national stimulus packages contain sizeable “green ” components. The authors categorize effects according to their a) shortrun employment effects, b) long-run growth effects, c) effects on carbon emissions, and d) “co-benefit ” effects (on the environment, natural resources, and for other externalities). The most beneficial “green ” programs in times of crisis are those that can stimulate employment

Die ZBW räumt Ihnen als Nutzerin/Nutzer das unentgeltliche, räumlich unbeschränkte und zeitlich auf die Dauer des Schutzrechts beschränkte einfache Recht ein, das ausgewählte Werk im Rahmen der unter