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Strategy-Proofness and Arrow’s Conditions: Existence and Correspondence Theorems for Voting Procedures and Social Welfare Functions

by Mark Allen Satterthwaite - J. Econ. Theory , 1975
"... Consider a committee which must select one alternative from a set of three or more alternatives. Committee members each cast a ballot which the voting procedure counts. The voting procedure is strategy-proof if it always induces every committee member to cast a ballot revealing his preference. I pro ..."
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Consider a committee which must select one alternative from a set of three or more alternatives. Committee members each cast a ballot which the voting procedure counts. The voting procedure is strategy-proof if it always induces every committee member to cast a ballot revealing his preference. I

Voting procedures with incomplete preferences

by Kathrin Konczak - in Proc. IJCAI-05 Multidisciplinary Workshop on Advances in Preference Handling , 2005
"... We extend the application of a voting procedure (usually defined on complete preference relations over candidates) when the voters ’ preferences consist of partial orders. We define possible (resp. necessary) winners for a given partial preference profile R with respect to a given voting procedure a ..."
Abstract - Cited by 95 (11 self) - Add to MetaCart
We extend the application of a voting procedure (usually defined on complete preference relations over candidates) when the voters ’ preferences consist of partial orders. We define possible (resp. necessary) winners for a given partial preference profile R with respect to a given voting procedure

Strategic Candidacy and Voting Procedures

by Bhaskar Dutta, Matthew O. Jackson, Michel Le Breton - ECONOMETRICA , 2000
"... We study the impact of considering the incentives of candidates to strategically affect the outcome of a voting procedure. First we show that every non-dictatorial voting procedure that satisfies unanimity, is open to strategic entry or exit by candidates: there necessarily exists some candidate ..."
Abstract - Cited by 26 (3 self) - Add to MetaCart
We study the impact of considering the incentives of candidates to strategically affect the outcome of a voting procedure. First we show that every non-dictatorial voting procedure that satisfies unanimity, is open to strategic entry or exit by candidates: there necessarily exists some

Automatic Analysis of Voting Procedures

by Nadya Peek, Supervised Ulle Endriss, Philip Larkin
"... Since the majority of me Rejects the majority of you, Debating ends forwith, and we Divide. And sure of what to do We disinfect new blocks of days For our majorities to rent With unshared friends and unwalked ways. But silence is eloquent: A silence of minorities That, unopposed at last, return Each ..."
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Each night with cancelled promises There are many different ways to elect a winner from a group of candidates. The best known method is the plurality rule, for which each voter selects one candidate to vote for and the candidate receiving the most votes wins. Some

Strategic Candidacy for Multivalued Voting Procedures

by Hülya Eraslan, Andrew McLennan , 2002
"... Dutta, Jackson, and LeBreton (2001) (DJLeB) initiate the study of the stability of voting procedures with respect to the possibility that a candidate may obtain a preferred outcome by withdrawing from the election. We generalize their framework in two ways: (a) we consider the possibility that the o ..."
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Dutta, Jackson, and LeBreton (2001) (DJLeB) initiate the study of the stability of voting procedures with respect to the possibility that a candidate may obtain a preferred outcome by withdrawing from the election. We generalize their framework in two ways: (a) we consider the possibility

ON RELATIVE UNIMPORTANCE OF VOTING WEIGHTS: OBSERVATIONS ON AGENDA-BASED VOTING PROCEDURES**

by unknown authors
"... International workshop "Distribution of power and voting procedures in the European Union" ..."
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International workshop "Distribution of power and voting procedures in the European Union"

Voting Experiments: Measuring Vulnerability of Voting Procedures to Manipulation

by unknown authors , 2011
"... Abstract A minimal reduction in strategic voter’s knowledge about other voters ’ voting pat-terns severely limits her ability to strategically manipulate the voting outcome. In this paper I relax the implicit assumption made in the Gibbard-Satterthwaite’s impossibility theorem about strategic voter‘ ..."
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‘s complete information about all other voters ’ preference profiles. Via a series of computation-based simulations I find that vulnerability to strategic voting is decreasing in the number of voters and increasing in the number of alternatives. Least vulnerable voting pro-cedures are Condorcet

Parliamentary Voting Procedures: Agenda Control, Manipulation, and Uncertainty

by Robert Bredereck, Jiehua Chen, Rolf Niedermeier, Toby Walsh
"... We study computational problems for two popular parliamentary voting procedures: the amendment procedure and the successive procedure. While finding successful manipulations or agenda controls is tractable for both procedures, our real-world experimental results indicate that most elections cannot b ..."
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We study computational problems for two popular parliamentary voting procedures: the amendment procedure and the successive procedure. While finding successful manipulations or agenda controls is tractable for both procedures, our real-world experimental results indicate that most elections cannot

Voting Procedure on Stopping Games of Markov Chain

by Krzysztof Szajowski, Masami Yasuda , 1996
"... . The paper deals with a p person, non-cooperative game related to the observation of a Markov chain. The players observe the process up to a random moment defined by a monotonic logical function based on an individual players' decision. The concept of Nash equilibrium is used. The solution of ..."
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of the game for finite and infinite horizon problems is derived. A simple example is presented. Key words. stopping game, non-cooperative game, Markov chain, voting procedure, majority rule 1 Introduction This paper deals with a p person stopping game related to the observation of a Markov chain. Let (Xn

Tamper Detection in Image using Voting Procedure Algorithm

by Ms Swaleha Chougale, Mrs Anis Mulla, Mr. S, Eep Sutar
"... Abstract- In today’s world seeing is no longer believing- the technology that allows for digital visual data to be manipulated is developing at great speed. The quick advance in image editing techniques has enabled people to synthesize realistic images conveniently. Some legal issues may arise when ..."
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a tampered image cannot be distinguished from original one by visual examination. In this paper Scale Invariant Feature Transform algorithm is used to extract interest points of an image. Voting procedure algorithm is used to determine transformation with respect to X-axis and Y-axis. Final results
Results 1 - 10 of 980