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469,951
The inductive approach to verifying cryptographic protocols
 Journal of Computer Security
, 1998
"... Informal arguments that cryptographic protocols are secure can be made rigorous using inductive definitions. The approach is based on ordinary predicate calculus and copes with infinitestate systems. Proofs are generated using Isabelle/HOL. The human effort required to analyze a protocol can be as ..."
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Cited by 476 (29 self)
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Informal arguments that cryptographic protocols are secure can be made rigorous using inductive definitions. The approach is based on ordinary predicate calculus and copes with infinitestate systems. Proofs are generated using Isabelle/HOL. The human effort required to analyze a protocol can
The Coinductive Approach to Verifying Cryptographic Protocols
, 2002
"... We look at a new way of specifying and verifying cryptographic protocols using the Coalgebraic Class Speci cation Language. ..."
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Cited by 1 (0 self)
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We look at a new way of specifying and verifying cryptographic protocols using the Coalgebraic Class Speci cation Language.
Verifying Cryptographic Protocols for Electronic Commerce
 2nd USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce
, 1996
"... This paper describes the Convince toolset for detecting common errors in cryptographic protocols, protocols of the sort used in electronic commerce. We describe using Convince to analyze confidentiality, authentication, and key distribution in a recently developed protocol proposed for incorporation ..."
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Cited by 5 (0 self)
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This paper describes the Convince toolset for detecting common errors in cryptographic protocols, protocols of the sort used in electronic commerce. We describe using Convince to analyze confidentiality, authentication, and key distribution in a recently developed protocol proposed
Verifying Cryptographic Protocols with Subterms Constraints
"... Abstract. Many analysis techniques and decidability results have been obtained for cryptographic protocols. However all of them consider protocols with limited procedures for the processing of messages by agents or intruders: Information expected in a protocol message has to be located at a fixed po ..."
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Abstract. Many analysis techniques and decidability results have been obtained for cryptographic protocols. However all of them consider protocols with limited procedures for the processing of messages by agents or intruders: Information expected in a protocol message has to be located at a fixed
Computing Symbolic Models for Verifying Cryptographic Protocols
 In Proc. of the 14th Computer Security Foundation Workshop (CSFW14
, 2001
"... We consider the problem of automatically verifying infinitestate cryptographic protocols. Specifically, we present an algorithm that given a finite process describing a protocol in a hostile environment (trying to force the system into a "bad" state) computes a model of traces on which se ..."
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Cited by 70 (0 self)
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We consider the problem of automatically verifying infinitestate cryptographic protocols. Specifically, we present an algorithm that given a finite process describing a protocol in a hostile environment (trying to force the system into a "bad" state) computes a model of traces on which
Formal Testing & Algebraic Modelling Techniques for Verifying Cryptographic Protocols
"... Abstract: Before trusting a communications security protocol with potentially critical or sensitive information, it is necessary to have some degree of assurance that the protocol fulfils its intended objectives. To provide this assurance it is necessary to use formal verification techniques, as int ..."
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, as intuitive reasoning does not satisfactorily guarantee complete freedom from protocol errors. In this paper, a number of recently published formal techniques for verifying cryptographic protocols, are described. The techniques are categorised as being based on algebraic modelling, or based on some form
Using Temporal Logic to Specify and Verify Cryptographic Protocols (Progress Report)
 In Proceedings of the 8th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop
, 1995
"... We use standard lineartime temporal logic to specify cryptographic protocols, model the system penetrator, and specify correctness requirements. The requirements are specified as standard safety properties, for which standard proof techniques apply. In particular, we are able to prove that the syst ..."
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Cited by 29 (0 self)
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We use standard lineartime temporal logic to specify cryptographic protocols, model the system penetrator, and specify correctness requirements. The requirements are specified as standard safety properties, for which standard proof techniques apply. In particular, we are able to prove
Using Temporal Logic to Specify and Verify Cryptographic Protocols (Progress Report)
 In Proceedings of the 8th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop
, 1995
"... We use standard lineartime temporal logic to specify cryptographic protocols, model the system penetrator, and specify correctness requirements. The requirements are specified as standard safety properties, for which standard proof techniques apply. In particular, we are able to prove that the syst ..."
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We use standard lineartime temporal logic to specify cryptographic protocols, model the system penetrator, and specify correctness requirements. The requirements are specified as standard safety properties, for which standard proof techniques apply. In particular, we are able to prove
Flat and OneVariable Clauses: Complexity of Verifying Cryptographic Protocols with Single Blind Copying
"... Cryptographic protocols with single blind copying were defined and modeled by Comon and Cortier using the new class C of first order clauses, which extends the Skolem class. They showed its satisfiability problem to be in 3DEXPTIME. We improve this result by showing that satisfiability for this c ..."
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Cited by 8 (0 self)
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Cryptographic protocols with single blind copying were defined and modeled by Comon and Cortier using the new class C of first order clauses, which extends the Skolem class. They showed its satisfiability problem to be in 3DEXPTIME. We improve this result by showing that satisfiability
A Resolution Strategy for Verifying Cryptographic Protocols with CBC Encryption and Blind Signatures ∗ ABSTRACT
"... Formal methods have proved to be very useful for analyzing cryptographic protocols. However, most existing techniques apply to the case of abstract encryption schemes and pairing. In this paper, we consider more complex, less studied cryptographic primitives like CBC encryption and blind signatures. ..."
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Cited by 5 (2 self)
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Formal methods have proved to be very useful for analyzing cryptographic protocols. However, most existing techniques apply to the case of abstract encryption schemes and pairing. In this paper, we consider more complex, less studied cryptographic primitives like CBC encryption and blind signatures
Results 1  10
of
469,951