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Characterization of ex post equilibrium in the vcg combinatorial auctions
 Games and Economic Behavior
"... We prove that when the number of (potential) buyers is at least three, every ex post equilibrium in the VickreyClarkeGroves combinatorial auction mechanisms is a bundling equilibrium and is symmetric. This complements a theorem proved in Holzman, KfirDahav, Monderer, and Tennenholtz [6], accor ..."
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Cited by 11 (0 self)
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We prove that when the number of (potential) buyers is at least three, every ex post equilibrium in the VickreyClarkeGroves combinatorial auction mechanisms is a bundling equilibrium and is symmetric. This complements a theorem proved in Holzman, KfirDahav, Monderer, and Tennenholtz [6
Simplified Bidding and Solution Methodology for Truckload Procurement and Other VCG Combinatorial
, 2007
"... In theory, combinatorial auctions can provide significant benefits in many realworld applications, such as truckload procurement. In practice, however, the use of such auctions has been greatly limited by the need for bidders to bid on an exponential number of bundles and for the auctioneer to solv ..."
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to solve an exponentially large winnerdetermination problem. We address these challenges for VCG combinatorial procurement auctions in which a bidder’s cost for each bundle is determined by a cost function with an amenable structure. For example, the cost to a trucking company of servicing a bundle
Connected Price Dynamics with Revealed Preferences and Auctioneer’s Discretion in VCG Combinatorial Auction
, 2010
"... Discussion Papers are a series of manuscripts in their draft form. They are not intended for circulation or distribution except as indicated by the author. For that reason Discussion Papers may not be reproduced or distributed without the written consent of the author. CIRJEF960 ..."
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Discussion Papers are a series of manuscripts in their draft form. They are not intended for circulation or distribution except as indicated by the author. For that reason Discussion Papers may not be reproduced or distributed without the written consent of the author. CIRJEF960
Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms
 In Proceedings of the Second ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC’00
, 2000
"... A major achievement of mechanism design theory is a general method for the construction of truthful mechanisms called VCG. When applying this method to complex problems such as combinatorial auctions, a difficulty arises: VCG mechanisms are required to compute optimal outcomes and are therefore comp ..."
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Cited by 221 (6 self)
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A major achievement of mechanism design theory is a general method for the construction of truthful mechanisms called VCG. When applying this method to complex problems such as combinatorial auctions, a difficulty arises: VCG mechanisms are required to compute optimal outcomes and are therefore
Inapproximability for vcgbased combinatorial auctions
"... The existence of incentivecompatible, computationallyefficient mechanisms for combinatorial auctions with good approximation ratios is the paradigmatic problem in algorithmic mechanism design. It is believed that, in many cases, good approximations for combinatorial auctions may be unattainable due ..."
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Cited by 24 (8 self)
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due to an inherent clash between truthfulness and computational efficiency. In this paper, we prove the first computationalcomplexity inapproximability results for incentivecompatible mechanisms for combinatorial auctions. Our results are tight, hold for the important class of VCGbased mechanisms
Combinatorial Auctions: VC v. VCG
"... The existence of incentivecompatible, computationallyefficient protocols for combinatorial auctions with decent approximation ratios is one of the most central and well studied open questions in mechanism design. The only universal technique known for the design of truthful mechanisms is the celeb ..."
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is the celebrated VickreyClarkeGroves (VCG) scheme, which is “maximal in range”, i.e., it always exactly optimizes over a subset of the possible outcomes. We present a firstofitskind technique for proving computationalcomplexity inapproximability results for maximalinrange mechanism for combinatorial
2 Combinatorial Auctions and the VCG Mechanism
"... Recall that the VA is concerned with auctioning off a single good. Combinatorial auctions are motivated by the following natural question. Question 2.1 What if there is a set S of m>1 goods to be auctioned off to n players? How can we extend the VA to this more general setting? A natural idea is ..."
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Recall that the VA is concerned with auctioning off a single good. Combinatorial auctions are motivated by the following natural question. Question 2.1 What if there is a set S of m>1 goods to be auctioned off to n players? How can we extend the VA to this more general setting? A natural idea
Bidding and Allocation in Combinatorial Auctions
 In ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
, 2000
"... When an auction of multiple items is performed, it is often desirable to allow bids on combinations of items, as opposed to only on single items. Such an auction is often called "combinatorial ", and the exponential number of possible combinations results in computational intractability ..."
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Cited by 277 (11 self)
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When an auction of multiple items is performed, it is often desirable to allow bids on combinations of items, as opposed to only on single items. Such an auction is often called "combinatorial ", and the exponential number of possible combinations results in computational intractability
Partialrevelation VCG mechanism for combinatorial auctions
 In Proceddings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI
"... Winner determination in combinatorial auctions has received significant interest in the AI community in the last 3 years. Another difficult problem in combinatorial auctions is that of eliciting the bidders ’ preferences. We introduce a progressive, partialrevelation mechanism that determines an ef ..."
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Cited by 50 (21 self)
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Winner determination in combinatorial auctions has received significant interest in the AI community in the last 3 years. Another difficult problem in combinatorial auctions is that of eliciting the bidders ’ preferences. We introduce a progressive, partialrevelation mechanism that determines
Results 1  10
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