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VickreyClarkeGroves (VCG) Auctions
, 2015
"... A VCG auction (named after their inventors Vickrey, Clarke, and Groves) is a generalization of the singlegood, second price Vickrey auction to the case of a combinatorial auction (multiple goods, from which any participant can bid on each possible combination). We formalize in this entry VCG aucti ..."
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A VCG auction (named after their inventors Vickrey, Clarke, and Groves) is a generalization of the singlegood, second price Vickrey auction to the case of a combinatorial auction (multiple goods, from which any participant can bid on each possible combination). We formalize in this entry VCG
VCG Auctions with Reserve Prices: Lazy or Eager
 EC'13
, 2013
"... VCG auctions with reserve prices are practical simple auctions with provably approximately optimal revenue, and have been crucial in the analysis of other appealing auctions. When different reserve prices are applied to different bidders, the auctioneer may choose to apply the reserves either before ..."
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VCG auctions with reserve prices are practical simple auctions with provably approximately optimal revenue, and have been crucial in the analysis of other appealing auctions. When different reserve prices are applied to different bidders, the auctioneer may choose to apply the reserves either
VCG AUCTION MECHANISM COST EXPECTATIONS AND VARIANCES
, 2013
"... We consider Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) auctions for a very general combinatorial structure, in an averagecase setting where item costs are independent, identically distributed uniform random variables. We prove that the expected VCG cost is at least double the expected nominal cost, and exactl ..."
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We consider Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) auctions for a very general combinatorial structure, in an averagecase setting where item costs are independent, identically distributed uniform random variables. We prove that the expected VCG cost is at least double the expected nominal cost
Firstpassage percolation on a width2 strip and the path cost in a vcg auction
 In Internet and Network Economics, Second International Workshop, WINE 2006
"... ABSTRACT. We study the time constant for firstpassage percolation, and the VickeryClarkeGroves (VCG) payment for the shortest path, on a width2 strip with random edge costs. These statistics attempt to describe two seemingly unrelated phenomena, arising in physics and economics respectively: the ..."
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Cited by 8 (1 self)
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ABSTRACT. We study the time constant for firstpassage percolation, and the VickeryClarkeGroves (VCG) payment for the shortest path, on a width2 strip with random edge costs. These statistics attempt to describe two seemingly unrelated phenomena, arising in physics and economics respectively
Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords
 AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
, 2007
"... We investigate the “generalized secondprice” (GSP) auction, a new mechanism used by search engines to sell online advertising. Although GSP looks similar to the VickreyClarkeGroves (VCG) mechanism, its properties are very different. Unlike the VCG mechanism, GSP generally does not have an equilib ..."
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Cited by 547 (20 self)
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We investigate the “generalized secondprice” (GSP) auction, a new mechanism used by search engines to sell online advertising. Although GSP looks similar to the VickreyClarkeGroves (VCG) mechanism, its properties are very different. Unlike the VCG mechanism, GSP generally does not have
Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms
 In Proceedings of the Second ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC’00
, 2000
"... A major achievement of mechanism design theory is a general method for the construction of truthful mechanisms called VCG. When applying this method to complex problems such as combinatorial auctions, a difficulty arises: VCG mechanisms are required to compute optimal outcomes and are therefore comp ..."
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Cited by 221 (6 self)
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A major achievement of mechanism design theory is a general method for the construction of truthful mechanisms called VCG. When applying this method to complex problems such as combinatorial auctions, a difficulty arises: VCG mechanisms are required to compute optimal outcomes and are therefore
Bidding to the top: VCG and equilibria of positionbased auctions
 In Proc. Workshop on Approximation and Online Algorithms (WAOA
, 2006
"... Many popular search engines run an auction to determine the placement of advertisements next to search results. Current auctions at Google and Yahoo! let advertisers specify a single amount as their bid in the auction. This bid is interpreted as the maximum amount the advertiser is willing to pay pe ..."
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Cited by 24 (5 self)
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an envyfree [4] or symmetric [8] Nash equilibrium with the same outcome in allocation and pricing as the wellknown truthful VickreyClarkeGroves (VCG) auction. Furthermore, we show that this equilibrium is the best such equilibrium for the advertisers in terms of the profit made by each advertiser. We
Inapproximability for vcgbased combinatorial auctions
"... The existence of incentivecompatible, computationallyefficient mechanisms for combinatorial auctions with good approximation ratios is the paradigmatic problem in algorithmic mechanism design. It is believed that, in many cases, good approximations for combinatorial auctions may be unattainable due ..."
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Cited by 24 (8 self)
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due to an inherent clash between truthfulness and computational efficiency. In this paper, we prove the first computationalcomplexity inapproximability results for incentivecompatible mechanisms for combinatorial auctions. Our results are tight, hold for the important class of VCGbased mechanisms
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